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This thesis addresses three themes relating to climate change. The first is which types of
fossil fuel to leave in the ground when they can differ in both their extraction cost and
emissions rate. The analysis shows that without resource constraints there will always
be use of at least one fossil fuel in the steady-state. With exhaustion constraints, any
fossil fuel that has a lower extraction cost than the marginal cost of the backstop will
be extracted in finite time regardless of the emissions rate. The only environmental con-
sideration is the timing of extraction rather than leaving fossil fuel stock in the ground
forever. The second theme is how altruistic concern of individuals for the well-being of
others influences the socially optimal consumption levels and optimal emissions tax in a
global context. If individuals have altruistic concern but believe that their consumption is
negligible, they will not change their behaviour. However, non-cooperative governments
maximising domestic welfare will internalise some of the damage inflicted on other coun-
tries depending on the level of altruistic concern individuals have and the cooperative
optimum also changes as altruism leads individuals to effectively experience damage in
other countries as well as the direct damage to them. Still, for behaviour to change,
individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. The third chapter develops
a new theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals balance the cost of not acting in
their own self-interest against the hypothetical moral value of adopting a Kantian form of
behaviour, asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did.
If individuals behave this way, then altruism matters and it may induce individuals to
cut back their consumption. But nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly
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The Climate Change Challenge
Climate change is one of the most complex problems facing our civilisation today. As
Brunner et al. (2012) describe it, the climate change challenge is characterised by ”deep
uncertainties, many interdependencies and complex social dynamics” (p. 260). One of the
central aspects of the climate change problem is that is it is both a global intra-temporal
externality and an inter-temporal externality.1 In addition, the activities leading to cli-
mate change (mostly the production of energy) are central to modern economic life.
Energy production is not a sector that can be replaced by some other activity and so
governments have to find ways that reduce emissions but don’t impact economic activity
and the competitiveness of the economy too greatly.
The fact that climate change is a global intra-temporal externality presents a problem
because there is no global government. If all countries were relatively similar in terms of
the ratio of how much they cause the externality and how much they suffer from it, this
would be less of a problem. But there are large asymmetries between countries. Some
countries contribute a lot to the externality but are unlikely to suffer significantly from
it, while other countries contribute virtually nothing to the externality but can expect to
suffer a lot. This means there are very varied incentives and abilities of different countries
to cut back on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It is a widely held view that in order to
control the GHG emissions externality, binding international agreements are necessary.
However, developing such agreements has proved very difficult in the past. Countries
face not just uncertainty over costs and benefits of such agreements but also uncertainty
about whether other parties will keep their side of the promise.2
The second problem is that climate change is an inter-temporal externality. Since it is
1IPCC (2014) provides an excellent overview of the inter- and intra-generational issues associated
with the climate change challenge.
2The global aspect of the climate change challenge will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 2.
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the cumulative stock of GHG emissions that creates the damage, any harm suffered today
is the consequence of action taken in the past and similarly action taken today will only
lead to harm at some point in the future, potentially only affecting people generations
away. Therefore, those people who will suffer the most from today’s emissions have no
role in current policy making. This naturally leads to the question of how policy actions
(such as emission taxes) should vary over time. The use of the appropriate discount rates
has been a long-standing issue in the economic analysis of the impact of climate change
and the cost associated with mitigation (for example Nordhaus (2007), Stern (2008),
Dasgupta (2008), Smith (2010), IPCC (2014)) This also relates to the debate about the
trade-off between inter-generational welfare and intra-generational welfare.
Another issue is one of uncertainty and learning. We may not fully understand the po-
tential damage caused by GHG emissions at the moment but we we will learn more about
it as time passes. The question is therefore whether we should act now or delay some
potentially tough action until we know more. In addition, there is a big issue of com-
mitment in climate change policy. Current government are not able to credibly tie the
hands of future governments. However, this leads to major uncertainty over future policy
which is a particularly significant problem since actions to reduce GHG emissions require
large-scale lump-sum investments that will only yield return over long time horizons.3
Thesis Outline
This thesis addresses three themes relating to the greenhouse gas emissions externality
leading to climate change. These are optimal fossil fuel extraction, global environmental
taxes and moral behaviour.
Chapter 1 analyses which types of fossil fuel to leave in the ground under optimal emis-
sions taxation. It builds on the previous literature on optimal resource extraction with
an emissions externality, developing a model of multiple fossil fuels that can differ in
both their extraction cost and emissions rate. The aim is to demonstrate under which
conditions with positive emissions decay certain fossil fuels may not be extracted at all
or will be extracted regardless of their emissions rate. The analysis shows that without
resource constraints there will always be use of at least one fossil fuel in the steady-state.
With exhaustion constraints on all fossil fuels any fossil fuel that has a lower extraction
cost than the marginal cost of the backstop will be extracted in finite time regardless of
3See for example Brunner et al. (2012), Ulph and Ulph (2013).
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their emissions rate. The only environmental consideration is the timing of extraction
rather than whether some of the fossil fuel stock should be left in the ground forever.
Chapter 2 then looks at how altruistic concern for the well-being of others influences
the socially optimal consumption level and optimal emissions tax in a global context.
A global externality like the GHG emissions leading to climate change are due to both
free-riding at the individual level as well as the government level. A government aim-
ing to maximise domestic social welfare may make individuals internalise the damage
within their country, but will free-ride on the damage caused to other countries. Only a
global cooperative solution could internalise global damage entirely. If individuals have
altruistic concern for others but continue to believe that their consumption is negligible
relative to the total, they will not change their behaviour. However, this paper shows
that in a multi-country setting the global equilibrium levels of consumption for both the
non-cooperative and cooperative solutions are affected by altruism. The key results are
(a) that non-cooperative governments maximising domestic welfare will internalise some
of the damage inflicted on other countries depending on the level of altruistic concern
individuals have, but (b) the cooperative global optimum also changes as altruism leads
individuals to effectively experience damage in other countries as well as the direct dam-
age to them. Since altruistic concern for others may vary across countries, global welfare
then becomes a function of the relative levels of altruistic concern between countries.
Chapter 3 develops a theory of alternative moral behaviour and how this may affect con-
sumption choices and the optimal emissions tax in a single country context. Free-riding
is often associated with self-interested behaviour. However, if there is a global pollutant,
free-riding will arise if individuals calculate that their emissions are negligible relative to
the total, so total emissions and hence any damage that they and others suffer will be un-
affected by whatever consumption choice they make. In this context consumer behaviour
and the optimal environmental tax are independent of the degree of altruism. For be-
haviour to change, individuals need to make their decisions in a different way. The model
developed in Chapter 3 is based on Daube and Ulph (2016) and proposes a new theory of
moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by not acting
in their own self-interest, and balance this cost off against the hypothetical moral value
of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences of their
action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as they did.
The analysis shows that: (a) if individuals behave this way, then altruism can matter and,
depending on the choice function, the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals
cut back their consumption of a ’dirty’ good; (b) nevertheless the optimal environmental
3
tax is exactly the same as that emerging from classical analysis where individuals act in
self-interested fashion.
The first part of Chapter 3 is based on the published paper (Sections 3.1 to 3.3.3), but
contains a more extensive literature survey which also gives an overview of the literature
on social norms and crowding of intrinsic motivation (Section 3.2.2 and Section 3.2.3).
The second part of Chapter 3 sets out some significant extensions to the basic model
that I have undertaken (Sections 3.3.4 to 3.6). These include: a generalised (non-linear)
choice function; the case of multiple dirty goods; as well as the case of heterogeneous
preferences. Finally, Chapter 3 also develops a model where individuals may exhibit a
desire for conformity in addition to their propensity to act morally (Section 3.7).
This thesis does not contain a concluding chapter. Because the topics analysed in each of
the three chapters are quite different in nature it is not effective to attempt to compare
the results of the individual chapters within the context of this thesis and develop ideas
for future research. Instead each of the three chapters has its own concluding remarks
where the main findings of each chapter are discussed and suggestions for future research
are developed.
To give some background information the remainder of the Introduction will provide a
brief overview of the key concepts in traditional environmental economics and behavioural
economics. While Chapter 1 is based on traditional approaches in the analysis of natural
resource and environmental economics, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are based on concepts
of pro-social behaviour in behavioural economics.
Overview of Environmental Economics
According to Perman et al. (2003), there are three main themes in the analysis of natural
resources and environmental issues. These are efficiency, optimality and sustainability.
Economics concerns itself particularly with allocative efficiency. An efficient allocation
of resources ensures that the net benefit to all of society is maximised and resources are
not wasted on inefficient activities. The concept of social optimality is achieved when a
resource allocation maximises the overall objective of society. Efficient resource allocation
is a necessary condition for optimality but it is possible that an efficient resource alloca-
tion is not socially optimal. The third concept is that of sustainability which means the
use of resources has to take account of posterity. Some economists may argue that social
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optimality would internalise any need for sustainability but as Perman et al. (2003) argue,
optimality as it is pursued by economics does not always take into account posterity to
an adequate degree. The idea of sustainability is usually driven by moralist views which
dictate that sustainability is a moral obligation regardless of economic optimality.
Market failure is a central problem in environmental economics. As Hanley et al. (2013)
describe it, market failure for environmental goods and resources means that ”benefits
and costs cannot be allocated with precision across and within nations and generations”
(p. 15). This usually arises because property rights over environmental resources are not
well defined or cannot be transferred. Market failure in environmental issues generally
occurs due to the public good problem as well as externalities, open-access property, and
hidden information.4 GHG emissions leading to climate change is a classic example of a
negative externality problem as the emitters do not carry all the costs of the pollution.
The approach to dealing with such market failures can vary widely. In some instances
regulation is used (a command-and-control approach) where a regulator conducts a cost-
benefit analysis of the environmental problem and enforce these regulations through fines.
Other approaches aim to correct market failure through market-based instruments such
as taxes or tradable permits. A tax is the standard method to correct for a negative
externality in economic theory, generally known as a Pigovian tax.5 This tax increases
the private marginal cost of the activity that creates the externality to the level of of the
social marginal cost. If the tax is set to the correct level, this reduces the level of activity
to the socially optimal level. However, because it is very difficult to measure the social
cost of a negative externality such as pollution, setting the level of tax is subject to a
lot of uncertainty. Another approach to dealing with an externality are tradable emis-
sions permits (as used in the EU-ETS). These cap the total amount of emissions within
the system, but the price of each unit of emissions is determined through a market for
permits. In theory this guarantees an efficient allocation of emissions within the system
given the constraint on total emissions. One downside of this approach is, however, that a
central regulator still has to determine the cap on total emissions, which is a non-market
intervention and can therefore lead to an inefficient or sub-optimal results. Due to the
difficulties with valuation, measurement and implementation when it comes to standard
economic instruments, interest in the field of behavioural economics has increased signifi-
cantly in recent years as a way to find methods and policies that could potentially enable
4Hanley et al. (2013)
5This concept was first developed by Pigou (1932).
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us to deal with environmental problems without only relying on extrinsic incentives.
Environmental policy is also often subject to strong ideological views. As Frey (1999)
summarises, there are two main approaches to thinking about environmental issues. On
one hand, there is the moralist view which is mostly a normative stance on the environ-
ment. The moralist views nature with unique value and believes that humans should
protect the environment for ethical reasons and because they have the capability to so.
This means that a country should reduce GHG emissions even if no other country does
so and if it is not in the best economic interest of the country to do so. In addition, those
who do not have the same moral views must be forced to protect the environment never-
theless, with little or no regard to any trade-offs. On the other hand is the rationalist or
utilitarian viewpoint which is more in line with the approach of neoclassical economics
already described. Over time there has been more and more recognition by both the
moralist and rationalist camps that an appreciation and understanding of both extrinsic
and intrinsic motivation is needed in order to design effective environmental policy. It
is therefore important to understand how behavioural economics can complement the
traditional way of thinking about externalities.
Overview of Behavioural Economics
The field of behavioural economics has become increasingly popular as it aims to explain
observations that deviate from predictions of traditional economic theory and further-
more intends to extend the classic framework of economic theory to account for the
observed behavioural failures. The field of behavioural economics started to make sig-
nificant advances when psychologists such as Kahneman and Tversky began comparing
their cognitive models of decision making to economic models in the 1960s.6
There are four key themes in behavioural economics. These are used in a range of issues
relating to energy and environmental policy (see for example Cabinet Office Behavioural
Insights Team (2011), Pollitt and Shaorshadze (2011), IPCC (2014) for an overview of
the various policy issues). First, Prospect Theory implies the importance of reference
points in assessing welfare changes and is used to explain observed phenomena such as
loss aversion (individuals value losses more than gains), the endowment effect (individuals
place additional value on goods they already own), and the status-quo bias (individuals
6For overviews of behavioural economics see for example Tirole (2002), Camerer et al. (2004), Sobel
(2005), Bernheim and Rangel (2007)
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tend to stay with default options chosen for them).7 The second theme is the principle
of time-varying discount rates. While neoclassical economics assumes that individuals
maximise their utility with exponential discounting, a number of studies have provided
evidence that hyperbolic discounting - higher discount rates for short time periods and
lower discount rates for longer time horizons - is more applicable in practice.8 Third is
the notion of bounded rationality. This refers to the idea that individuals have cognitive
constraints that render their decision making ability sub-optimal compared to the homo
economicus assumed by neoclassical theory. Observed phenomena that are explained by
bounded rationality include choice overload (individuals have difficulty making a choice
when there are too many options), heuristics (shortcuts to decision making), and the
failure to assess statistical probabilities (individuals often base their decisions on ’vivid
and salient information’ rather than actual probabilities).9
The final key theme in behavioural economics is prosocial behaviour (see for example
Kahneman et al. (1986) for an early contribution in this area). Prosocial behaviour is the
key theme of Chapter 3 and various aspects of it will be discussed in more detail in that
chapter. Behind this concept is the observation that individuals appear to often not just
maximise their consumption and monetary payoff, but act in specifically prosocial ways.
The provision of public goods through voluntary contributions is a particularly important
concept in the area of behavioural-environmental economics as it explores whether pub-
lic goods (such as clean air) can be provided through an individual’s sense of prosocial
behaviour rather than through a centralised mechanism. This is also important in the
area of climate change where it is very difficult to establish the extrinsic incentives to
internalise the GHG emissions externality due to its global nature. In addition, as will be
discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, there is some evidence to suggest that the existence
of extrinsic incentives can crowd out or crowd in the intrinsic motivation for prosocial
behaviour individuals may have.
7Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Thaler (1980), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988) Shogren and
Taylor (2008), among others.
8For example Thaler (1981), Benzion et al. (1989), Holcomb and Nelson (1992), Laibson (1997),
Camerer et al. (2004).





An Analysis of Which Types of
Fossil Fuel to Leave in the Ground
1.1 Introduction
The Paris Agreement negotiated at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change conference
is regarded as one of the most important steps in global efforts against climate change.
It was agreed by 195 countries and represents a framework for the reduction in carbon
dioxide emissions and a global transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy. However,
the agreement leaves room for use of fossil fuels in the long term as long as corresponding
emissions are in line with natural absorption rates or balanced by carbon capture and
storage technologies.1 This raises the question if it is optimal to leave some fossil fuels in
the ground forever, and if so under which conditions, or if we should extract it all. The
topic is of course not a new one, and has already received a lot of attention in natural
resource economics. Analysis of optimal use of non-renewable resources dates back to
Hotelling (1931). The Hotelling rule states that the marginal net rent - the market price
net of marginal extraction cost - of an exhaustible resource has to grow at the same rate
as the interest rate which is assumed to be exogenous and constant. This is a result of the
arbitrage condition which dictates that that the return from not extracting a unit of the
resource has to equal the return of extracting it. Based on Hotelling’s insights, a major
step in exhaustible resource economics was the development of the Dasgupta-Heal-Solow-
Stiglitz (DHSS) model, which is a result of the three seminal articles Dasgupta and Heal
(1974), Solow (1974) and Stiglitz (1974). The DHSS model describes an economy with
1https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf
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two assets, man-made capital and a non-renewable resource stock.2
Although at the time not related to the climate change issue, D’Arge and Kogiku (1973)
made the case for combining the analysis of the exhaustible resources problem with the
pollution problem and famously asked the question: ”which should we run out first, air
to breathe, or fossil fuels to pollute the air we breathe?” (p. 68). Early contributions in
this includes Schulze (1974) who develops a finite horizon model to determine optimal
extraction with a stock externality and looks at cases of degrading resource quality, re-
cycling of the resource and the impact of technological change on resource prices in the
long-run. Hoel (1978) models optimal extractions paths under a variety of conditions
with a stock externality effect where ”harmful residuals” (p. 222) from resource extrac-
tion cause damage. In addition, the individual can consume both the resource and a
recycled version of the resource which contributes less to the emissions stock. While his
analysis doesn’t explicitly look at the optimal path of a tax to internalise the externality,
the model setup is very similar to the later models used to determine the optimal carbon
tax path and also used in this chapter. Forster (1980) uses a finite horizon approach to
develop a stock externality model of optimal resource use which includes the possibility
of ”antipollution activities” (p. 326) that in turn require use of the resource. He finds
that such activities will not be used and while initial consumption of the resource should
be reduced, it then should increase over time.
Analysis of the classic exhaustible resource problem had established that a constant tax
on a costless exhaustible resource will not change the depletion of the resource (e.g. Das-
gupta and Heal 1979). This in turn would imply that a constant tax, regardless of the
level, would have no effect on the emissions stock. This suggests that the time-path of
the tax rather than the level is the central aspect to reducing the amounts of the resource
extracted and the corresponding emissions. As the understanding of the impact of carbon
dioxide emissions generated from burning fossil fuels improved (see for example Nordhaus
1994), this was reflected in the literature on optimal resource extraction and a focus on
the optimal time path of a carbon tax developed. A fundamental model combining the
exhaustible resource problem with the negative emissions externality was developed by
Sinclair (1992) and argued that since the question for resource owners is mainly about the
timing of extraction rather than the total amount to be extracted, the aim of an emissions
tax has to be to delay some extraction to the future. His analysis of an optimal carbon
tax suggested that the tax should be falling over time. While expectation of a falling
2Benchekroun and Withagen (2011) provide a closed form solution to the DHSS model which char-
acterises a path of all variables in the model from all possible inital values.
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carbon tax would incentivise producer to delay extraction, a rising carbon tax would
achieve the opposite. Another early model in this area is Withagen (1994) who compares
the optimal time at which to exhaust a resource with and without a stock emissions
externality. Following this, Ulph and Ulph (1994) developed a model that uses a convex
damage function to reflect the idea that the marginal damage increases as the stock of
emissions in the atmosphere increases. Assuming linear-quadratic functional forms they
find that the emissions tax should increase as the emissions stock increases and later
decrease again as the rising scarcity rent increases the price of the resource. At the same
time extraction rates decline and the emissions stock falls to natural levels. Hoel and
Kverndokk (1996) build on this analysis by modelling extraction costs that increase as
the stock of the remaining resource declines. This approach models ”economic exhaustion
(zero long-term Hotelling rent)” (p.116) rather than physical exhaustion of the resource
which is in line with the approach used by Heal (1976). The authors also model the effect
of a backstop technology, a perfect substitute to the fossil fuel resource that is available
at constant marginal costs, infinite supply and causes no emissions externality. The main
finding is that these factors do not influence the total amount of fossil fuel extraction,
but will shift some of the resource extraction to a distant time period where the emissions
stock is declining. Tahvonen (1997) develops these two models further and shows that for
a model without extraction costs and without a backstop, the optimal emissions tax (and
the time path of the emissions stock) follows an inverted U-shape form without having
to assume any specific functional form for utility and damage. He then also analyses the
case of a backstop technology and extraction costs that increase with resource depletion.
This shows that due to the assumptions that a certain proportion of the emissions stock
is decaying naturally, a sustained period of simultaneous consumption of both the fossil
fuel and the backstop can occur.
All of the analysis mentioned above looks at the first-best solution where the emissions
externality is internalised optimally through the Pigovian tax. However, among others,
Sinn (2008) argued that it is not politically feasible to implement such a carbon tax, espe-
cially on a global scale. His analysis therefore focusses on ways to replicate the first-best
outcome in the absence of the required carbon tax. This argument also puts the focus
on the green paradox. This principle says that a rising carbon tax or subsidies for green
technologies may actually increase current use of fossil fuels (and increase emissions) as
resource owners anticipate the fall in demand over time. This could potentially lead to a
lower level of overall welfare than if no tax or subsidy had been imposed.3 Gerlagh (2011)
3Of course this is only possible if the instrument used is not the first-best Pigovian tax since this is
by definition the social welfare maximising optimum.
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defines two types of the green paradox. A ’weak’ green paradox arises if the prospect
of a cheaper clean backstop leads to an increase in current emissions. This, however,
could still be welfare improving if future emissions decrease sufficiently. The ’strong’
green paradox on the other hand implies that the cheaper backstop leads to an increase
in cumulative damage of the emissions, evaluated at the NPV. As such it reduces total
welfare. Gerlagh (2011) analyses a variety of cases of different resource and backstop cost
structures, as well as an imperfect backstop. Based on this van der Ploeg and Withagen
(2012a) also make an evaluation of the green paradox under different circumstances but
first develop the first-best optimum as counterfactual. In that they use a similar setup
to Tahvonen (1997) but assume no decay of the emissions stock. This leads to the result
that it is never optimal to simultaneously use the fossil fuel resource and the backstop,
and the optimal emissions tax will never decrease. They find that if the initial level of the
emissions stock is low, there will be use of the fossil fuel resource only to start with but
as the tax increases, there will eventually be a switch to the backstop where it will stay
forever. Their approach also models extraction costs that are a function of the remaining
fossil fuel stock.
The literature discussed so far generally models one exhaustible resource and, in some
cases, a backstop technology. However, based on the Hotelling rule Herfindahl (1967)
developed a partial equilibrium model of multiple resources which differ only in their
marginal extraction cost. This resulted in the least cost first principle which states that
extraction has to occur in order of cost, starting with the cheapest one. This has also
been shown by Solow and Wan (1976). Since this analysis assumed that the resources
were identical in everything but extraction cost, the literature has since made an effort
to evaluate if the least cost first principle still holds under a variety conditions. For
example, Kemp and Long (1980) show that the principle may not hold in a general equi-
librium setting with Ricardian techniques of extraction, and if the marginal extraction
cost is constant for each deposit of the resource in terms of a perfect substitute for the
resource. Following this, Lewis (1982) shows that even in that framework the least cost
first principle holds as long as the resource can be converted into capital and that ”a
sufficient condition for the strict sequencing of extraction to be optimal is that stored
capital be productive so that it can be used to produce additional capital” (p. 1081).
While these models characterise the difference between resources through extraction cost,
Chakravorty and Krulce (1994) analyse the case where resources have quality differences
which are characterised through heterogeneous demand for the resources. Specifically
their model assumes that two resources are of the same quality for the generation of
electricity, but differ in quality for the use in transport. They show that this would lead
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to simultaneous extraction of both resources for some period. Further work on the va-
lidity of the least cost first principle includes the case where the extraction capacity is
constrained (Amigues et al. 1998; Holland 2003) and the existence of setup costs (Gaudet
et al. 2001). Furthermore, assuming no decay of emissions, van der Ploeg and Withagen
(2012b) develop a model of two fossil fuels where the dirtier one, coal, acts as a backstop.
Using simulations they show that with that setup it is optimal to use more of the cleaner
fossil fuel (oil in their model) and less coal. They develop the optimal carbon tax path to
achieve this order where initially only oil is used, then both oil and coal are used simulta-
neously and finally only coal is used. They then add a clean renewable backstop to show
that this impacts on transition times as well the optimal carbon tax. Chakravorty et al.
(2008) use a model of two fossil fuels that have the same extraction costs but different
emissions rates to show that the Herfindahl rule does not necessarily have to apply in
their setup.
There are three main rationales for arguing that fossil fuels should be left in the ground.
First, there are environmental concerns which predict that increasing carbon dioxide lev-
els in the atmosphere could at some point lead to catastrophic damage. Second, there
is the reasoning that the presence of a backstop technology will make fossil fuels redun-
dant. And third, increasing extraction costs for fossil fuels may make it uneconomic to
extract certain fossil fuels at some point. Most of the literature on exhaustible resources
alongside a backstop technology models the extraction cost either as constant or as a
function of the remaining resource stock, i.e. the lower the remaining stock the higher
the extraction cost. At the same time, however, the emissions rate remains constant.
The model developed in this chapter is based on previous models but aims to extend the
analysis with regard to extraction costs and emissions rate by modelling multiple fossil
fuels and a backstop technology. While the extraction cost of each of the fossil fuels is
not dependent on the resource stock, the extraction costs as well as the emissions rate
can vary across each fossil fuel. Furthermore, the model assumes that there is positive
decay of emissions. This chapter will first analyse the case where none of the fossil fuels
are exhaustible and then contrast this to the case with exhaustion constraints. The aim
is not to explicitly solve for the optimal extraction path, but to demonstrate under which
conditions with positive emissions decay certain fossil fuels may not be extracted at all
or will be extracted regardless of their emissions rate. The analysis shows that without
the exhaustion constraints the resulting steady-state has to involve a fossil fuel, it can-
not be possible to end up with just the backstop.4 Furthermore, if there are exhaustion
4This is assuming that there is at least one fossil fuel with marginal extraction cost lower than the
marginal cost of the backstop.
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constraint, any fossil fuel with lower extraction costs than the backstop costs will be
exhausted in finite time regardless of the emissions rate.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 develops the basic model setup and
starts the analysis by assuming that fossil fuels can be supplied infinitely and therefore
are not subject to exhaustion constraints. Section 1.3 builds on this and analyses the case
where the fossil fuels are exhaustible. Furthermore, Section 1.3.3 will look at some of the
dynamics in the case of exhaustion constraints and establish conditions for simultaneous
consumption of multiple resources. Finally, Section 1.4 provides a brief discussion and
concluding remarks.
1.2 Non-Exhaustible Fossil Fuels
1.2.1 Model Setup
In this section we develop the basic model setup and analyse the case where none of the
fossil fuels are subject to an exhaustion constraint. Start by assuming that there are
1 ≤ n < ∞ different fossil fuels. The amount of each fossil fuel extracted in period t
is denoted by xit (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and each fuel can be extracted at constant marginal cost
ci.The extraction cost may be the same for multiple fossil fuels but has to be different for
at least some of the fuels. Use of the clean backstop technology is denoted zt and it has
a constant marginal cost γ. The fossil fuels and the backstop are perfect substitutes and





Furthermore we have u(0) = 0; u′(.) > 0 ∀xi, z ≥ 0; u′(.) → 0 as xi, z → ∞; u′′(.) < 0;
and 0 < ci, γ < u
′(0). The stock of emissions in the atmosphere at time t is denoted Mt
with the initial stock of emissions M0 taken as given. The damage caused by the emissions
stock in period t is captured by the damage function D(Mt). This is a strictly increasing
and convex function where we have D(0) = 0, D′(0) = 0 and D′(Mt) > 0, D
′′(Mt) > 0
∀ Mt > 0.5 Since an increasing and convex damage function will approach infinite
marginal damage as the emissions stock increases to very high levels, this representation
is consistent with the idea that carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere may reach a
critical level at some point. Next, consumption of the fossil fuels add to the emissions
stock at a rate of αi > 0 for each unit of the corresponding fossil fuel used.
6 The emissions
5This means that none of the damage is irreversible, and that the marginal damage for a zero
emissions stock is neglibile.
6If any of the fossil fuels had a zero emissions rate then this would of course make it a backstop
technology.
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stock, however, also decays at a rate of δ > 0. While it is allowed that different fossil
fuels may either have the same extraction cost or the same emissions rate as another
fossil fuel, it is assumed that none of the fossil fuels have exactly the same extraction cost
and emissions rate as any other fossil fuel, as this would make those fuels identical for
the purpose of this analysis. Finally, the rate of time preference is given by r > 0. Given
























where the constraint is the equation determining the time-path of the emissions stock.
The emissions stock in period t increases at the rate of the aggregate use of all the fossil
fuels multiplied by their emissions rate (i.e. the total emissions caused by fossil fuel use)
minus the natural decay of the emissions stock.
1.2.2 Model Analysis





















where the parameter σt represents the shadow cost of the emissions stock constraint in









xit + zt) ≤ γ, zt ≥ 0, (1.4)
σ̇t = (r + δ)σt −D′(Mt), (1.5)







t − δMt, (1.6)
lim
t→∞
e−rtσt = 0, (1.7)
where (1.3) and (1.4) hold with complementary slackness and (1.7) is the transversality
condition. To begin the analysis, we see that (1.3) and (1.4) in combination with the
complementary slackness condition ensure efficiency in consumption of the fossil fuels and
the backstop. If consumption of any of the fossil fuels or the backstop is positive, then
for that fuel the marginal benefit of consumption has to be equal to the marginal social
cost. This includes both the marginal extraction cost as well as the effective marginal
shadow cost of emissions σt, adjusted for the emissions rate. Note that we can interpret
σt as the required emissions tax. Since the fossil fuels (and the backstop) are perfect
substitutes it is also straightforward to see that for any two fuels f and g where cf ≤ cg
and αf ≤ αg with one of the two holding with strict inequality, then fuel g will always
be more expensive than fuel f and therefore never be used regardless of the emissions
tax.8 It is of course also easy to see from (1.3) and (1.4) that any fossil fuel with an
extraction cost ci > γ will never be used at all as it is always more expensive compared
to the backstop regardless of the emissions rate and emissions tax.
Next, differential equation (1.5) describes the development optimal emissions tax. It is
straightforward to determine that σ̇t > 0 if σt >
D′(Mt)
r+δ
and vice versa. Furthermore,
taking the second time derivative we also see that σ̈t > 0 if σ̇t > Ṁt
D′′(Mt)
r+δ
. As done in
Hoel and Kverndokk (1996), we can use (1.5) and the transversality condition (1.7) to







dτ ≥ 0. (1.8)
The above shows that the optimal emissions tax is determined by the discounted future
marginal damage caused by the emissions externality. This is of course what we would
intuitively expect and will help us understand the development of the emissions tax in
the analysis. Finally, differential equation (1.6) describes the time path of the emissions
stock in the atmosphere which is simply the constraint from the maximisation problem




Ignoring the backstop for the moment, suppose that with a given emissions tax σt a
particular fossil fuel j is extracted (and none other) and therefore u′(xjt) = cj + αjσt.
Furthermore assume the emissions stock and emissions tax are increasing (Ṁt > 0 and
σ̇t > 0). This increases the marginal cost of fuel j and reduces consumption. As the tax
continues increasing, it may at some point be optimal to switch to another fossil fuel k
where cj ≤ ck but αj ≥ αk. Although fossil fuel j has a lower extraction cost, the impact
of the emissions rate on the total marginal cost through the tax offsets the extraction






As we can see, the parity tax level is given by the difference in the extraction costs
relative to the difference in emissions rates. This also confirms that fuel k has to have
lower emissions rate but higher extraction cost for it to be the next in line with an
increasing emissions tax. If we had cj ≥ ck but αj ≤ αk then fuel k would already have
been more expensive than j at the prevailing tax rate. And similarly we have already
established that if either fuel had both a lower extraction cost and emissions rate it would
always be the preferable fuel at any level of the tax. Note also that from (1.9) we can see
that σ̇kjt = 0, and therefore we cannot have simultaneous consumption of multiple fossil
fuels if the tax is either increasing or decreasing.9
If we order the fossil fuels according to their marginal costs at any time t given the
corresponding emissions tax σt, we can establish the order in which the switching from
one fossil fuel to the next will occur as the tax increases. However, at some point we
will reach a point where rather than switching to the next fossil fuel, the tax will lead
to marginal cost parity with the backstop technology. Suppose that the fuel just before
the backstop is reached is fossil fuel k. Then the tax level that puts fossil fuel k and the





9Note that it is possible that more than two fossil fuels are at parity at any single point in time,
but as the tax continues to increase there will only be one fossil fuel that will be optimal to use as time
continues.
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Of course there is a tax level that puts any of the fossil fuels that have an extraction cost
lower than the cost of the backstop at parity with the backstop, but these are of lesser
importance as for any fuel other than k there will be another fossil fuel that is cheaper
at that tax level. Only fossil fuel k transitions to consumption of the backstop.
So far we have looked at an increasing emissions tax and of course the reverse dynamics
would be true for a decreasing emissions tax. Let us now see if there is a steady-state in
the system and if so, what this looks like. In the steady-state there is no change over time
in the emissions stock (Ṁt = 0), emissions tax (σ̇t = 0), and extraction and consumption












In order to draw this in the σt−Mt space we need to express the extraction levels of the
fossil fuels in (1.12) in terms of the emissions tax σt. The level of extraction is defined by
the inverse of the utility function and therefore we know that, assuming only fossil fuel
j is consumed at time t, we have xjt = f(cj + αjσt) given x
k





f(cj + αjσt) if x
k
t = 0 ∀ k 6= j. (1.13)
This of course applies to any of the n fossil fuels consumed on their own at time t.10
Furthermore, we also know that when γ > 0 and xit = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then we require
Mt = 0 to have Ṁt = 0. Note that, using the above example of fossil fuels j and k where








This means there is a range of consumption levels between those two points which can
10There can of course be consumption of more than one resource in the steady state as is demonstrated
later in this section. The purpose of (1.13) is to develop a component in the full description of the
conditions for a constant emissions stock as shown in (1.15) and illustrated in Figure 1.1.
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involve both fossil fuels simultaneously and is consistent with Ṁt = 0.
We can now describe the level of the emissions stock consistent with no change in the
stock in terms of the emissions tax σt. Although this can be done for all n fuels and the
backstop, for simplicity and illustration purposes we will describe this for the case of two
fossil fuels, j and k, as well as the backstop where cj < ck < γ and αj > αk. Furthermore,
to ensure that both of these fossil fuels are used before the backstop comes into play we







This condition ensures that the relative emissions rates and relative cost differences to
the backstop for the two fossil fuels are such to ensure that, with an increasing emissions
tax, it is fossil fuel k that is used just prior to the backstop coming into play. Given this,
the consumption levels consistent with a constant emissions stock (i.e. Ṁt = 0) for any









) ≤ αjxjt + αkxkt ≤ αjf(
αjck−αkcj
αj−αk
) ∀ σt = ck−cjαj−αk
αkf(ck + αkσt) ∀ ck−cjαj−αk < σt <
γ−ck
αk
0 ≤ αkxkt ≤ f(γ) ∀ σt =
γ−ck
αk
0 ∀ σt > γ−ckαk
.
(1.15)
In Figure 1.1 the red line shows equation (1.11) and the blue line shows equation (1.15).11
Note that the blue line extends down all the way to the x-axis. If we order the fuels in
order of their extraction costs, c1 ≤ c2 ≤ .... ≤ cn, and assume σt = 0, then there will
be some level of the emissions stock consistent with steady-state consumption of the
cheapest fuel, i.e. fuel 1 with cost c1.
Next we see that the black bold line depicts the saddle path for the tax rate that leads
to the steady-state level of the emissions stock M̂ . At this point the tax on emissions
also remains constant forever and therefore σ̂t = σ
kz
t . Fossil fuel k and the backstop are
11For n fossil fuels there is a curved and flat segment for each fuel that has a lower marginal cost than











Figure 1.1: Steady-State Emissions Stock and Tax with Non-Exhaustible Fossil Fuels
consumed simultaneously forever (at constant levels), but there is no consumption of any
other fossil fuel. It is assumed here that the cost of the backstop relative to the cost of the
fossil fuels as well as the damage function are such that (1.11) and (1.15) intersect at a
point somewhere on the horizontal part of the blue line and therefore there is consumption
of the backstop in the steady-state. The further the intersection moves to the right along
the horizontal part the lower the share of the backstop in overall consumption. If the
intersection point were at the very right edge of the horizontal part there would be no
consumption of the backstop.12 And if the intersection were somewhere along the curved
segments, the steady-state would involve only the corresponding fossil fuel at a level that
just offsets the natural decay in each period.13
As depicted in Figure 1.1 let us assume we have a low initial level of the emissions stock,
M0 < M̂ and initial tax level σ0 > 0. Then at time t=0 we start with fossil fuel j
and an increasing tax and emissions stock. At that point we have cj + αjσ0 < γ and
cj +αjσ0 < ci+αiσ0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i 6= j. Furthermore, it also means that regardless of the
extraction cost, any fuel h with an emissions rate higher than fuel j that is not cheaper
than fuel j at t = 0 will never be extracted at all.14 This means that depending on the
12Only if the intersection were all the way at the y-axis (i.e. at M̂ = 0), would the steady-state use
only the backstop. However, given that we have D′(0) = 0, this is not possible.
13It is also noteworty that, as explained earlier and indicated by the second line in (1.15), if the
steady-state tax happens to be equal to a parity tax level between two fossil fuels (e.g. σ̂ = σkjt ), then
the steady-state may involve simultaneous consumption of two fossil fuels forever. There is a range of
emissions stocks consistent with such a steady state (the horizontal segment between the two curves),
consisting of different combinations of the two fossil fuels.
14Also any fuel with both a higher extraction cost and a higher emissions rate relative to another fossil
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initial level of the emissions stock, it is possible that there may be a whole range of the
dirtiest fossil fuels that would never be used at all.
Proposition 1 If there are n ≥ 1 non-exhaustible fossil fuels and the initial tax rate is
below the steady-state level, any fossil fuel h with a higher emissions rate and higher total
marginal cost at the initial tax level compared to another fossil fuel, will never be extracted
at all, i.e. xht = 0 for any αh > αj and ch + αhσ0 > cjαjσ0, 1 ≤ j, h ≤ n ∀ t ∈ (0,∞).
Proof: Suppose that for fossil fuel h at the initial tax level σ0 < σ̂ we have x
h
t > 0
given αh > αj and ch + αhσ0 > cjαjσ0. Then (1.3) and the complementary slackness
condition - which ensure efficiency - imply that ch + αhσo = u
′(.) > cj + αjσo. However,
this is a contradiction as it violates (1.3) for fossil fuel j and therefore we must have
xht = 0 at the initial tax level. Of course the same argument also holds for any σt > σ0.
Since σ0 < σ̂ the tax has to be increasing over time and therefore x
h
t = 0 up to and
including the steady-state.
As the tax increases, the marginal cost of fossil fuel j rises and extraction (and consump-
tion) falls (i.e. ẋjt < 0). This continues until the tax has reached the level that induces
a switch to the next fossil fuel, i.e. the level shown in (1.9). At this point consumption
switches from fossil fuel j to the next one. The tax continues to increase in line with
the emissions stock and there continues to be a fossil fuel switch depending on which has
the lowest marginal cost given the current emissions tax. There could be any number of
fossil fuels in that order before the switch to fossil fuel k occurs, the one that will remain
cheapest until parity with the backstop is reached. Once fossil fuel k is consumed the
tax continues to increase to the backstop parity level given by (1.10). This is of course
the steady-state where it will remain forever and there is no further switch to any other
fossil fuel. This also implies that any fossil fuel with a higher marginal cost at any tax
level lower or equal to the steady-state tax will never be used.
Proposition 2 If there are n ≥ 1 non-exhaustible fossil fuels and a backstop, any fossil
fuel l with a higher total marginal cost than the backstop cost at all tax levels lower or
equal to the steady-state tax level will never be extracted at all, i.e. xlt = 0 if cl +αlσt > γ
for all σt ≤ σ̂, 1 ≤ l ≤ n ∀ t ∈ (0,∞).
Proof: Suppose that for fossil fuel l at any tax level σt ≤ σ̂ we have xlt > 0 given
cl + αlσt > γ. Then (1.3) and the complementary slackness condition would imply that
cl + αlσt = u
′(.) > γ. However, this is a contradiction as it violates (1.4) and therefore
fuel will never be used at all because it always has a higher marginal cost relative to that fuel regardless
of the tax.
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we must have xlt = 0. Of course the same also holds for any σt > σ̂.
Now let us suppose that we started with an initial emissions stock higher than the steady-
state, M0 > M̂ . Then the tax would start at a level σ0 > σ̂ and decrease over time (σ̇t <
0). The high tax would mean that only the backstop is consumed initially (ci +αiσ0 > γ
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n). With only use of the backstop the emissions stock will decreases (Ṁt < 0)
until the steady-state is reached where the backstop and fossil fuel k are consumed forever.
This means that with a high initial emissions stock only one fossil fuel would ever be
extracted. However, this also implies that if there is at least one fuel that has a lower
extraction cost than the backstop cost, the steady-state has to involve a fossil fuel, it
cannot use only the backstop. If there were only consumption of the backstop the tax
and the emissions stock would fall towards zero, and this would again make it optimal to
use some of the fossil fuels.
Proposition 3 If there are n ≥ 1 non-exhaustible fossil fuels as well as a backstop, and
there is at least one fossil fuel with cj < γ, 1 ≤ j ≤ γ, the steady-state consumption and
emissions levels cannot involve only use of the backstop, there has to be consumption of
a fossil fuel.
Proof: Suppose this were not the case and we have zt > 0 and x
i
t = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n while
there is one fossil fuel j with cj < γ. Then we know from (1.6) that Ṁt = −δMt < 0.
The falling emissions stock in turn implies from (1.5) and (1.7) that the tax is falling,
i.e. σ̇ < 0. Of course this is not a steady-state. At the same time, it implies that
γ = u′(.) < ci +αiσt ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. However, as σt decreases and approaches zero, at some




in conjunction with both Ṁt̂ = 0 and σ̇t̂ = 0. Therefore the steady-state has to involve
consumption of a fossil fuel.
Note that it is possible that at the steady-state tax level σ̂ there is not only parity be-
tween fossil fuel k and the backstop but it could happen that this point also has parity
with one or more other fossil fuels, for example fuel k + 1. Then the steady-state would
involve simultaneous consumption of all the fossil fuels that are at parity at that point
as well as the backstop. The analysis has demonstrated that the steady-state will involve
use of at least one fossil fuel that is consumed to some degree forever. This means that
if there are exhaustion constraints on the fossil fuels we know that this has to be binding
on at least one of them.
For simplicity, the analysis in this chapter assumes that the marginal cost of the back-
stop is constant over the entire time horizon. However, in reality one would expect the
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cost of the backstop to change over time, and in particular it would be expected to fall.
Depending on the point in time at which the backstop cost decreases, this could change
the types of fossil fuels that are not extracted at all, or the amount of extraction for those
that are used. Of course eventually there will be a steady state involving the backstop at
the cheaper cost as well as a fossil fuel. Since a lower cost of the backstop would mean
that a lower tax is required to achieve the steady state, it could mean that some of the
fossil fuels with a higher extraction cost but lower emissions rate would not be extracted
at all compared to the case without a decrease in the backstop cost. While the final
steady state would involve a fossil fuel with a higher emissions rate and lower extraction
cost, the steady state emissions stock would be lower because the cumulative fossil fuel
use before the steady state is lower and the emissions stock remains constant once the
steady state is reached.
We have shown a number of results for multiple fossil fuels and a backstop when there
are no exhaustion constraints. We will now explore the implications of finite resource
availability and therefore extend the model to include exhaustion constraints.
1.3 Exhaustible Fossil Fuels
1.3.1 Model Setup
Following on from the results in the previous section, let us now develop the model where
only a finite stock of each fossil fuel is available for extraction. This also means that if
an exhaustion constraint is binding (i.e. the stock is exhausted in finite time), the fuel
will be subject to a scarcity rent (also called Hotelling rent). Formally the exhaustion
constraints state that cumulative extraction over the entire (infinite) time horizon cannot
exceed the initial level of the stock, or
∫∞
0
xitdt ≤ Si0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.15 The initial stock Si0






















t − δMt,∫ ∞
0
xitdt ≤ Si0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(1.16)
15Alternatively this can also be expressed as Ṡit = −xit, which means that the change in the fossil fuel
stock in period t is equal to the flow rate of extraction at time t.
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This means there are n additional constraints, one for each fossil fuel.
1.3.2 Model Analysis






































xit + zt) ≤ γ, zt ≥ 0, (1.19)






t − δMt, (1.21)∫ ∞
0
xitdt ≤ Si0, µi ≥ 0, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (1.22)
lim
t→∞
e−rtσt = 0, (1.23)
where (1.18), (1.19) and (1.22) hold with complementary slackness. The parameter µi is
the present value scarcity rent for each fossil fuel and this is constant over time, while
ertµi can be thought of as the user cost. It is straightforward to see that the user cost
increases at the rate of time preference. From the complementary slackness condition in
(1.22) it is also easy to see that the scarcity rent for a particular fossil fuel is strictly
positive if and only if the exhaustion constraint is binding. If the stock of a particular
fuel is not fully exhausted then the scarcity rent is zero.
The main purpose of this chapter is to analyse which types of fossil fuels may be left in
the ground. It is not required to solve the extraction path explicitly in order to determine
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that any fossil fuel with an extraction cost lower than the backstop cost will be extracted
fully in finite time and therefore the exhaustion constraint is binding and the scarcity
rent positive. On the other hand, any fossil fuel that has an extraction cost higher than
the backstop cost will never be extracted at all. Note that this also implies that any fuel
that is extracted to any degree from t = 0 will eventually be exhausted fully. This holds
regardless of the emissions rate of the fossil fuels.
Proposition 4 Any fossil fuel with extraction cost lower than the backstop cost will be
exhausted fully in finite time regardless of its emissions rate, i.e. µi > 0 for any ci < γ,
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Any fossil fuel with extraction cost higher than the backstop will never be
extracted at all, i.e. xjt = 0, µj = 0 for any cj > γ, 1 ≤ j ≤ n ∀ t ∈ (0,∞).
Proof: First it is straightforward to see from (1.18) and (1.19) that for any fossil fuel
j where cj > γ, 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we always have cj + αjσt + ertµj > γ even if both σt = 0 and
µj = 0. Therefore it is never optimal to use such a fossil fuel at any time regardless of
the emissions tax or exhaustion constraints. To demonstrate why fossil fuels with lower
extraction cost than the backstop have to be exhausted in finite time, suppose first that
none of the n fossil fuels are exhausted, none of the exhaustion constraints are binding
and therefore µi = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then we are back in exactly the model analysed in
Section 1.2. From the analysis there we know that the system will converge to a steady-
state that involves at least one fossil fuel k with ck < γ. This fossil fuel will be consumed
alongside the backstop forever and therefore an infinite amount of the fossil fuel will be
extracted. This in turn means that with finite resource availability fossil fuel k will have
to be exhausted in finite time. Denote the time at which fuel k is exhausted Tk. Then
this leaves us with n − 1 fuels at Tk. We can think of Tk as the initial time for the case
of n− 1 fossil fuels with non-binding exhaustion constraints. That of course means that
another fuel k + 1 with ck+1 < γ will be used in a new steady-state and therefore has to
have a binding exhaustion constraint as well and will be exhausted at some point Tk+1
where Tk < Tk+1 <∞. By iteration we then know that if there are 0 ≤ l ≤ n fuels with
extraction cost lower than the backstop, all l fuels will have to be exhausted in finite
time.
Another way to think of this is by assuming that there is only one fossil fuel k to begin
with where ck < γ, there is a low initial level of the emissions stock and emissions tax
and therefore from (1.18) we have u′(xk0) = ck +αkσ0 +µk < γ. Suppose the scarcity rent
is positive. As the tax increases consumption of the fossil fuel decreases and eventually it
will either be exhausted or the tax will rise to a level that puts it at marginal cost parity
with the backstop. If at that point there were a switch to just the backstop, this would
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mean that the tax decreases as the emissions stock falls and crucially it also means that
µk = 0 as the stock is not full exhausted. However, if µk = 0 then it would be optimal to
re-start use of the fossil fuel k and this implies the backstop and fossil fuel k have to be
consumed simultaneously until the fossil fuel is exhausted. In that period the emissions
tax is falling, offsetting the continually increasing user cost (i.e. ertµk) and maintaining
parity between fuel k and the backstop. While both the backstop and fossil fuel k are
consumed simultaneously during this period, the amount extracted in each period falls
and use of the backstop increases, which means the emissions stock of course also de-
creases. Then at some point Tk fossil fuel k will be exhausted and if there is another
fossil fuel then this fossil fuel will also have to be exhausted within finite time and so on
until all of the fossil fuels with extraction cost lower than the backstop are exhausted.
This argument is consistent with the findings in the literature on single fossil fuels with
a backstop and stock-dependent extraction costs, for example Tahvonen (1997). Note
also that this result holds regardless of the emissions rates of the fossil fuels. A higher
emissions rate will mean that extraction may be delayed and spread over a larger time
horizon but still the entire fuel stock will be exhausted eventually. This is because when
the emissions stock falls with use of the backstop when no fossil fuel is used anymore, the
tax will approach zero and therefore reach a level where even use of a fossil fuel with a
very high emissions rate will become optimal.
1.3.3 Simultaneous Consumption of Two Resources
In Section 1.2 the emissions tax was the factor driving switches from one fossil fuel to
the other and the backstop. Analogous to (1.9) the emissions tax that ensures marginal








The above shows that the parity tax level is higher compared to (1.9) if µk > µj and vice
versa if µk < µj. Therefore it depends on the difference in the scarcity rent whether a
switch will occur at a lower or higher tax level relative to that which induces a switch in
the absence of exhaustion constraints. Intuitively the scarcity rent (if positive) increases
the marginal cost of a fossil fuel, but if the next fossil fuel in line has an even higher
scarcity rent, the tax required for parity between the two fuels will be higher still. This
also influences the time at which the switch occurs. Of course it is entirely possible that
the order of marginal costs at a particular tax level that prevailed in Section 1.2 will
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change completely depending on the relative sizes of the various scarcity rents the fossil
fuels will earn. For simplicity let us continue the analysis for just two fossil fuels. In
Section 1.2 we saw that the parity level between two fossil fuels cannot continue for any
positive length of time and therefore there will simply be a switch from one to the next.
However, this may now be different. To see whether the parity level can be sustained










r2 = rσ̇jkt . (1.26)
First, note that σ̇jkt > 0 only if µk > µj. Therefore, assuming that both the emissions
stock and the emissions tax are increasing, we also know that simultaneous consumption
between two fossil fuels can only be maintained if µk > µj. If we have µk < µj then we
would require the tax to decrease in order to maintain parity, which is not in line with
assumption taken regarding the starting point. Let us suppose that we do have µk > µj.
Then in order for parity between two fossil fuels to be maintained the tax rate has to
increase at an increasing rate and the rate of increase has to be exponential at the rate




same time, taking the second derivative of (1.20) with respect to time and plugging this





′′(Mt) > 0. (1.27)










It is straightforward to see that this always holds if the emissions stock is increasing (i.e.
Ṁt > 0). Since this is the case given our assumption of a low level of the initial emissions
stock M0, this is consistent with the requirements for maintaining parity between the two
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fossil fuels. Plugging this condition back into (1.20) we can then see that the emissions









Therefore we have shown that once parity between the two fossil fuels is achieved under
an increasing emissions stock and emissions tax, and we have µk > µj, it is possible that
both of them are consumed at the same time for some periods. Simultaneous consumption
can continue until either one of the fossil fuels is exhausted, but a switch to the next
fossil fuel may of course occur as the tax continues to increase. The argument presented
assumes that both the tax and the emissions stock is increasing, which means there is
only consumption of the fossil fuels and no use of the backstop.
Now suppose again that it is fossil fuel k that will be consumed just before the tax rises
to a level that brings marginal cost parity with the backstop and there is no simultaneous
consumption with any other fossil fuel at that point. The emissions tax increases until




[γ − ck − ertµk]. (1.30)
For a binding exhaustion constraint on fuel k this tax level is lower than for the case of
no exhaustion constraint. Since the scarcity rent in general increases the marginal cost
of a fossil fuel, a lower tax is required to achieve parity with the backstop. Potentially
this could also mean that the backstop starts to be used earlier than with no exhaustion
constraint and there is less overall extraction of fossil fuels before the backstop is used. As





ertµk < 0. (1.31)
The condition is analogous to (1.25) but requires the emissions tax to be decreasing.





′′(Mt) < 0. (1.32)
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This is exactly the same as (1.27) except that with the backstop being consumed the
emissions stock will start to decrease as does the tax. For the emissions stock to be








Ṁt. Therefore the decrease in extraction
of the second fossil fuel has to be sufficiently strong and vice versa the increase of the
backstop use sufficiently large (ż > 0).
While we have seen that it is possible that both fossil fuel k and the backstop will be
consumed at the same time, the question is whether this will happen or not. Suppose
that it does not, there is no other fossil fuel, and after parity with the backstop the tax
does decrease but not sufficiently to outweigh the increase in the scarcity rent. However,
this would mean that there would be no further extraction of fuel k and the stock would
not be full exhausted. This in turn would mean that µk = 0. But then it would become
beneficial to re-start extraction of the fossil fuel.16 Therefore, once parity with the back-
stop has been reached, both will be consumed simultaneously until either it is exhausted
or a switch to other fossil fuels may occur for some time.
Next, suppose that parity with the backstop is reached while we have simultaneous con-
sumption of the two fossil fuels. This means that at that point we must have parity
between both of the fossil fuels and the backstop. Therefore we need the tax levels




t . This is achieved when







However, since this leads to rertµk = −αkαj re
rtµj < 0 and we know that µk > 0, parity
between the three fuels cannot be maintained for any positive length of time. Therefore
we can only continue with one fossil fuel and the backstop from that point onwards.
While the literature on exhaustible resources without the stock externality problem sug-
gested that it would never be optimal to simultaneously use two resources (e.g. Dasgupta
and Heal 1979), the later literature on optimal emissions taxes, in particular Tahvonen
(1997), has shown that simultaneous consumption of both a fossil fuel resource and the
clean backstop technology is feasible with the stock externality present. This section
has also demonstrated that it is feasible that multiple fossil fuels of different stock sizes,
extraction cost and emissions rates can be consumed simultaneously for some period of
16This argument is analogous to the one made by Tahvonen (1997).
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time, although it requires the emissions tax to be at the right level and change at very
particular rates.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
The analysis has shown that without resource constraints, if there is at least one fossil
fuel with extraction cost lower than the backstop cost, the resulting steady-state has to
involve consumption of a fossil fuel forever. Furthermore, any fossil fuel that has a higher
marginal cost at the initial tax level relative to another fossil fuel and any fossil fuel
that has a higher marginal cost than the backstop at all levels of the emissions tax, will
never be extracted at all. Based on the finding that without resource constraints there
will be infinite consumption of at least one fossil fuel, the analysis has then shown that
with finite resource availability any fossil fuel that has a lower extraction cost than the
backstop will be exhausted fully in finite time and any fossil fuel with a higher extraction
will not be extracted at all. Finally, while Tahvonen (1997) shows that it is feasible to
have simultaneous consumption of the fossil fuel and the backstop, the analysis in Section
1.3.3 has demonstrated that it is also possible that for some time there is simultaneous
consumption of two fossil fuels when there is no use of the backstop.
The results of this chapter imply that the consideration of whether to extract a fossil fuel
entirely or leave some in the ground is not an environmental consideration but purely
based on extraction cost. It is, however, noteworthy that while all of those fossil fuels
will be exhausted fully, the environmental consideration is in the timing of extraction.
This is consistent with the previous literature on this topic. The optimal emissions tax
in conjunction with the scarcity rents will potentially delay use of some of the fossil fuels
to the very distant future. Without solving for the paths explicitly it is not possible
to make more precise statement but one of the key factors suggesting large time-scales
until exhaustion is that the results of this model crucially depend on the assumption that
there is positive decay of the emissions stock. Among others, van der Ploeg and Withagen
(2012a,b) argue that the time scales for natural decay of carbon dioxide emissions are so
large that for all practical purposes one should abstract from it. If we were to assume
that δ = 0 we know that the tax will never fall (e.g. van der Ploeg and Withagen 2012a).
This also means that once the tax has reached a level that makes it optimal to use the
backstop, there will only be consumption of the backstop from that point onwards and
any number of fossil fuels may not be exhausted. While it may be argued that it is more
realistic to assume no decay of emissions, the result for that case is fairly straightforward
and well established in the literature. The contribution of this chapter lies in establishing
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what types of fossil fuels may be left in the ground in the presence of positive decay, even
though the result may be useful for theoretical purposes only.
Another important issue in the analysis of exhaustible resources is that of a carbon
leakage. When only some countries participate in measures to reduce emissions, the non-
participating countries may emit more than before the participants took action to reduce
emissions. An important contribution in this area is Harstad (2012) who looks at this
issue from the supply-side perspective, and in particular models the extraction of fossil
fuel deposits in a setting where some countries form a coalition to reduce emissions and
take into account the damage caused by the global externality, while non-participating
countries ignore the damage in their policy choices. He shows that non-participants emit
more than in the optimum, may extract the dirtiest types of fossil fuel and invest too
little in renewable technologies. However, when countries can trade fossil fuel deposits,
the participants will buy the deposits that have the highest extraction costs. This en-
ables the participants to reduce emissions without the non-participants increasing theirs.
The analysis by Harstad (2012) complements the analysis in this chapter and the wider
literature on optimal fossil fuel extraction. The model in this chapter looks at the first
best optimal carbon tax in a single country (global) context. The issue of carbon leakage
becomes relevant when a globally optimal carbon tax cannot be implemented. A key
conclusion of this chapter is that with exhaustion constraints all fossil fuel reserves will
be extracted in finite time as long as they have a marginal extraction cost lower than
the marginal backstop cost. This is also consistent with the results of Harstad (2012) if
analysed in an infinite horizon context. While initially participants may find it optimal to
purchase deposits to avoid increases in the non-participants’ emissions, at some point it
will become optimal to extract these deposits as well. However, the timing of extraction
is the key environmental consideration and extraction may be delayed to the very distant
future. This leads back to the assumption of positive decay which is crucial to the results
of this chapter. If δ = 0, the traded deposits may never be extracted at all once the
backstop is used and fossil fuel consumption stops forever.
It may also be interesting to extend the analysis to include Carbon Capture and Storage
technologies (CCS). These would effectively reduce the emissions rate of (some) fossil
fuels and this could have significant impact on the extraction levels and which fuel is
used at which point time compared to the case without CCS. Such a model would have
to involve modelling of the R&D requirements and costs for such a technology relative to




Altruism & Global Environmental
Policy
2.1 Introduction
As Stern (2007) and Galarraga and Markandya (2009) point out, climate change rep-
resents one of the largest externalities that society has had to face. As is the case
with all types of externalities, the need for policy intervention arises from free-riding be-
haviour. In standard economic theory, free-riding occurs because individuals are purely
self-interested. And since individuals have to carry all the cost of changing their behaviour
while only getting a small benefit from the reduction in harm experienced through the
externality, there is little incentive for individuals to change their behaviour without some
form of intervention. In the case of a global externality like climate change resulting from
GHG emissions, individuals may even perceive that their contribution to the externality
is so small relative to the total, that the total level of the externality and therefore the
damage suffered, are unaffected by the individual’s behaviour. In such a case, the ratio-
nal, and purely self-interested individual will ignore the effect of the consumption choice
on total emissions.
The classic prescription to deal with such a problem is the introduction of a Pigovian
tax (equal social marginal damage), which makes individuals face the full economic cost
of their consumption. However, because it is global greenhouse gas emissions that cause
climate change, emissions in one country do not just cause a negative externality in that
country but also in every other country. At the same time, while it is aggregate global
emissions that cause climate change, the damage experienced from climate change may
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be much more significant in some countries compared to others.
Governments may implement a tax that maximises the welfare of that country, taking
as given the emissions in other countries and the resulting damage for that country, but
ignoring the effect of the country’s emissions on other countries. While this corrects for
individuals’ free-riding behaviour within a given country, it is now governments that are
free-riding by ignoring the effect the country’s emissions have on other countries. And
if every country acts that way, such a non-cooperative equilibrium will lead to higher
emissions and lower welfare compared to the global cooperative solution where global
aggregate welfare is maximised and global damage is fully internalised. For example,
van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) model the Pigovian taxes for a global externality
when each country sets their own tax in a non-cooperative way and compare it to the
global cooperative solution. They start with a simple static model with flow pollution
but the bulk of the analysis focusses on a dynamic approach with stock pollution. Fur-
thermore, Aronsson and Löfgren (2001) develop a dynamic two-country model of a global
externality and evaluate the non-cooperative and cooperative equilibria with regard to
valuation problems implicit in environmental accounting.
While we know that in the absence of a global regulator countries have no incentive to co-
operate, there are a number of approaches that aim to show how the cooperative global
optimum might be achieved nevertheless. For example, Barrett (1990) explores where
cooperative agreements might arise in case of global externalities. He first shows that
the biggest discrepancies between the cooperative and non-cooperative equilibria arise for
global externalities that carry significant damage but are costly to reduce (such as climate
change), and also for low damage externalities that can be reduced at relatively low cost.
He further summaries a number of approaches that might lead to a cooperative equilib-
rium, among which is the aspect of morality where governments may be guided by some
moral concerns rather than just maximising their countries’ welfare. Similarly, Barrett
(1994) looks at self-enforcing international agreements, which may either be modelled as
members maximising the collective net-benefits or as an infinitely repeated game. He
shows that neither approach can sustain full cooperative behaviour when the differences
between the net benefits of the global cooperative solution and the non-cooperative so-
lution are large.
Furthermore, while emission permit based mechanisms, such as used in the Kyoto pro-
tocol, are deemed to be of limited potential to establish the required international coop-
eration, there are other proposals, for example the price influencing climate protection
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scheme put forward by Nordhaus (2006).1 Altemeyer-Bartscher et al. (2010) further
develop this approach by proposing a scheme that also includes side-payments. The lit-
erature also points to the importance to measure and take into account ancillary benefits
of climate protection because regional secondary benefits of climate protection efforts
may overcome free-riding behaviour (e.g. Markandya and Rübbelke 2004), and in par-
ticular in conjunction with side-payments or tax transfers (e.g. Altemeyer-Bartscher
et al. 2011, Markandya and Rübbelke 2012 and Altemeyer-Bartscher et al. 2014). Other
contributions in the area of global externalities or global public goods evaluate the ef-
fects of labour mobility (e.g. Aronsson and Blomquist 2003)2, non-competitive markets
(Tahvonen 1995), Veblen effects (e.g. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman 2014)3, and the
existence of abatement activities that only mitigate local pollution in addition to those
that mitigate global pollution (e.g. Pittel and Rübbelke 2010).
The potential for free-riding at the country level is of course a result of free-riding at
the individual level. It is sometimes thought that if individuals are not completely self-
interested, but also have a concern for the welfare of others, this may overcome free-
riding behaviour and reduce the required tax on the externality. And although standard
economic theory predicts that in a non-cooperative setting individuals will make only
negligible contributions to public goods (see for example Andreoni (1988) and Bergstrom
et al. (1986)), there a number of theories that show that when contributing yields some
sort of utility benefits, voluntary contributions can be consistent with standard economic
models. One example of this is Impure Altruism (also called warm-glow effect) which
captures that individuals may have a utility benefit from the contribution itself (An-
dreoni 1989, 1990). Based on this approach, other approaches have made more specific
assertions about the underlying psychological motivation for such a utility benefit. This
is commonly based on a type of self-image concern or social norm. Examples of this are,
among others, Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008), Nyborg
et al. (2006) and Brekke et al. (2003).
While these models are concerned with a utility benefit to individuals from the contribu-
tion itself, other forms of altruism are dealing with a concern for the welfare of others.
1This is ”essentially a dynamic Pigovian pollution tax” (p.32).
2Aronsson and Blomquist (2003) look at optimal tax policy for trans-boundary environmental prob-
lems with labour mobility. Using a two-type approach they show that ability has an impact on the optimal
tax, but even with labour mobility part of the externality remains uninternalised in a non-cooperative
equilibrium. Only a cooperative approach can fully internalise the externality.
3Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2014) look at optimal provision of both national and global
public goods when individuals care about relative consumption levels, both relative to others in their
country as well as relative to individuals in other countries.
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In the economics literature, there two main types of altruism that deal with individuals’
concern for others, namely Pure Altruism and Paternalistic Altruism. Pure Altruism
means that an individual’s utility may to some degree be a function of others’ utility,
but not just a specific component of it. Applications of this type of altruism are often
used in smaller environments such as the family where one might care about the welfare
of specific individuals (for example Becker 1974, 1981). In large-scale contexts it can
also be assumed that an individual cares for the total or average welfare of all other
individuals in the population (see Hammond 1987; Johansson 1997 for examples). On
the other hand, Paternalistic Altruism means that an individual’s utility is not a func-
tion of others’ utility as such, but a specific component of that utility (see Archibald
and Donaldson 1976). In an environmental context, this component may be the damage
others experience from the dirty good.4 In both of these cases, the individual’s welfare
is affected by the damage others experience and therefore it is intuitive that this would
induce people to cut back on the harmful activity voluntarily. However, in the context of
the global climate change problem Daube and Ulph (2016) demonstrate that as long as
individuals continue to believe that total emissions are unaffected by their consumption
choice, then no matter how much they care about the welfare of others, their behaviour
will not change.5 Furthermore, it was shown in a single country context that the optimal
tax is still the standard Pigovian tax equal to social marginal damage.
This chapter is closely linked to the model setup used in Daube and Ulph (2016) and
extends their static model of Pure Altruism to a setting of multiple countries. The model
will first be developed under standard theory with self-interested individuals only, and
then add individuals’ altruistic concern for the utility of others. However, individuals in
any given country may exhibit a different level of altruistic concern for the total utility
in their own country compared to the concern for total utility in other countries. Indeed,
individuals can have different levels of altruistic concern for every country. Intuitively,
it is plausible to assume that an individual may care more for the well-being of the
people in their own country, or people closer to the individual, compared to individuals
who may live half way around the world. The analysis covers individual behaviour but
focusses mostly on socially optimal levels of consumption under the non-cooperative so-
lution where governments individually aim to maximise their country’s welfare and the
global cooperative solution where global welfare is maximised. This chapter makes no
efforts to show how such a global equilibrium may be achieved but simply compares the
4While Impure Altruism only takes into account the individual’s contribution to the externality,
Paternalistic Altruism means that the individual is affected by others’ experience of the externality,
regardless of the individual’s contribution.
5This result is also consistent with the analysis of Johansson (1997) for large populations.
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consumption levels under those different equilibria. The main results are:
• In a non-cooperative equilibrium of two countries a population increase in one
country may either increase or decrease equilibrium consumption in another country
depending on the relative size of the countries.
• Under standard theory the cooperative equilibrium achieved by a global social plan-
ner will internalise global damage fully and a single global tax rate equal to global
marginal damage can induce this global optimum.
• Individuals’ altruistic concern for the welfare of others (Pure Altruism) will alter
the non-cooperative equilibrium resulting from domestic social planners and lead
countries to internalise some, but not all, of the damage caused by emissions in
their country, depending on the level of altruistic concern relative to the concern
for themselves and others in their country.
• However, altruistic concern will also alter the welfare-maximising global optimum,
requiring a lower level of emissions as individuals effectively experience damage
from the externality through
1. the direct effect of their country’s damage function on personal welfare, and
2. the effect of altruistic concern and thus the damage individuals in other coun-
tries experience from the externality.
Since socially optimal consumption in the global optimum then depends on the
relative levels of altruistic concern, the degree to which damage is internalised in
each country will now differ across countries and thus there is no single global tax
rate anymore to achieve the optimum.
The chapter will proceed as follows. Section 2.2 describes the basic model setup. Section
2.3 will then develop the general model and evaluate the results under standard theory.
This serves as counterfactual to the analysis with Pure Altruism in Section 2.4. Finally,
Section 2.5 will provide some concluding remarks and discuss ideas for potential further
research.
2.2 Model Setup
We start off with a continuum of individuals living within n discrete countries. Individuals
within a given country have the same initial endowment of income yi > 0, where 1 ≤ i ≤
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n. An individual chooses consumption levels of a clean good x and a dirty good z, where
the clean good is a numeraire good with a price of 1 and therefore represents expenditure
on all other goods but the dirty good. Consumption of the clean good generates no
externalities. The dirty good, however, generates one unit of emissions, which is a negative
externality to all individuals across all countries. The average consumption of the dirty
good within country i is denoted by z̄i. The size of the population of each country i is
measured by Mi. Therefore total emissions in country i are captured by
Ei = Mi, z̄i.





Ei = MT z̄T .
where MT measures the global population size and z̄T captures global average consump-
tion of the dirty good. Individuals derive private utility from consumption of the two
goods. For simplicity let us assume that individuals within a given country have the same
preferences over the two goods and therefore individuals within each country will have
identical utility functions. However, preferences over the two goods may differ across
countries. Furthermore, utility is linear in consumption of the clean good. This ensures
there are no issues of income distribution in the analysis.
The damage individuals in country i experience from the negative emissions externality
of the dirty good is captured by the damage functions Di(ET ). A key component of this
multi-country model is that each country can experience different damage as a result of
the emissions externality and therefore we have n different damage functions. Therefore
this setup also captures any ancillary costs of the emissions externality, which are local
to a particular country. The damage function can vary for each country and includes all
of the damage associated with the externality, including any ancillary cots. In addition,
total global damage is captured by the damage function DT (ET ). However, note that
the damage function is a function of ET , and therefore it is always total global emissions
that determine the damage experienced. This means that emissions in every country con-
tribute equally to global emissions. In a different setting one could model that emissions
generated in a particular country cause more damage in that country and only a fraction
of the emissions generated in other countries enter the damage function for that country.




However, in the model developed in this chapter it is always total global emissions which
matter for the damage function. Therefore every country’s experienced damage is a con-
sequence of the same total emissions. Different countries may suffer differently from those
total emissions (i.e. different countries may have different damage functions), but the un-
derlying global emissions are always the same for each country. As such we are modelling
a truly global pollutant where the aggregate global emissions are what matters. This is
in line with the aim of capturing some of the distinguishing features of climate change.
Formally, damage experienced by individuals in country i is given by
Di(MT z̄T ) = Di(
n∑
i=1
Miz̄i) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
where MT =
∑n




i=1Miz̄i. Mi captures the population size of
each country while z̄i measures average consumption of the dirty good in each country.
Furthermore we have





MiDi(MT z̄T ), where D
′
T (ET ) > 0, D
′′
T (ET ) > 0, ∀ ET > 0.
From this it is also straightforward to derive that



















Therefore, utility derived from consumption of the two goods is given by
ui(xi, zi;ET ) = xi + φi(zi)−Di(ET ) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (2.1)
where
φ′i(zi) > 0, φ
′′
i (zi) < 0; and D
′
i(ET ) > 0, D
′′
i (ET ) > 0, ∀ ET > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Damage experienced from the emissions externality is a strictly increasing and and strictly
convex function of total global emissions for all positive levels of emissions. The private
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gross benefit derived by individuals in country i from consumption of the dirty good is
captured by φi(zi) and is a strictly increasing and strictly concave function of consump-
tion of the dirty good zi. The dirty good is produced with constant unit cost ci > 0,
which again is the same for individuals within country i but may differ across countries.
In addition, governments of the different countries impose an emissions tax ti ≥ 0 on
consumption of zi. However, in each country this tax revenue is redistributed to the in-
dividuals through a lump-sum transfer σi which is identical for all individuals in country
i. The government budget constraint for country i is therefore defined by
σi = tiz̄i, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.2)
2.3 Standard Theory
We can now develop the model under standard theory, where individuals simply maximise
their own private utility of consumption without any altruistic concern for the utility of
others.
2.3.1 Individual Behaviour
Given the model setup described in Section 2.2, and in particular the definition of global
emissions and the government budget constraint, the individual’s private utility can be
expressed as
ui(zi; z̄i, z̄T , ti) = (yi + tiz̄i)− (ci + ti)zi + φi(zi)−Di(MT z̄T ) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.3)
A key feature of this model is the atomistic nature of the consumption choice, formally
captured by the continuum of individuals. This means that the individual’s consumption
choice has no impact on damage experienced as well as no impact on the government
budget constraint. At the same time, the standard Nash assumption that individuals
take the consumption of all other individuals as given, also applies. The consequence of
those two fundamental assumptions is that individuals take total global emissions, and
therefore the damage experienced from the emissions externality, as given. An individual
in country i will choose their consumption of the dirty good by maximising their utility
shown in (2.3). Using the first order condition it is then straightforward to show that the
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consumption choice for an individual in country i is characterised by6
φ′i[z̃i(t)] = ci + ti ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.4)
The left hand side of (2.4) describes the marginal private gross benefit from consumption
of the dirty good while the right hand side describes the private marginal cost. Indeed
this is the same result as in Daube and Ulph (2016), the only difference being that in-
dividuals in different countries may have different private preferences over consumption
of the dirty good, may be subject to differences in the production cost of the dirty good,
and have their government impose a different tax on the dirty good. Note that since the
individual’s choice has no impact on total emissions the fact that that utility is a function
of the damage experienced by the individual in country i is irrelevant to the choice.
2.3.2 Domestic Social Planner
For the social welfare functions we now have two possible approaches. The first approach
is the non-cooperative approach where governments aim to maximise total welfare for
their country only (taking consumption in all other countries as given). This will be called
the ’Domestic Planner’ approach. The second approach is the cooperative global solution
where global welfare (i.e. the sum of all countries’ welfare functions) is maximised. This
is labelled ’Global Planner’. It is obvious from a theoretical viewpoint that the Global
Planner’s solution yields the globally optimal levels of consumption and emissions.
We start by looking at the optimal level of consumption from the Domestic Planner’s
perspective. For this let us first define z̄−i =
∑
j 6=i z̄j and M−iz̄−i =
∑
j 6=iMj z̄j, which
captures the total consumption of the dirty good across all countries other than country
i. Because individuals in country i have identical and strictly concave utility functions,
everybody in country i consumes the same amount of the dirty good in the domestic
optimum. Therefore country i’s social utility function is given by
Si(zi; z̄−i) = yi − cizi + φi(zi)−Di(Mizi +M−iz̄−i) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.5)
The Domestic Planner takes into account the link between the taxes paid on the dirty
good and the lump-sum transfer individuals receive through the government budget con-
6All the necessary second-order condition are assumed to hold.
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straint. This means the socially optimal level of consumption is independent of the tax
rate. Furthermore, the Domestic Planner also takes account of the connection between
consumption of the dirty good in country i and global emissions ET . However, in the
multi-country context the Domestic Planner also has to take into account consumption
of the dirty good in all other countries because the damage experienced in country i is a
function of global emissions which is in turn determined by the consumption of the dirty
good in each of the n countries. Since we are dealing with a non-cooperative situation,
the standard Nash assumption where the planner takes consumption in all other coun-
tries as given applies. The optimal level of consumption in country i from the Domestic
Planner’s perspective is therefore defined by7
φ′i(ẑ
D




i +M−iz̄−i) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.6)
The above shows that the socially optimal level is achieved when the private marginal
gross benefit of consumption is equal to the social marginal cost of consumption in country
i. This characterisation of the socially optimal level of consumption is similar to that of
the single country model developed by Daube and Ulph (2016). The characterisation fully
internalises the damage experienced in country i and takes full account of the government
budget constraint and the redistribution of the tax revenues. However, since the Domestic
Planner optimises only domestic welfare, this socially optimal level ignores the effect of
consumption in country i on the damage experienced in other countries. This is of course
an illustration of the free-riding behaviour countries may engage in by ignoring the effects
of their actions on other countries.8
Result 1 In a multi-country setting a domestic social planner will free-ride on the dam-
age caused by consumption in their country but experienced in the other countries.
This result is similar to van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992) although their model has
identical damage functions for all countries. Now, by comparing (2.4) and (2.6) it is
straightforward to see that the optimal tax on the dirty good in country i inducing





i +M−iz̄−i) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.7)
7All the necessary second-order condition are assumed to hold.
8Note that if the damage function in country i were linear in total global emissions E, then marginal
damage would be constant and therefore marginal damage would be independent of consumption in other
countries. In that case both the socially optimal consumption level and the corresponding optimal tax
on the dirty good would be independent of consumption elsewhere.
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Since it is assumed that the damage function is non-linear in total emissions E, we have
already noted that marginal damage is a function of the average consumption level in
all other countries. Therefore (2.6) describes the reaction function leading to the Nash
equilibrium. In order to explore the equilibrium level of consumption, let us now assume
there are only two countries and each sets its socially optimal tax. Then the reaction
function for country 1 becomes
φ′1(ẑ
D







We already know that consumption in country 1 depends on consumption in country 2 and
vice versa. Specifically, we can determine that the degree to which optimal consumption



















It makes intuitive sense that consumption in one country will decrease as consumption in
the other country increases. This is because if consumption in one country increases this
also increases marginal damage in the other country and therefore the social optimum
under the Domestic Planner has to decrease in the other country. From this we can also
determine the conditions in the two-country case that need to hold in order to have a
unique and stable Nash Equilibrium where both countries consume positive amounts of
















If one country is bigger than the other, then one of the two conditions will always hold.
However, the other is more restrictive and essentially guarantees that one country is not
9These are the standard conditions for a unique and stable Nash equilibrium in a Cournot duopoly
with linear reaction functions.
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too large compared to the other. We will explore this condition further later in this
section when we use an example of a specific functional form for φ(.) and the damage
function D(.).
Returning to the analysis of comparative statics, it is straightforward to see that the
equilibrium level of consumption in both countries depends on the population size of each
country. Looking at the comparative statics of the equilibrium levels of consumption, we















Therefore an increase in the population size of country 1 leads to lower consumption of
the dirty good in country 1 under the Domestic Planner. This makes intuitive sense
as an increase in population leads to an increase in marginal damage which has to be
offset by lower consumption levels. However, since the Domestic Planner has to take
account of the emissions generated in other countries it is also important to explore how
consumption in other countries might change with an increase in the population of country
1. Consumption in country 2 will be affected by the total emissions in country 1, and
these are of course a function of the size of country 1 as well as the level of consumption
of the dirty good in country 1. However, it is not definitive whether consumption in






















The above shows that consumption in country 2 will increase as a result of a popula-
tion increase in country 1 if consumption in country 1 is less than the ratio between the
marginal damage experienced in country 1 and the rate at which the marginal private
gross benefit derived from consumption of the dirty good changes for individuals in coun-
try 1. There are two effects driving this. First, an increase in M1 increases the marginal
damage for country 2 and, ceteris paribus, works towards reducing consumption of the
dirty good in country 2. However, because the increase in M1 will reduce consumption
of the dirty good in country 1, this reduction may offset the effect on D′2(.) sufficiently to
allow country 2 to actually increase its consumption of the dirty good. From the condi-
tion given in (2.13) we see that this is the case if consumption in country 1 is sufficiently


























Figure 2.1: Non-Cooperative Nash Equilibrium wtih Domestic Planners
affect marginal damage of country 2 and therefore the more likely that it is that the
resulting decrease in consumption in country 1 is sufficient to allow country 2 to increase
its consumption of the dirty good.
To illustrate the Nash Equilibrium further it is useful to look at an example of a simple
functional form for the private gross benefit from consumption of the dirty good φ(z) and
the damage function D(ET ). In order to simplify the problem further and isolate the im-
portance of relative population sizes, let us also assume that both countries are identical
in everything but size. This means they have the same preferences over consumption of
the dirty good and experience the same damage from global emissions. Specifically let
us assume
φ(zi) = azi −
b
2






2 ∀ i = 1, 2,
where a > c.








Of course there is an equivalent reaction function for country 2. Solving this system of
equations it is then straightforward to derive that the equilibrium level of consumption
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Figure 2.1 further illustrates the reaction functions and the resulting equilibrium level of
consumption. Note that this depicts a case were M1 > M2 since the equilibrium is above
the 45 degree line. If both countries had the same population size then of course the
equilibrium would be completely symmetric and consumption in both countries would be
equal.
We already know from (2.11) the conditions to guarantee the existence and stability of a









To explore this further let us now say that M1 = sMT and M2 = (1 − s)MT , where the
parameter 0 ≤ s ≤ 1 captures the size of country 1 relative to the total population mass.
Then the two conditions for the Nash Equilibrium become
2s2 − 3s+ 1 > −b
M2Td
and 2s2 − s > −b
M2Td
. (2.17)
Figure 2.2 shows that both conditions in (2.17) will hold for any relative population sizes
as long as M2Td < 8b. The parameter d is the damage parameter and captures the degree
of damage caused by the emissions externality. The term M2Td is the second derivative of




more, −b is the second derivative of the private gross benefit with respect to consumption
of the dirty good and therefore b captures the rate at which the marginal benefit of con-
sumption decreases as consumption increases.10 As such we know that if that rate at
which marginal damage increases is less than eight times the rate at which the marginal
benefit decreases we will always have a stable and unique Nash Equilibrium under the
Domestic Planner. However, if M2Td > 8b, then we require either both countries to have
similar size or for one country to be much larger than the other. For example, for the
10Note that b is the same for both countries in our simplified example.
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Figure 2.2: Conditions for Existence of Nash Equilibrium
case shown in the figure above where −b
M2T d
= −0.05 (i.e. M2Td = 20b), we require that
s / 0.056, 0.444 / s / 0.556 or s ' 0.944.11 We can illustrate this example further by
determining the consumption levels in each country when we have M2Td = 20b. Plugging
M1 = sMT , M2 = (1 − s)MT and M2Td = 20b into (2.15) we find that the domestic
optimum for country 1 is
ẑD1 =
1 + 20(2s2 − 3s+ 1)






Doing the equivalent for country 2, the domestic optimum for country 2 is
ẑD2 =
1 + 20(2s2 − s)






Figure 2.3 plots (2.18) and (2.19) for the whole range of possible values of s. This nicely
illustrates the relative population ranges where we have a stable Nash Equilibrium, which
are marked by the thick blue and red lines and is consistent with the range determined
earlier. If s < 0.056 we have positive consumption levels of the dirty good for both coun-
11These intervals are of course symmetric since the countries are identical in every aspect but popu-
lations size.
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Figure 2.3: Equilibrium Consumption Levels at M2Td = 20b
tries and the equilibrium is stable. However, if 0.056 < s < 0.444, optimal consumption
of the larger country 2 would be zero given the consumption of country 1. But this






would mean that optimal consumption in country 2 should be positive as well. It makes
intuitive sense that the middle section where both countries are of similar size leads to
stability as no one country dominates and induces the other country to consume none of
the dirty good. Indeed, we already know that if the countries are of exactly the same
population size (and therefore completely identical) then we always have a unique and
stable Nash Equilibrium. The interesting result, however, is the case where one country
is much larger than the other country and this still leads to a stable equilibrium.12
Suppose we start with s = 0.5 and then slowly decrease s, so that country 1 becomes
relatively smaller and country 2 relatively larger, while we hold the total size of the
population MT constant. As country 1 becomes smaller it can increase its domestically
optimal consumption level and in turn country 2 decreases theirs as it increases in pop-
ulation size.13 This effect is true for any relative size between M2Td and b as we can see
from Figure 2.4 where M2Td = 6b. This continues as s decreases further. In the case
of M2Td = 20b, the increase in optimal consumption for country 1 eventually has such
12The model in this chapter does not consider a production function. In a more general model one
should of course reflect that an increase in the population of a country will also have an impact on
output.
13As the share of the total population in a country approaches zero each individual can consume close
to the level that would be consumed if no account of the damage were taken into account (z̃(0) = a−cb )
as the contribution to total emissions becomes negligble.
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Figure 2.4: Equilibrium Consumption Levels at M2Td = 6b
a significant effect on the marginal damage relative to the marginal benefit from con-
sumption in country 2 that it can no longer consume a positive amount of the dirty good
given the optimal level in country 1 and the larger population size of country 2. In the
equivalent case where M2Td = 6b the only difference is that the marginal damage does not
increase at as high a rate relative to the decrease in the marginal benefit so that it is still
optimal for country 2 to consume a positive level. However, as is evident from Figure
2.4, as s decreases further eventually a minimum level of consumption for country 2 is
achieved and as s decreases the optimal level of country 2 starts to increase again. While
consumption levels in country 1 continue to increase with the falling population size, at
some point the decrease in population outweighs the increase in consumption in country
1 and the population increase in country 2 with regard to the damage experienced in
country 2. At that point country 2 can increase its consumption of the dirty good again.
This turning point is consistent with the condition shown in (2.13) where at some point
a population decrease of the country 1 may increase consumption in country 2 although
that specific condition is based on the case where only M1 changing, while the example
here has M1 decrease and M2 increase at the same rate so that MT stays constant. When
we don’t have stability over the entire range of population sizes we may have an interval
of population shares where there is no stable equilibrium but as s approaches either 0
or 1 a stability will emerge again when the optimal level of consumption of the larger
country can increase sufficiently.
Note that these specific results are due to having used simple quadratic functional forms
for both φ(.) and D(.) and that we assumed that the countries are identical in everything
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Figure 2.5: Condition for Comparative Statics Result
but size. For example, the number 8 in the threshold of M2Td < 8b has no particular
meaning but is a result of those quadratic functional forms. However, the intuition de-
scribed for the results above holds in general.
Next let us look at the comparative statics for this simplified example. It is straightfor-
ward to show that consistent with (2.12) we have ∂z1
∂s
< 0.14 Furthermore we find that,
equivalent to (2.13), the condition required for ∂z2
∂s
< 0 is
4s− 2s2 − 1 < −b
M2Td
. (2.20)
This is illustrated in Figure 2.5 and shows that since −b
M2T d
< 0 we know that we never
have ∂z2
∂s




and that if d < b (i.e. −b
M2T d
< −1), we never have ∂z2
∂s
< 0
regardless of the relative population sizes.
While it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions from these specific results, they do
underline the importance of the relative size of the countries in determining the socially
optimal level of consumption in equilibrium even though the Domestic Planner does not
take into account the damage that country imposes on other countries. The key to these
results is that it is total global emissions which drive the damage experienced from the
externality in each country, creating dependencies even when a country tries to only
maximise its own welfare with no regard for other countries, and individuals also have
14This is effectively the same as ∂z1∂M1 since s measures the relative size of country 1.
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no altruistic concern for others. The next step is to see how these results may change if
instead of the Domestic Planner there is a Global Social Planner.
2.3.3 Global Social Planner
In contrast to the Domestic Planner a Global Social Planner aims to maximise global
welfare across all n countries. This global welfare function consists of the sum of all
countries’ social welfare functions and is therefore given by






yi − cizi + φi(zi)−Di(M1z1 + . . .+Mnzn)
]}
. (2.21)
In the case of the Domestic Planner each country took consumption in every other coun-
try as given. However, the Global Planner maximises aggregate welfare and therefore
simultaneously chooses the globally optimal consumption level of the dirty good for each
of the n countries. This cooperative global optimum for country i is characterised by15
φ′i(ẑ
G














1 + . . .+Mnẑ
G
n ) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(2.22)
Contrary to the case of the Domestic Planner, (2.22) shows that in a global equilibrium
global damage of consumption of the dirty good is fully internalised in each country. This
means that consumption in country i does not just internalise the damage experienced in
country i, but also the damage in all other countries. It also means that if preferences over
the dirty good and the cost of production were the same for each country (φ(z) = φi(z)
and c = ci, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n), then we would have the same level of optimal consumption
in each of the n countries. It is important to note that it would be the same level
of consumption for each country regardless of their size or damage function. This is
because global damage is now equally distributed across all individuals globally and each
individual carries an equal share of global damage. The global optimum is driven by
global marginal damage rather than the damage experienced in each country. A key
factor for this result is the assumption that it is total global emissions that cause the
damage experienced in each country. Note that if only a fraction of the emissions caused
in other countries would contribute to the damage experienced in country i (as discussed
15All the necessary second-order condition are assumed to hold.
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in Section 2.2), then the global optimum would not internalise global emissions equally,
but country i would only internalise other countries’ emissions to the extent that they
spill over to other countries.
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in the global social optimum consumption in country
i internalises the damage experienced in country i as a result of a consumption change
in country i as well as the damage experienced in country j as a result of a consumption
change in country j, which is why it equates to internalising global damage. To illustrate
this point, let us look at the simplified version of a 2-country case. Then the global social
optimum for country 1 is characterised by
φ′1(ẑ
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The last part of this is the marginal damage experienced in country 2 as a result of a
marginal increase of average consumption in country 2. However, this is not the same
as the marginal damage experienced in country 2 as a result of a marginal increase in
consumption in country 1, which would capture the damage inflicted by country 1 on
country 2. Yet, we can also rewrite (2.23) as
φ′1(ẑ
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Then we see that the global optimum internalises the damage inflicted by country 1 on
country 2, adjusted for the relative population sizes. Intuitively this is the case because
the Global Planner optimises the joint welfare functions across both countries, which is of
course weighted by the different population sizes and thus even a global optimum does not
necessarily require that the damage inflicted on another country is fully internalised within
one country, but the Global Planner is able to distribute the degree of internalisation such
that global welfare is maximised by each country internalising global damage caused by
consumption of the dirty good across all countries.
Result 2 A global social planner fully internalises global damage and ensures that each
individual carries an equal share of global damage. If private preferences over the dirty
good and the cost of production of the dirty good are the same for all individuals globally
(i.e. φ(z) = φi(z) and c = ci ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n), then all individuals will consume the same
amount of the dirty good under the global social optimum regardless of the countries’
population sizes and damage experienced from the externality.
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Comparing (2.4) and (2.22), it is then straightforward to see that the global optimum
can be achieved by a single tax rate imposed on each country. This globally optimal tax
on the dirty good is equal to global marginal damage, or




1 + . . .+Mnẑ
G
n ) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.25)
This is an important result because if a cooperative solution could be achieved this Global
Planner could induce the optimum through a single tax rate on the dirty good for all
countries. This would not just be simpler to implement in practice, it also is a fair solution
since it imposes the same tax on each individual globally but consumption can still differ
in line with private preferences over the dirty good.
Result 3 The global social optimum can be achieved by a single tax on the dirty good
applied to each country, equal to global marginal damage of consumption of the dirty good.
Let us now compare these results to the case of the Domestic Planner. To illustrate
the differences, first assume that the Global Planner imposes the optimal tax on each
country. Further, we will use the simplified case of two countries identical in every aspect
but size, and with the specific functional forms used previously. With this setup it is







where MT = M1 +M2.
Note that the socially optimal consumption level is the same for both countries because
private preferences over the dirty good as well as the cost of production are assumed to
be the same. As already described in the more general setting, it is also noteworthy that
optimal consumption would still be the same for each country even if the damage functions
were different in different countries. In that case the damage parameter d would simply
have to be replaced with a dT parameter capturing global damage. Figure 2.6 illustrates
the global optimum in this simplified setup and compares it to the Domestic Planner
equilibrium.
First, note that since consumption in equilibrium will be the same in both countries under


























Figure 2.6: Global Planner Equilibrium compared to Domestic Planner Equilibirum
if the size of one of the countries changes or one country has a different damage function,
the resulting equilibrium will still lie on the 45 degree line. This is not the case for the
Domestic Planner’s equilibrium which shifts depending on the relative size of the two
countries. In general it is intuitive that average consumption across the two countries
will always be lower under the global equilibrium compared to the domestic equilibrium
because the Global Planner internalises more damage than each of the Domestic Planners.
However, it is theoretically possible that, for example, consumption in country 1 would
be higher under the Global Planner than under the Domestic Planner. This would be
the case if the size of country 1 is sufficiently large relative to country 2 such that the
domestic equilibrium would have a very low level of consumption in country 1 and a
comparatively high level in country 2. The Global Planner’s equilibrium would then
redistribute this imbalance and allow country 1 to consume more, but of course require
country 2 to consume less. Formally, in order to have ẑG1 < ẑ
D





This has to hold in addition to the previously stated conditions required for the existence
and stability of the Domestic Planner equilibrium.16 Since b
d
> 0 we know that the
above condition will always hold if M2 > M1. This means that if country 2 has a larger
16Note that under the Global Planner we will always have a unique and stable equiliblrium regardless
of the relative population sizes.
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population, then the domestic optimum for country 1 will always be larger than the global
optimum would be. Intuitively this is because a large country 2 will experience a higher
marginal damage for the same average consumption level compared to a smaller (but
otherwise equal) country 1 and therefore the consumption of country 2 would be lower
than that of country 1. This in turn enables country 1 to have a higher consumption level
in the domestic optimum. If however, country 1 is sufficiently large relative to country 2,
then it may consume less under the domestic optimum compared to the global optimum.
This is because a large country 1 internalises its own experienced damage fully (although
it ignores its effect on the other countries) while a global optimum equally shares the
burden of global emissions (which are disproportionately caused by country 1 in this
example). Of course this may be different if country 1 has a ’lower’ damage function
compared to country 2.
In the example case of the simple functional forms used above individuals have identical












< 0. This makes intuitive sense because both countries have to consume the
same level of the dirty good after an increase in any of the countries’ population size
and therefore the change in consumption has to be the same. Of course an increase in
population size anywhere leads to an increase in global marginal damage and therefore
the consumption of the dirty good by each individual has to decrease under a global social
optimum. In more general terms, under a global optimum in the two-country case, the





















and the change in consumption in country 2 as a result of the population increase in




















This demonstrates that any differences in the amount of change between the two countries
as a result of the population increase in country 1 is only driven by the private preferences
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over the dirty good. This is consistent with the earlier finding that in a global equilib-
rium differences in consumption are only caused by differences in the private benefit from
consumption of the dirty good as well as differences in the cost of production. We es-
tablished from (2.22) that differences in globally optimal consumption between countries
are only driven by differences in private preferences and the cost production. Since the
cost of production is assumed to be a constant, it has no impact on the degree to which
optimal consumption changes as the result of a population increase. Therefore differences
in the degree to which consumption changes are only determined by the different private
preferences over the dirty good.
After having developed the model under standard theory we can now begin to explore
how these results change when individuals may exhibit altruistic concern for the utility
of others.
2.4 Pure Altruism
This chapter uses Pure Altruism in the sense that individuals’ utility is a function of the
direct utility of all other individuals in population rather than just specific individuals.17
However, given the multi-country setup, the individual can have a different level of al-
truistic concern for others’ utility in their country compared to others’ utility in other
countries. Indeed, the individual may have a different level of altruistic concern for each
of the n countries. The degree of altruistic concern of individuals in country i for an
individual in country i is captured by the parameter αii ≥ 0, while altruistic concern of
individuals in country i for an individual in country j is captured by αij ≥ 0.18 Therefore
the total level of altruistic concern an individual in country i has for the whole popula-
tion of country i is given by αiiMi, and similarly the total level of altruistic concern an
individual in country i has for the whole population of country j is given by αijMj. Since
the degree of altruism is defined as the degree of care for an individual, and the degree
of altruism is assumed to be equal for all individuals in that country, the total weight
of altruistic concern is greater the larger the population given a fixed level of α. This
reflects the idea that while an individual could have a very high level of altruistic concern
for individuals in a very small country, this will be offset to some degree by the fact that a
large amount of people are affected by the emissions externality in another country, even
17See for example Johansson (1997) and Hammond (1987).
18Note that the altruism parameter is assumed to be non-negative since a negative α would not
capture a degree of altruism but rather some type of ’Schadenfreude’.
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though the concern for each individual may be lower. Furthermore, in order to maintain
the reasonable assumption that the individual cares at least as much for their private




Mjαij ≤ 1 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.30)
As will become evident, this assumption is crucial to the interpretation of the results.
The condition above effectively ensures that the welfare derived directly from consump-
tion of the dirty good does not become negligible compared to the welfare derived from
altruistic concern for others.19 Also note that for simplicity this chapter assumes that
all individuals in any particular country have the same levels of altruistic concern, but
altruistic concern between countries is of course allowed to differ.
2.4.1 Individual Behaviour
This section will refer to an individual’s utility function that includes utility derived
from altruistic concern as the individuals ’welfare’.20 An individual’s personal welfare is
given by the sum of their direct utility of consumption and the total utility of all other
individuals weighted by the corresponding degrees of altruistic concern, αij. Therefore
we have
wi(zi; z̄i, ti, αij) =(yi + tiz̄i)− (ci + ti)zi + φi(zi)
−Di(MT z̄T ) +
n∑
j=1
αijMjūj(.) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(2.31)
where ūj captures the average personal utility of individuals in country j. Note that
individuals have altruistic concern for the direct utility derived from their consumption
choice, but no altruistic concern for the indirect utility others derive from their altruistic
concern. This is done to avoid a loop effect where one individual would be affected by
another’s altruistic concern for that individual. From (2.31) it is straightforward to de-
termine that due to the atomistic nature of consumption, the individual’s consumption
choice has no impact on the utility of others, neither in their own country nor in any
other country, and therefore the individual’s consumption choice is still characterised by
19This approach is consistent with the same argument made in Johansson (1997).
20This is of course a personal welfare function rather than a social welfare function.
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(2.4). Thus altruism has no effect on an individual’s consumption choice. However, it
may affect the socially optimal levels of consumption as we will determine in the next
section. Just as we did for standard theory we will look at two cases of social welfare
optimisation, under a Domestic Planner and under a Global Planner.
2.4.2 Domestic Social Planner
The Domestic Planner maximises total welfare in their country. We assume that total
welfare is simply the sum of all individuals’ welfare including the effects of altruistic
concern for others. Therefore the social welfare function for a Domestic Planner is given
by






















(y + tj z̄j)− (c+ tj)z̄j + φ(z̄j)−Dj(Mizi +M−iz̄−i)
]}
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(2.32)
We still have identical personal welfare functions for all individuals in country i and there-
fore in the domestic optimum, each individual in country i will consume the same amount
of the dirty good. Maximising the social welfare function we find that the domestically
optimal level of consumption of the dirty good is characterised by21
φ′i(ẑ
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∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (2.33)
The above characterises the reaction function for each country analogous to those in
Section 2.3.2 leading to the non-cooperative Nash Equilibrium. Daube and Ulph (2016)
found that in the single country setting the level of altruistic concern for the utility of
21All the necessary second-order condition are assumed to hold.
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others has no impact on the socially optimal level of consumption. However, from (2.33)
we see that altruism does affect the domestic optimum in a multi-country setting. Taking
a closer look we can see that the degree to which the damage experienced in country i is
internalised is independent of the level of altruistic concern individuals in country i may
have for others in their country. This is consistent with the results of the model in Daube
and Ulph (2016). However, we also see that the degree to which damage experienced
in the other countries as the result of a consumption in country i is internalised by the
Domestic Planner is driven by the relative levels of altruistic concern. The key factor
in this multi-country setting is that the chosen level of consumption by the Domestic
Planner affects total emissions and thus also has an impact on the damage experienced
in the other country, which in turn has an impact on domestic welfare driven by their
level of altruistic concern for other countries welfare.
To clarify this, note that if individuals in country i did not have any altruistic concern
for the individuals in any other country (i.e. if αij = 0 ∀ j 6= i), then this would
be the same as under standard theory shown in (2.6). However, since individuals may
have altruistic concern for individuals in the other countries (potentially a different level
for each country), the damage experienced in country j 6= i but caused as a result of
consumption in country i now also enters the socially optimally level of consumption
in country i. Furthermore, note that the degree to which this influences the domestic
optimum is not simply a function of the altruistic concern for the other country, but
the level of altruistic concern for the other country relative to the concern for their own
private utility and altruistic concern for their own country. This means that the lower the
altruistic concern for the other country compared to the concern for their own country,
the less of the damage caused to other countries will be internalised.
To get a clearer picture of how exactly the level of altruistic concern influences the
domestic optimum it is helpful to look at the simpler case of just two countries. Then
the characterisation shown in (2.33) becomes
φ′1(ẑ
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determines to what degree the damage inflicted on country 2
is internalised, and captures the level of altruistic concern for country 2 relative to the
total weight given to the individual’s private utility of consumption (equal one) and their
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altruistic concern for all other individuals in country 1.
Due to the constraint on the total level of altruistic concern relative to the private utility
of consumption as defined in (2.30), which is α11M1 + α12M2 ≤ 1 in the two country
case, and assuming that there is at least some degree of altruistic concern for domestic
welfare if there is concern for the other country (i.e. α11 > 0 if α12 > 0), then we
know that α12M2
1+α11M1
< 1. Therefore the Domestic Planner will never fully internalise the
damage caused by consumption in country 1 but experienced in country 2. The only way
for the damage to be fully internalised is if there were no domestic altruism (α11 = 0)
while at the same time having the maximum level of altruistic concern for the other
country (α12M2 = 1). However, this special case could only occur in the case of two
countries. When there are more than two countries, none of coefficients could be equal
to one. We can therefore generalise this result to the n-country case and say that for
n > 2 the Domestic Planner will never fully internalise the damage imposed on any
other country caused by consumption in their country, regardless of the level of altruistic
concern (given the conditions imposed on the size of altruistic concern). While, unlike
in the single country model, the level of altruism does matter to the Domestic Planner,
and the impact of consumption on damage experienced in other countries is internalised
to some degree, it is not fully internalised.
Result 4 In a multi-country setting altruistic concern for the welfare of individuals in
another country is necessary for a domestic social planner to internalise to some degree
the damage inflicted on another country as a result of domestic consumption. The degree
to which damage in other countries is internalised depends on the altruistic concern for
the other country relative to the concern for the individuals direct utility and the welfare
of others in that country. However, for any n > 2 the Domestic Planner will never fully
internalise the damage inflicted on another country, regardless of the levels of altruistic
concern, given the constraints on the levels of altruistic concern as defined in (2.30).
From (2.33) we can also derive that
∂ẑDi
∂αij
< 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, where i 6= j. This makes
intuitive sense. As the degree of altruistic concern increases relative to the concern for
their own country, individuals will internalise more of the other countries’ damage and the




1 ≤ i ≤ n. An increase in the altruistic concern for the utility of their own country lowers
the relative importance of the damage experienced in other countries and therefore coun-
try i can consume more under the domestic equilibrium. Here it is of course important
to keep in mind that a decrease in the country i’s consumption will also have an effect on
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the equilibrium consumption in all other countries. Furthermore, as we have established
in detail in Section 2.3.2, the Nash Equilibrium level of consumption under the Domestic
Planner is a function of the relative population sizes and damage experienced in the other
countries, regardless whether there is altruistic concern or not.22
So far we have looked at this social optimum as internalising the damage inflicted on
another country. However, we can also evaluate whether the levels of altruistic con-
cern could be sufficient to induce a Domestic Planner to internalise global damage. To
investigate this we start by rewriting (2.34) as
φ′1(ẑ
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This is exactly the same as before only rewritten such that the last part of the equation
captures the marginal damage experienced in country 2 as the result of a consumption
change in country 2. It shows that the damage in country 2 is internalised to the degree
defined by the coefficient α12M1
1+α11M1
. If this coefficient is equal to one, the Domestic Planner
will fully internalise global damage, the same as the Global Planner would determine
under standard theory without altruism. We know that this is the case if
(α12 − α11)M1 = 1.
From this we see immediately that the condition requires that α12 > α11, which means
it requires that the level of altruistic concern for the other country is larger than it is for







We know that the left hand side of (2.36) is greater than one due to the constraint
imposed earlier on the total level of altruistic concern relative to the private utility of
consumption (α11M1 + α12M2 ≤ 1). Therefore for the condition to hold, we require M1
to be larger than M2 and in such a way that the ratio between the sum of the concern
for the individual’s private utility and the welfare of all others in the same country and
the concern for individuals in the other country is the same as the ratio between the
population sizes of the two countries. Intuitively this means that the size of country 2
22Assuming non-linear damage functions.
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has to be sufficiently small and the level of altruistic concern for the other country be
sufficiently larger than the concern for the domestic welfare in order for the total weight
of the altruistic concern to have enough weight in the domestic social welfare function
that it fully internalises the damage of country 2. In the n-country case this would have
to hold for each of the other countries and for this to be consistent with the restriction in
(2.30) country 1 has to become larger and larger relative to all other countries the more
countries there are.23 It is noteworthy that it is counter-intuitive that this condition
would actually hold, since it is reasonable to expect that the level of altruistic concern
for the welfare in another country is not greater that the level of concern for welfare in
their own country.
Next we want to establish how the domestic optimum with Pure Altruism is affected by a
change in population size in country i. Again turning to the case of only two countries, we
find that the change in the domestic optimum in country 1 as a result of the population

















































Since we know that AD1 A
D
2 < 1 from the restriction put on the total level of altruistic
concern we also know that, as in the case without altruism, an increase in consumption
in country 1 leads to a decrease in domestically optimal consumption of the dirty good





























23For example in the case of three countries we would require that M1 ≥ 2M2 and M1 ≥ 2M3.
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Similar to the findings under standard theory, it is not clear whether consumption in
country 2 will increase or decrease as a result of the population increase in country 1.
The condition for ∂z2
∂M1
> 0 is given by
−φ′′1(.) <











where of course the left hand side is a positive value. While this condition is not straight-
forward to interpret, the intuition is the same as for the case without altruism. If country
1 is sufficiently large or the marginal damage in country 1 is sufficiently high relative to
the private benefit of consumption in country 1 and the size and marginal damage in
country 2, the decrease in consumption in country 1 can be such that country 2 could
actually increase consumption of the dirty good under a Domestic Planner. Of course the
levels of altruistic concern the two countries have for themselves and the other country
influences how much a country changes its consumption of the dirty good.24
We have already determined earlier that equilibrium consumption in country 1 will de-




and that equilibrium consumption in country 1 will increase with an increase in the level
of altruistic concern for their own country (i.e.
∂ẑD1
∂α11
> 0). In the result shown in (2.37)
we defined the parameters AD1 and A
D
2 . These represent the level of altruistic concern by
individuals in country 1 and country 2 for the other country relative to the concern for
their country and the direct utility from consumption respectively. As already established
it is the relative levels of altruism that matter, and therefore it is these parameters that















Therefore, as we would expect, consumption in country 1 decreases as the relative level of
altruistic concern for country 2 increases. However, equilibrium consumption in country
1 also depends on consumption in country 2. Since we know that an increase in AD2 will
decrease consumption in country 2, we can deduce that this means that consumption in
24Also note that if both AD1 = 0 and A
D
2 = 0, then the condition described in (2.39) reduces to that
shown in (2.13).
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This shows that consumption in country 1 increases as the relative level of altruistic
concern by individuals in country 2 for country 1 increases. This is consistent with our
earlier findings. Note that AD2 does not affect the consumption choice of country 1 directly
but only through the change in the consumption level for country 2. Therefore we can









This illustrates that as AD2 increases, consumption in country 2 decreases in line with
the equivalent of (2.40) for country 2. And since consumption in country 2 decreases,
consumption in country 1 increases.
We can now turn to see how the socially optimum level from the perspective of a Global
Planner is affected by the presence of Pure Altruism.
2.4.3 Global Social Planner
As before, the global social planner simultaneously maximises the joint welfare functions
of all n countries. Therefore total global welfare is given by












Taking the first order condition with respect to zi, it is then straightforward to derive that






























∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(2.43)
The above shows that - just as in the case of the Domestic Planner - the damage in
country i is fully internalised, but the degree to which damage in the other countries is
internalised depends on the relative levels of altruistic concern. Although this relative
level of altruism is different from the Domestic Planner case, it shows that it is by no
means given that the Global Planner fully internalises global damage equally in each
country. One may intuitively expect that for a Global Planner the degrees of altruistic
concern would cancel out somehow and we would still arrive at the same global optimum
as described under standard theory in (2.22). However, this is not the case and altruism
clearly does matter. In order to get a better understanding of what exactly is going on,
let us look at the simplified case of only two countries. Then the global optimum for
country 1 is characterised by
φ′1(ẑ
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The first point that is evident from (2.44) is that the degree to which damage in country
2 is internalised does not just depend on the relative level of altruistic concern in country
1 for their own country and country 2 (as is the case for the Domestic Planner), but now
the combined levels of altruistic concern in both countries for country 2 relative to the
combined levels of altruistic concern in both countries for country 1 drive the degree to
which damage in country 2 is internalised. This is because the Global Planner maximises
the joint global welfare function that also includes the effect of country 2 on country
1 and their levels of altruistic concern. Indeed, it is straightforward to see that if in
both countries the level of altruistic concern is at the same level for their own country
as it is for the other country (or in other words α11 = α12 and α22 = α21), then the
coefficient is equal to one and the socially optimal level fully internalises global damage
(i.e. φ′1(ẑ
G






2 )). And of course it is also evident that in this case
the socially optimal level in country 2 fully internalises damage in country 1 as well, and
25All the necessary second-order condition are assumed to hold.
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we have the same optimum as under standard theory without altruism. To generalise this
to the n-country case we would require αii = αij ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n. But because the levels of
altruistic concern may be different for each country, and each of those parameters enters
the global welfare function, the global optimum with Pure Altruism may very well be
different from the standard theory result where each country internalises global damage
to the same degree. Also note that even if there is only altruistic concern by individuals
for their own countries (αij = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j) then the global optimum is still
not the same as under standard theory unless the degree of altruistic concern within each
country is also the same.
However, it is not strictly necessary to have exactly the same levels of altruistic concern
for the other countries as for their own country in order for the coefficient for the marginal
damage of the other country to be 1. More generally we can see that the marginal damage







Let us refer to the difference between the altruistic concern for their own country and
the concern for the other country as the ’additional domestic altruism’ (e.g. α11 − α12),
assuming for simplicity that the altruistic concern for their own country is larger than for
the other country. Then we can see from the above that if the relative level of additional
domestic altruism in both countries is equal to the inverse of the relative size of the two
countries the global optimum will internalise global damage equally for each country. In
the n-country case, this requirement becomes a little more complicated. In order for
the damage of country j to be fully internalised in the socially optimum consumption
of country i we would require the population weighted additional domestic altruism in
country i to be equal to the sum of the population weighted additional altruism for
country j relative to country i by all other countries. Specifically we would require






∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j. (2.45)
The above condition is necessary for the global optimum to equally internalise global
damage in each country. However, the key intuition behind a global social optimum
including degrees of Pure Altruism in the welfare function is that one country may in-
ternalise more of the damage due to the relative levels of altruism compared to another
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country. Indeed, if the population weighted sum of the altruistic concern for country j
across all countries is greater than the sum of population weighted altruistic concern for
country i, then the social optimum for country i would imply internalising more than
global marginal damage. Of course in turn country j’s optimal consumption level would
internalise less than global marginal damage. If, in a two-country example, country 1
has a large amount of altruistic concern for the welfare of country 2 but country 2 has a
low level of altruistic concern for the welfare of individuals in country 1 but a high level
of concern for the welfare of their own country, then the global welfare function will put
more weight on the damage experienced in country 2 than a Global Planner would do
under standard theory. Altruistic concern of individuals in country 1 for country 2 means
that the individuals in country 1 do not just experience the damage directly, but they
also suffer to some degree the damage the individuals in country 2 experience. Therefore
they are affected more by the externality than they would be without altruism.
Result 5 In a multi-country setting the socially optimal level of consumption from a
global social planner’s perspective is driven by the relative levels of altruistic concern. If,
in each country, the levels of altruistic concern for the domestic welfare is the same as
the level of altruistic concern for welfare in all other countries, then the social optimum
internalises the global damage equally across each country. However, if the relative levels
of altruistic concern for a particular country by other countries are large, the welfare of
that country - and therefore the damage function of that country - will carry more weight
in determining the global optimum.
Comparing both the optimal consumption levels under the Domestic Planner with that
of the Global Planner, we can further determine that as long as the level of altruistic
concern for domestic welfare is larger than the level of concern for the welfare in other
countries (i.e. αii > αij ∀ 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, i 6= j), then the global social optimum will lead to
a lower consumption level of the dirty good compared to the domestic social optimum.
This makes intuitive sense since the Global Planner would, on average, internalise more
of the global effect of the externality than a Domestic Planner could achieve through the
effect of altruism alone.
Next, we again want to show how the optimal consumption levels in each country are
affected by a population increase in one country. For this, let us turn back to the case of
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, AG2 =
1 + α11M1 + α21M2
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2 = 1 we can see that the second part of the numerator falls away. Note that
the only differences between (2.46) and (2.37) are the altruism parameters AD and AG.





















Therefore optimal consumption falls in both countries as a result of a population increase
in either country. This is consistent with Global Planner results under standard theory
shown in Section 2.3.3. Finally, similar to the Domestic Planner case, it is intuitive and







As we would expect, if the level of altruistic concern for country 2 (by either country)
increases relative to the altruistic concern for country 1, the optimal consumption level
in country 1 decreases as the welfare of country 2 then has more weight in the global
welfare function compared to country 1. Similarly, if the altruistic concern for country 1
increases relative to the altruistic concern for country 2, the optimal consumption level
for country 1 increases. We have now completed the analysis of the non-cooperative and
cooperative equilibria in the presence of Pure Altruism. To complete the analysis let us
now see how the optimal tax to induce this optimal behaviour under both the Domestic
Planner and the Global Planner has changed compared to standard theory.
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2.4.4 Optimal Tax
We have seen in Section 2.4.1 that adding Pure Altruism to the individual’s utility func-
tion does not alter individual behaviour due to the atomistic nature of the consumption
decision in this model. However, we have also determined that altruistic concern for
other countries does influence the socially optimal level of consumption, whether this is
the level determined through the non-cooperative equilibrium as a result of Domestic
Planners or the global optimum determined by the cooperative solution of the Global
Planner. This is a key difference compared to the results under standard theory as well
as compared to a single country model with Pure Altruism.
Yet, because individual behaviour is unaffected by their altruism, under both solutions
discussed every individual in country i still consumes the same amount of the dirty good
and we can induce this solution through a tax on the dirty good. For the Domestic















i +M−iz̄−i) ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(2.48)
As under standard theory, this tax may be different for each country depending on their
damage function. In addition, it is now also a function of the altruistic concern individuals
in this country may have. However, we also see now that, unlike under standard theory,
to achieve the global optimum we cannot impose the same tax in every country and
need to have a different tax for each country depending on the relative levels of altruistic


























∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(2.49)
As discussed in the previous section already, the required tax on the dirty good would
only be the same for each country if for each country the degree of altruistic concern for
their own country is the same as that for every other country. Even if that were the case,
it means that inducing the global optimum requires significantly more information about
individuals and the damage caused in individual countries; knowledge about global dam-
age is not sufficient anymore. Not only does the Global Planner require information about
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the various levels of altruistic concern, but also about the different damage functions for
each country. This is important because with altruistic concern, even if a cooperative
solution can be achieved, it is not straightforward for policy makers to determine the
Pigovian tax for each country.
Result 6 With Pure Altruism in a multi-country setting the cooperative global (first-
best) solution can no longer be induced by a single global tax on the dirty good unless in
each country the levels of altruistic concern for the domestic welfare are the same as the
concern for welfare in all other countries.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has shown that while individual behaviour is unaffected by altruism in the
multi-country setting, meaning individuals will free-ride in the absence of a tax on the
dirty good regardless of their level of altruistic concern for others, determining the opti-
mal level of consumption of the dirty good for both a non-cooperative and cooperative
welfare maximising solution, as well as determining the right tax to induce that level,
becomes more complex. Individual behaviour is unaffected due to the atomistic nature
of the consumption decision. Therefore no matter how much they may care about the
welfare of others, in their country or another, their consumption choice has no impact
on global emissions. The chosen consumption level is only determined by the private
marginal benefit and cost of consumption.
Given the global nature of climate change, non-cooperating governments might maximise
domestic welfare, taking consumption in other countries as given. However the social
optimum is determined by the global cooperative solution where global welfare is max-
imised for each country simultaneously. With or without altruism, the global optimum
implies lower average consumption compared to non-cooperative solution. While indi-
viduals will free-ride on the damage their consumption causes, governments maximising
domestic welfare only will also free-ride on the damage caused to other countries. Under
standard theory the Domestic Planner will only internalise domestic damage, while a
Global Planner will internalise global damage completely and differences in optimal con-
sumption are only caused by differences in private preferences and the cost of production
of the dirty good. Therefore the global optimum can be induced by a single tax rate
on the dirty good for everyone globally, equal to global marginal damage from the dirty
good. This is a common result in the literature.
However, this chapter has shown that if individuals exhibit altruistic concern for the
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utility of others, both the non-cooperative solution as well as the global optimum will
change. If individuals exhibit altruistic concern for the welfare of other countries, then
the Domestic planners’ non-cooperative solution will internalise the damage caused to
other countries depending on the level of altruistic concern for that country relative to
the altruistic concern for their own country and their own private utility. However, the
Domestic Planner will never fully internalise global damage if there are more than two
countries. Altruistic concern for other countries effectively increases the damage individ-
uals experience as they will not just be affected by the damage they experience directly,
but also the damage others experience. Consequently, even the Domestic Planner has to
take account of damage caused to other countries. The key result, however, is that the
global optimum is affected by the existence of altruistic concern for the same reasons.
Effectively altruism means that global damage is now not the simple sum of all the indi-
vidual damage functions but the weighting has to be adjusted for the damage experienced
via altruistic concern for others. This depends on the relative levels of altruistic concern
each country has for their own country and for other countries, and means that unless
for each country the altruistic concern for their own country is the same as for all other
countries, the global optimum will be different from standard theory. From this it also
follows that although altruistic concern leads the Domestic Planner to internalise some of
the damage, the gap between the non-cooperative solution and the global optimum may
not narrow. Furthermore, this chapter has shown that with altruism the global optimum
can no longer be achieved by a single tax equal to global marginal damage but has to be
adjusted for each country depending on the levels of altruistic concern. This significantly
increases the information policy makers require to set the right tax on emissions even if
a global cooperative solution could be achieved.
This chapter is inspired by the model developed in Daube and Ulph (2016), whose main
contribution is the development of an alternative theory of behaviour where individuals
do not necessarily act in a utility-maximising way, but may base their consumption de-
cision on a hypothetical moral benefit determined by asking what would be optimal if
they and everybody else were to make the same choice. Therefore a natural extension of
this chapter would be to apply this alternative theory of behaviour to the multi-country
setting developed here. Furthermore, in order to develop more concrete policy recommen-
dations it may be useful to link this model to empirical analysis of the degrees of altruistic




Moral Behaviour, Altruism &
Environmental Policy
3.1 Introduction
In a recent paper assessing the challenges that policy-makers and society face in ad-
dressing climate change, Galarraga and Markandya (2009) point out the key ethical and
welfare considerations that need to be taken into account - in particular the intra-and
inter-generational impact of the damage that climate change may bring. While economists
frequently consider these ethical considerations in terms of the formulation of the appro-
priate welfare objective for policy-makers to pursue, an equally important issue is how
far individuals themselves take these factors into account when deciding what actions to
take and what policies they are willing to support. This raises the important question of
the extent to which policy action might be needed if individuals themselves are willing to
alter their behaviour as they recognise the potential harm that their actions might cause.
As both Stern (2007) and Galarraga and Markandya (2009) point out, climate change
represents one of the largest externalities that society has had to face, and, like all exter-
nalities, the fundamental need for policy intervention arises from free-riding behaviour - in
this case not just by individuals and companies but also by governments. In the classical
analysis of externalities, free-riding arises because individuals are purely self-interested,
and so perceive that, while they bear all the costs of changing their consumption be-
haviour, they may get only a very small gain in terms of the reduced damage that they
themselves will suffer. In the extreme case, individuals may calculate that their emissions
are so insignificant relative to the total, that total emissions and hence any damage that
they (and others) might suffer will be unaffected by whatever consumption choices they
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make.1 In these circumstances individuals make their consumption choices ignoring any
effect these choices have on climate change and the damage it will cause.2 The classic
prescription is the introduction of a Pigovian tax (equal to social marginal damage) so
that individuals face the full economic cost of their consumption decisions.
It is sometimes thought that if individuals are not self-interested, but instead are altruistic
and so take account of the effect of their actions on others, this may overcome free-riding
behaviour. However, as we will show, as long as individuals continue to believe that total
emissions are completely unaffected by whatever they do, then howevermuch they care
about others, their behaviour will not change, and the optimal policy is to impose exactly
the same tax as if individuals were self-interested. For individual behaviour to change,
individuals need to make their consumption decisions in a different way. While there have
been a number of theories of pro-social behaviour, these typically involve individuals ob-
taining some kind of utility gain from behaving morally. This chapter proposes a new
theory of moral behaviour whereby individuals recognise that they will be worse off by
not acting in their own self-interest, and balance this cost off against a hypothetical moral
value of adopting a Kantian form of behaviour, that is by calculating the consequences
of their action by asking what would happen if everyone else acted in the same way as
they did. The analysis of the baseline model shows that
1. individuals behaving this way will adjust their behaviour to take account of the
impact of their decision on themselves and others.
2. if individuals behave in this way, then altruism can matter and, depending on the
choice function, the greater the degree of altruism the more individuals cut back
their consumption of a ’dirty’ good.
3. nevertheless the optimal environmental tax is exactly the same as that emerging
from the classical analysis where individuals are purely self-interested.
While the baseline results are developed under a simple linear choice function, this chap-
1This inability to influence the total level of the externality will be referred to as ’atomistic’ con-
sumption.
2Echoes of such free-riding behaviour can be found in a paper by Longo et al. (2012) reporting on
a study conducted in the Basque Country on people’s willingness to pay for the ancillary benefits of
climate change mitigation. They note that, as in many such studies, while many people reveal a positive
willingness to pay, there is a group of protestors who say they do not want to pay for these benefits,
either because they do not think the proposed policy actions will be effective, or because they feel that
others should contribute.
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ter shows that these results also hold with a more generalised choice function.3 Further
extensions to the baseline model show that even if preferences are heterogenous, the op-
timal tax is still the same as under the baseline model. This also holds when individuals
exhibit a desire for conformity in addition to the alternative form of behaviour. Further-
more, if individuals choose consumption of two different dirty goods, an increase in the
tax on one good can either increase or decrease consumption of the other good.
A key result of this chapter is that the existence of altruistic and ’moral’ behaviour does
not change the socially optimal tax on an environmentally harmful good. Johansson
(1997) previously modelled the socially optimal tax on an externality for different types
altruism and compared it to the standard Pigovian tax level. Using a setting of discrete
individuals, he finds that the optimal tax in the presence of altruistic concern for others’
utility is the same as the standard tax in large populations. This is in line with the find-
ings of this chapter.4 However, Johansson (1997) uses a different approach to analysing
the case where individuals’ behaviour is driven by something other than maximising their
utility (i.e. Genuine Altruism), and finds that the optimal tax is lower than under stan-
dard theory. Contrary to this chapter, Johansson (1997) is not analysing a Kantian type
of behaviour and therefore uses a different type of choice function that includes the indi-
vidual’s and everybody else’s utility. He further assumes that all individuals are identical
in their degree of altruism or morality.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 conducts a brief discussion of the litera-
ture on pro-social behaviour and altruism. Section 3.3 then develops the baseline model,
starting with standard theory excluding any form of altruism in Section 3.3.1. This serves
as counterfactual to the remaining analysis. Section 3.3.2 then proceeds to layer on a
type of Pure Altruism that will be defined carefully in what follows. Section 3.3.3 turns
to the central element of this chapter by developing the theory of moral behaviour. Sec-
tions 3.3.4 and 3.3.5 will then look at two variations of the baseline model to see how
the results may change. Following this, Section 3.4 furthers the analysis by looking at a
generalisation of the choice function to show that the main results are not dependent on
the linear choice function used in the baseline model. Section 3.5 extends the model to
the case where individuals choose consumption of a range of different dirty goods rather
than just one while Section 3.6 develops the model to capture heterogenous preferences
3Note that, as shown in Section 3.4.6, a choice function non-linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit
altruism does not necessarily always lead to a reduction in consumption of the dirty good as the level of
altrsuim increases.
4However, the model developed in this chapter uses a continuum of individuals in order to capture
the atomistic nature of the consumption choice in the context of global environmental externalities such
as climate change.
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over the dirty good. As a final extension, Section 3.7 combines the theory of alternative
behaviour with a model where individuals have a desire for conformity. Finally, Section
3.8 will present a brief discussion of the model and results as well as make suggestions
for future research based on the findings in this chapter.
3.2 Review of Literature
3.2.1 Warm-Glow and Concern for Self-Image
As described in the Introduction, pro-social (and pro-environmental) behaviour is usually
at odds with standard economic analysis, which predicts that in a non-cooperative setting,
individuals only make negligible contributions to public goods. For example, Andreoni
(1988) shows that in large populations the share of individuals making contributions to
a public good tends to zero as the free-riding effect dominates.5 However, when con-
tributing to the public good also yields some utility benefit to the individual, voluntary
contributions can be consistent with standard economic models. Andreoni (1989, 1990)
models the individual’s utility not just as a function of the consumption of the private and
public goods, but also of the individual’s contribution to the public good itself. This is
commonly referred to as the ’warm-glow’ effect and describes a form of Impure Altruism.
Andreoni’s development of warm-glow giving is based on the analysis of the provision of
impure public goods by Cornes and Sandler (1984). The analysis of impure public goods
also has importance in the area of environmental policy. For example, Markandya and
Rübbelke (2004) analyse ancillary benefits of climate policy and argue that policymakers
should consider these more thoroughly. Further, Markandya and Rübbelke (2012) look
at the under-provision of impure public technologies in an environmental context while
Altemeyer-Bartscher et al. (2014) take into account that climate policy is an impure pub-
lic good in their analysis of tax-transfer schemes in relation to international public goods.
However, Impure Altruism and impure public goods are not the same concept. Impure
public good means that the good itself has some private characteristics and this may
impact individuals’ contribution to the public good. Whether a public good is a pure
or impure public good depends on the characteristics of the good, and is independent of
how the good is funded. However, Impure Altruism relates to the decision individuals
make regarding the funding for the provision of the public good, and, in particular, to
the relative weights they place on the benefits to themselves and to others in making that
decision. For example, a public good may of a pure nature (i.e. both non-excludable and
non-rivalrous) and confer no private benefits of the type mentioned above. An altruistic
5Also see Bergstrom et al. (1986).
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individual will value the benefits that the provision of this good brings to others but may,
in addition, derive some utility gain (warm-glow) from knowing that they are taking an
action (contributing) that gives benefits to others. The label ’impure’ therefore refers to
the nature of utility derived from an altruistic action, but not to the properties of the
public good the individual is contributing to.
’Warm-glow’ can also be interpreted as a self-image gain from contributing to the public
good.6 While Andreoni makes no assumptions regarding the psychological cause of this
’warm-glow’, various other authors have developed more sophisticated models with regard
to the underlying motivation. These models usually work on the premise that individuals
derive intrinsic value from a self-image desire or social norms. Bénabou and Tirole (2006),
for example, model a ”reputational payoff” (p. 1656) from contribution to a public good,
which is also a function of the belief others have regarding the type of consumer this in-
dividual is. In a model by Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) the level of social approval
depends on whether the individual himself approves of the person who approves him. Ny-
borg et al. (2006) also construct a model where individuals are motivated by a concern for
self-image. However, this self-image is a function of the total benefit a ’green’ good yields
to the population, as well as their perception of what share of the population is choosing
to consume the ’green’ option.7 This means the consumer’s intrinsic incentive to be pro-
social increases as the share of the population acting that way increases.8 On the other
hand, Brekke et al. (2003) develop a model where individuals are able to make a more
sophisticated calculation of the ”morally ideal effort” (p. 1971). This is achieved by eval-
uating the socially optimal contribution to a public good if they and everybody else were
to make the same choice. The individual then derives self-image value depending on how
close their contribution is to that socially optimal level, while trading off the self-image
gain against the utility benefit from consumption. In this setting the individual of course
still behaves according to the utility-maximisation principle. However, a key difference to
the standard warm-glow approach is that individuals are able to make the quite sophisti-
cated calculation of what the social optimum constitutes. The results of the analysis by
6Also note that Andreoni refers to the case of an individual who only cares about the total supply
of the public good as Pure Altruism. However, although the total supply of a public good also affects
others, this chapter, as well as other literature on altruism, uses the term Pure Altruism to refer to an
individual’s direct concern for the utility of others. A more detailed description of how Pure Altruism is
modelled will be provided later in this section.
7To some extent this also captures the idea of a social norm or peer pressure and an individual’s
belief about what others do can be more important than what they actually do. Their analysis also
shows that such norms can lead to herd behaviour. See Section 3.2.2 for more on social norms.
8Because what matters in their model is the individual’s perception of what others do, Nyborg et al.
(2006) further argue that policy makers may be able to influence this perception, for example through
advertising. Also, a temporary tax on the environmentally harmful good could move the population to
a permanent ’green’ equilibrium even when the tax is later removed.
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Brekke et al. (2003) still lead to under-provision of a public good and furthermore show
that extrinsic incentives can reduce private provision of the public good due to the effect
they can have on the individuals’ perception of what constitutes the morally best choice.9
3.2.2 Social Norms
The concepts on warm-glow and self-image concern link to the notion of social norms
where individuals’ choices can be affected by what others in the population do. This is a
very broad area and there are various ways to approach this. For example, conspicuous
consumption, a term introduced by Veblen (1924), describes the consumption of status
goods in order to signal status to others. When individuals are motivated this way, the
utility an individual obtains is a function of the individual’s consumption relative to the
consumption of a peer group. This type of competitive consumption can lead to over-
consumption of a good. Similarly, an individual may also be willing to pay a higher price
for a status good compared to a non-status - but otherwise equal - good. This is called
the Veblen effect.10 Arrow and Dasgupta (2009) use an inter-temporal model to anal-
yse conspicuous consumption behaviour and find that conspicuous consumption might
not lead to a market distortion but this is dependent on the number of goods subject
to the conspicuous consumption effect as well as the formulation of the utility function.
Dasgupta et al. (2015) model conspicuous consumption with multiple goods where con-
sumption creates a negative environmental externality. They also find that conspicuous
consumption does not necessarily have to lead to a market distortion and there may be
no need for the government to correct for the conspicuous consumption effect. However,
they also note that these results are only derived under very specific conditions.
While an individual strives to consume more than others when competitive consump-
tion is present, another approach to social norms is that an individual will benefit from
making a consumption choice as close as possible to a certain norm level.11 Information
effects are one way in which the choice of others can influence consumption decisions.
9Another area of the literature where individuals may have utility gains from behaving in pro-
environmental ways looks at individuals’ concern for relative consumption. An example relevant to
the analysis of global public goods such as climate protection is the work by Aronsson and Johansson-
Stenman (2014), who look at optimal provision of national and global public goods when individuals
care about relative consumption levels.
10The Veblen effect is used to explain the Easterlin Paradox (Easterlin 1974, 2001) which states that
once a certain per capita income is reached, a further increase in income per capita has no impact on
individuals’ well-being.
11See Hargreaves Heap (2013) for an overview of the various ways in which individuals may derive
benefit from conforming to a social norm.
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For example, Allcott (2011) use a natural experiment where residential electricity cus-
tomers were sent reports comparing their consumption to that of neighbours, resulting
in significant reductions in electricity consumption.12 Being member of a group can also
enhance trust between individuals which is similar to the idea of social capital. However,
while group membership may enhance trust within the group it may also reduce trust
to individuals outside the group (see for example Putnam (2000), Dasgupta (2000) and
Hargreaves Heap 2013).
Another way in which social norms can affect behaviour is when more intrinsic bene-
fits are derived from belonging to a group. Akerlof and Kranton (2000) build a model
incorporating self-identity and how this could affect individual interaction. They argue
that individuals derive a psychological benefit from being part of a group since this a key
aspect of self-identity. This is in line with Adam Smith’s concept of ”special pleasure of
mutual sympathy” (Smith 1759, Chapter 2). Similar to the warm-glow effect from the
contribution to a public good described earlier, individuals may also derive a warm-glow
from conforming with a social norm. This type of behaviour where individuals are more
willing, for example, to contribute to a public good if they know that others in their peer
group act similarly, is called conditional cooperation.13 For example, Azar (2004) models
tipping behaviour where the tipping choice is determined both by conformity to a social
norm driven by the avoidance of social disapproval, as well as a warm-glow factor such
as self-image and impressing others. He finds that for a norm to be sustained over time
these other benefits have to be present, otherwise the norm will disappear eventually.
Such a warm-glow effect derived from behaviour relative to a social norm can also have
an impact on recycling behaviour as investigated by Bruvoll and Nyborg (2004), Brekke
et al. (2010) and Abbott et al. (2013), among others. In addition, Buchholz et al. (2014)
analyse non-governmental public norm enforcement in a two-stage model where individu-
als first voluntarily contribute to a non-governmental agency that provides social approval
incentives for public good provision in the second stage. That way voluntary public good
provision can be maintained in a non-cooperative equilibrium where individuals do not
exhibit any altruism.
Bernheim (1994) develops a model where individuals care about the perception others
have about their type relative to some ideal type.14 The analysis shows that if status is
12This is consistent with similar studies using smaller samepls such as Nolan et al. (2008) and Schultz
et al. (2007).
13See Chaudhuri (2011) for a literature survey on sustaining cooperation in laboratory public good
experiments.
14An individual’s type is private information in this model.
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important enough then, despite heterogenous preferences, individuals may conform to a
single norm. However, individuals with extreme preferences will not conform regardless
of the loss of status.15 Ulph and Ulph (2014) develop a model where individuals have
a desire for conformity but choose whether to adhere to a norm before they make their
consumption decision. If an individual chooses to adhere to the norm, the individual
derives a benefit from conformity but at the same time has disutility depending on how
far the chosen consumption level is from the norm level and the individual’s strength of
adherence to the norm. In addition, the norms are not exogenous but are determined
endogenously by the consumption decisions individuals make. This model is the basis for
the extension developed in Section 3.7 and will be described in more detail then.
3.2.3 Motivation Crowding
The analysis by Nyborg et al. (2006) described earlier argues that extrinsic incentives such
as taxes and subsidies can enhance the level of green consumerism. There are a number
of studies aiming to establish how intrinsic incentives of behaviour can be affected by
extrinsic incentives such as fines or taxes. The theories of this are usually based on case
study observations where people’s behaviour changed in response to the imposition of
some extrinsic incentive. A key contribution in this field was made by Deci (1971), whose
experiment established that people are motivated by intrinsic incentives and found that
extrinsic (monetary) rewards dependent on performance reduce the intrinsic motivation
for a certain task. Another example is Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) who find that
people’s willigness to accept a nuclear facility in their community was reduced when
monetary compensation was offered. Frey (1997) points out that external incentives can
both crowd-out or crowd-in intrinsic motivation depending on the type of incentive ap-
plied. In the context of environmental issues, Frey (1999) and Frey and Jegen (2001)
argue that policy instruments such as taxes and subsidies can crowd out environmen-
tal concern as they reduce the level of self-determination of individuals and violate the
idea of reciprocity based on the concept of an implicit contract of acknowledgement of
each other’s action that is broken through extrinsic incentives. Indeed, the crowding-out
effect can even outweigh the relative price effect of an extrinsic incentive. In addition,
Frey (1999) develops the proposition that not just does any form of regulation undermine
environmental concern, but the complexity of such regulation is of importance. Further-
more, he argues that taxes do crowd out environmental concern but the effect is smaller
compared to the case of tradable emission permits as these can be seen as giving the
15Such reputational gains are similar to the approach used by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) described
earlier and based on earlier work such as Akerlof (1980) and Jones (1984).
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owner a legitimate right to pollute and therefore reduce all sense of ’wrongness’ associ-
ated with the activity. Bénabou and Tirole (2006) also argue that extrinsic incentives
can crowd out intrinsic motivation but develop a slightly different reason for this effect.
They argue that the existence of extrinsic incentives leads to uncertainty over whether
the individual’s behaviour is driven by intrinsic motivation or the extrinsic incentives and
therefore makes it difficult to assess the ’virtue’ of the individual. Bénabou and Tirole
(2006) take the view that prosocial behaviour is largely driven by concerns of reputation
and extrinsic incentives such as rewards or punishments can crowd out this motivation.
In line with this they also argue that the level of intrinsic motivation is a function of
memorability and prominence of the prosocial activity as this increases the reputational
value of the activity. They note, however, that with heterogeneity in individuals’ image
concerns, prosocial activities may be suspected of having been undertaken only for image
reasons and this would reduce the effectiveness of rewards like public praise. Similarly,
the inferences and reputational value that can be drawn from any prosocial activity also
depend on what others in the economy choose to do.
While extrinsic incentives can reduce the level of intrinsic motivation, Frey (1999) argues
that environmental concern can be enhanced (or crowded-in) through personal relation-
ships, through principals and agents communicating with each other, or when employees
are able to participate in the decision making process because these factors increase the
level of self-determination and acknowledgement of intrinsically motivated behaviour. In
particular he develops the proposition that environmental concern is supported in the
short term by appeals and participation, and in the long run by education which in-
creases the self determination aspect. Nyborg and Rege (2003) find that while different
models of the motivation for prosocial behaviour such as impure altruism, social norms
and fairness lead to mixed conclusions regarding the influence of government provision
on private contributions to a public good, in all models subsidies will crowd-in private
contributions. Due to the dynamics of the crowding out-effect, Frey (1999) points out
that either ’low’ or ’high’ environmental tax rates are more effective than ’intermediate’
tax rates. This is because a ’low’ tax would work in support of environmental concern,
while ’high’ tax rates will completely outweigh moral concerns yet still achieve the de-
sired outcome. Tax rates in between, however, may crowd out moral motivation while
the extrinsic incentive is not strong enough to reduce emissions sufficiently. He concludes
that a complementary approach of both traditional and behavioural policy instruments
is important for effective environmental policy. Traditionally, when a policy instrument
such as a tax is seen not to be working as desired, it is usually just applied in a stronger
way. However, by doing that it is possible that the crowding-out effect starts dominating
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and environmental damage may even increase. Instead, the tax should be supported by
a policy instrument that supports the crowding-in of environmental concern.
3.2.4 Altruism
Most of the contributions discussed in Section 3.2.1 capture a form of Impure Altruism
where, to some extent, the contribution itself matters to an individual’s utility. However,
altruism is instead often viewed as a concern for the welfare of others.16 The two main
types of altruism that capture an individual’s concern for others’ welfare are Pure Altru-
ism and Paternalistic Altruism. Pure Altruism uses the idea that an individual’s utility
may to some degree be a function of others’ utility, but not just a specific component of
it. Applications of this type of altruism are often used with smaller settings, such as the
family where one might care about the welfare of specific individuals (for example Becker
1974, 1981). In large-scale contexts it can also be assumed that an individual cares for the
total or average welfare of all other individuals in the population (see Hammond (1987)
and Johansson (1997) for example).17 Paternalistic Altruism differs from Pure Altruism
in that it does not assume that an individual’s utility is a function of others’ utility as
such, but a specific component of that utility (see Archibald and Donaldson (1976)). In
an environmental context, this component may be the damage experienced by others
from the environmentally harmful good. While Impure Altruism only takes into account
the individual’s contribution to the externality, Paternalistic Altruism means that the in-
dividual is affected by others’ experience of the externality, regardless of the individual’s
contribution. All these types of altruism still assume that individuals maximise their
utility when acting pro-socially. Genuine Altruism as defined by Kennett (1980), on the
other hand, requires that individuals’ behaviour is driven by some function other than
maximising their utility. For example, the individual may make the consumption choice
by maximising a function consisting of their own utility and everybody else’s utility, but
by doing so will incur a loss in utility compared to standard economic behaviour.18 Since
this implies a deviation from ’rational’ behaviour driven by self-interest economists usu-
ally assume, it is the most drastic form of altruism.
Johansson (1997) models the socially optimal tax on an externality for all four types of
16The literature on altruism is very rich and we will only make a superficial survey as relevant to this
chapter. For more detail, Fontaine (2008) provides a summary of the history of the concept of altruism
in economics.
17Also see Nyborg and Rege (2003) for basic modelling approaches to public good provision including
Pure and Impure Altruism.
18See Johansson (1997) for an example of this.
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altruism described above and compares it to the standard Pigovian tax level. He uses a
model of discrete, identical consumers, who choose between a ’clean’ good and a ’dirty’
good, which in turn causes the externality. The government imposes a tax on the dirty
good, but tax revenues are distributed back to the consumer. The analysis finds that un-
der Pure Altruism the optimal level of tax is equal to the standard Pigovian level in large
populations. This result is driven by the assumption that the size of altruistic concern
has to be small relative to the private consumption utility in order to maintain realistic
proportionality of the utility function. However, with a form of Genuine Altruism where
individuals maximise a function of the weighted sum of their own utility and everybody
else’s utility, Johansson (1997) finds that the optimal tax is lower than the Pigovian tax.
The socially optimal level of consumption is unchanged from the standard level as this
type of altruism does not affect it, but the individual will demand this lower level of con-
sumption due to the function maximised and therefore the requirement on the tax level
is reduced. If the weight in the maximisation were equal between the individual’s utility
and all others’ utility, the tax rate would drop to zero. Furthermore, for Paternalistic
Altruism Johansson (1997) finds that the tax is higher than the Pigovian tax because, as
individuals take into account others’ experience of the externality, the socially optimally
level of the externality is reduced and therefore the optimal tax level increases. For the
case of Impure Altruism, the optimal tax is exactly equal to the Pigovian tax. Although
the socially optimal level of consumption is lower than the standard level, this shift is
exactly the amount that occurs due to the ’warm glow’ from the individual’s contribution
to the externality. Therefore, the optimal tax level does not need to be higher in order
to achieve the socially optimal level of consumption.
3.2.5 Towards an Alternative Theory of Behaviour
In his analysis Johansson (1997) recognises that Genuine Altruism is the most contro-
versial of all types of altruism as it contradicts mainstream economic theory. Yet the
traditional model has already for a long time drawn fundamental criticism. Sen (1977)
describes why the economist prefers to assume the existence of a selfish being: ”It is
possible to define a person’s interests in such a way that no matter what he does he
can be seen to be furthering his own interests in every isolated act of choice.” (p. 322).
Indeed it means that every action can be explained simply through the concept of re-
vealed preferences. This saves the economist from having to take a closer look at what
constitutes preferences and utility, or as Sen (1977) puts it: ”a robust piece of evasion.”
(p. 323). Sugden (1982) further argues that assuming utility-maximising behaviour in
the traditional sense may be too constricting and different people might indeed maximise
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very different functions in order to determine their consumption choice.
The criticism presented here does not seek to suggest that the utility-maximising model
is without value, and the critical literature usually acknowledges the usefulness of the
traditional model, especially in market-exchange situations. But in the context of this
chapter it has to be recognised that environmental issues are often subject to strong moral
views.19 As Frey (1999) summarises, contrary to the utilitarian perspective, a moralist
views the environment with unique value and believes that it should be protected purely
for ethical reasons and with little or no regard to any trade-offs. Furthermore, Arrow
(1986) argues that rationality as the economist defines it often only occurs through mar-
ket exchange, rather than through the intrinsic motivation of an individual. However, as
Shogren and Taylor (2008) point out, environmental resources are frequently not subject
to the market exchange required for consistent choices. Furthermore, the approach taken
in this chapter puts forward that when individuals realise that the government is not
able to set the incentives correctly, they may also recognise that the result will be far
from optimal for themselves and everybody else without a change in behaviour. This
may, in turn, lead to moral motivation that requires a different type of model to explain.
Along the lines of Harsanyi (1955), Sen (1977) develops the idea that people may have
two preference relations working at the same time.20 Utility-maximising behaviour with
some consideration for the utility of others he labels as ’sympathy’, while actions driven
only by their moral value with no consideration of utility he calls ’commitment’.21 The
latter is very much in line with Kant’s concept of ’duty’.22
Laffont (1975) develops the idea of a Kantian approach to behaviour where individu-
als consider what would be optimal if they and everybody else were to make the same
choice.23 However, Laffont (1975) assumes that individuals are identical, with all individ-
uals applying this rule equally. In his model this implies that individuals will correctly
19Also see Bergstrom (2009) for a discussion of the links between moral rules and utility.
20The model developed in this chapter can also be thought of as capturing the idea of two different
preference sets to some extent. However, combining two preference sets into a conventional model
usually assumes that one supersedes the other or individuals follow certain rules (see Thaler (1980) for
an example). The model in this chapter assumes that individuals trade-off moral preferences against
utility preferences depending on their propensity to act morally.
21Sen (1977) also points out that the resulting behaviour may well be the same as the utility-
maximising one, but that this may not have been the individual’s motivation.
22White (2003) provides a good summary of the essentials of Kant’s philosophy as relevant to an
economist and discusses linking it to the traditional model of economic behaviour.
23Such an approach (a version of which is also used in our model) is generally inspired by Kant’s
Formula of Universal Law (a version of the categorical imperative) which states: ”Act only according to
that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.” (Kant (1875), p.
421).
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anticipate that everybody else will indeed behave the same way, meaning that ultimately
individuals still maximise their personal utility. The model developed in this chapter
differs to that of Laffont (1975) in that individuals have no expectations regarding the
behaviour of others and they assume that all others continue to behave in the utility-
maximising way. Individuals therefore recognise that acting morally means they will
suffer a loss of personal utility. The central aspect of this approach is that individuals
assess the intrinsic ’moral value’ of their action by comparing the utility they actually get
to the utility they would get if everyone else were to make the same choice as this indi-
vidual.24 Individuals then trade off this hypothetical ’moral value’ of the action against
the associated Utility Cost when making their consumption choice.
Ulph (2006) sets up a simple model of consumption choice where individuals have some
propensity to act morally. It assumes that people determine the intrinsic ’rightness’ of
their action by comparing the utility they actually get to the utility they would get if
everyone else were to make the same consumption choice as this individual. In that, in-
dividuals recognise that their action will not influence the behaviour of others in any way
and thus the individual will get a loss in utility compared to the conventional economic
choice. In making the consumption decision, individuals put some weight to the ’right-
ness’ of the choice and trade this off against the utility loss incurred from deviating from
the utility-maximising level. The model developed here is based on and an extension of
this approach. It generalises the approach taken by Ulph (2006) and includes a measure
for the size of the population whereas Ulph (2006) normalised the population to 1. This
is done to highlight the impact of the population size on total emissions and therefore the
damage caused. Furthermore, the propensity to act morally and the way an individual
with propensity to act morally makes the consumption choice is captured in a different
way compared to Ulph (2006).
In addition to the concept of ’moral value’, the model developed in this chapter also
considers that individuals may have altruistic concern for others’ utility (Pure Altruism).
In line with the definition by Hammond (1987), the model assumes that people may ex-
hibit altruistic concern for the utility of all other individuals as a collective. Specifically,
the model assumes that an individual’s utility function is the sum of their direct utility
from consumption and the total utility of all other individuals weighted by the degree
of altruistic concern.25 While Johansson (1997) also models this form of Pure Altruism,
24This type of ’Kantian’ calculation is similar to the one used by Brekke et al. (2003), although they
link the moral value of this Kantian behaviour to a concern for self-image instead.
25Although for simplicity reasons it is assumed that the degree of altruistic concern is the same for
all individuals in the population, it is possible to generalise the result to allow for varying degrees of
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the model developed here explicitly models a continuum of individuals in order to cap-
ture the atomistic nature of individuals’ consumption choice in the context of large-scale
environmental problems such as climate change. Such an individual would recognise the
atomistic nature of their choice and hence, when making their consumption decision,
takes average and total levels of consumption, welfare as well as damage from the ex-
ternality as given. It is noteworthy that both the discrete and continuous approaches
are widely used in the literature depending on the issue to be addressed. Finally, by
modelling a combination of two different types of altruism, ’Pure Altruism’ (the concern
for others’ utility) and ’Genuine Altruism’ (the propensity to act morally through non-
utility-maximising behaviour), the model captures the idea that people may be concerned
about the welfare of others but may also have some propensity to act morally despite
their inability to influence the impact of the environmentally harmful good.
Of course a distinction between Kant’s categorical imperative and this model is that Kant
sees moral duties as absolute that completely supersede any considerations of utility. The
model developed in this chapter, on the other hand, does not use such a binary approach,
but allows the individual’s propensity to act morally to determine in how far they are
driven by the moral value of the action relative to the associated loss in utility. Only
individuals with full propensity to act morally will completely disregard their own utility
and act in a fully Kantian fashion. At the same time, individuals with no propensity to
act morally will not take into account the moral value at all and thus act in a standard
utility-maximising way. The propensity to act morally is assumed to be an exogenous
parameter that is distributed across different types of individuals in the economy. Since
no assumption is made regarding what this distribution may look like, this approach does
not argue that people necessarily have a certain propensity to act morally but the aim is
simply to evaluate the consequences for the socially optimal tax on an environmentally
harmful good if some people do act this way.
3.3 The Model
3.3.1 Standard Theory
Start with a population consisting of a continuum of potentially different types of indi-
viduals. These types are indexed by k ∈ [0, 1], 0 ≤ k ≤ 1. The distribution is given by
altruism for different types of individuals without affecting the main conclusions from our analysis.
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the density function




Each individual has the same initial endowment of income y > 0 and chooses between a
’clean’ good x and a ’dirty’ good z. The clean good is a numeraire good with a price of
1 and therefore represents the expenditure on all other goods but z. Its consumption is
assumed to generate no externalities. On the other hand, the dirty good generates one
unit of emissions per unit consumed, which is a negative externality to all individuals.
Further, let ζ(.) denote the function that assigns to an individual of type k their chosen
consumption of the dirty good, ζ(k) ≥ 0, and let z̄ denote the average consumption of
the dirty good. The size of the population is measured by M > 0 and therefore total
emissions E are




Each individual derives utility from the personal consumption of the two goods. For
simplicity we assume that preferences over the two goods are the same across all types
and as such all individuals have identical utility functions.26 Additionally, utility is
assumed to be linear in consumption of the clean good in order to avoid issues of income
distribution.27 This means as long as consumers always consume a positive amount of
the clean good, the marginal utility of income is constant and welfare losses that may
arise are not due to inequality but inefficiencies. Utility derived from the consumption of
the two good takes the following form:
u(x, z, E) = x+ φ(z)−D(E),
where φ′(z) > 0; φ′′ < 0;
and ∀E > 0, D′(E) > 0; D′′(E) ≥ 0.
(3.2)
The damage from emissions experienced by individuals is captured by the damage func-
tion D(E). It is a strictly increasing and convex function for all positive levels of emis-
sions. Furthermore, φ(z) describes the private gross benefit gained from consumption of
26Although individuals have identical utility functions, different types of individuals will later be
defined by their propensity to act morally.
27Income distribution is of course an important element in the analysis of environmental externalities.
However, in order to isolate the effect of altruism and moral behaviour on individuals’ consumption
choice, issues of income distribution have been kept out of this analysis.
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the dirty good and is strictly increasing and strictly concave in z.
The dirty good is produced by a perfectly competitive industry operating with constant
unit costs c > 0. At the same time the government imposes an emissions tax t ≥ 0
on the consumption of z. The tax revenue is redistributed to the individuals through
a lump-sum transfer σ that is identical for all individuals. Therefore the government
budget constraint is defined by
σ = tz̄. (3.3)
Using the definition of emissions provided in (3.1) and the government budget constraint,
we can now derive the utility from personal consumption and emissions as a function that
only depends on the individual’s consumption level of the dirty good, and the average
consumption of the dirty good across the population:
u(z; z̄, t) = (y + tz̄)− (c+ t)z + φ(z)−D(Mz̄) (3.4)
In line with the idea of atomistic consumption, in all stages of the analysis we use the
standard Nash assumption that the individual always takes the consumption by everyone
else as given when making the choice over consumption of the dirty good. This means
that the individual treats average emissions as independent of z because their choice of
consumption of the dirty good has no influence on average and total emissions. Indeed,
based on the definition of total emissions as shown in (3.1), even if every other individual
of the same type as this one were to change their consumption simultaneously, it would
still not impact the level of average or total emissions.
Using this basic setup the individual chooses z to maximise their direct personal util-
ity as given by (3.4). Under standard utility-maximising behaviour the chosen level of
consumption of the dirty good z̃(t) can be derived from
z̃(t) = ArgMax
z
u(z; z̄, t). (3.5)
Therefore the chosen level of consumption for the utility-maximising individual is char-
acterised by
φ′[z̃(t)] = c+ t. (3.6)
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As we would expect, the left hand side of (3.6) describes the marginal gross benefit of
consumption of the dirty good and the right hand side describes the private marginal
cost of consumption. Further, as we would expect given the atomistic nature of the
consumption choice in this model, the damage incurred from the dirty good is not a
factor in determining the chosen consumption level under standard theory.
Given this we can determine that for any tax rate t and any dirty good assignment
function ζ(.), social utility across all individuals in the population is
S(ζ, t) = M
∫ 1
0




Since individuals have identical, and strictly concave utility functions, the socially optimal
consumption level requires that everyone consume the same amount of the dirty good.









y − cz + φ(z)−D(Mz)
]
(3.8)
As we can see, the social planner takes account of the link between the taxes paid on
the dirty good and the lump-sum transfer received by consumers through the govern-
ment budget constraint. This means that the socially optimal level of consumption is
independent of the tax rate t. In addition, the social planner also takes into account
the connection between the consumption of the dirty good and total emissions. As we
would expect, this means that the social planner can fully internalise the externality. The
socially optimal level of consumption of the dirty good ẑ is then implicitly defined by
φ′(ẑ) = c+MD′(Mẑ), where ẑ < z̃(0). (3.9)
This shows that, from a social planner’s perspective, the social marginal cost of consump-
tion consists of the direct marginal cost of production of the dirty good, as well as the
social marginal damage created by the emissions externality, MD′(Mẑ), but not the tax
on the dirty good since the revenues are entirely redistributed to the individuals.
From (3.6) and (3.9) it is also straightforward to see that the government can achieve the
socially optimal consumption level by setting the tax on the dirty good equal to the social
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marginal damage of consumption (the standard Pigovian tax). Denoting this optimal tax
rate by t̂, it follows that
t̂ = MD′(Mẑ) (3.10)
So far we have only described the basic model setup and laid out the results under stan-
dard theory. These will serve as counterfactual for the remaining analysis.
3.3.2 Pure Altruism
As discussed in the introduction, Pure Altruism in this model means that individuals
may put some weight on the total utility of all other individuals in the population.
Individuals will therefore not only maximise their own private utility from consumption,
but the (weighted) sum of their own private utility and the total utility of all others. For
simplicity it is assumed that the degree of altruistic concern does not vary across different
types of individuals.28 The weight given to the total utility of others is denoted α ≥ 0
for all k. Then the total welfare of an individual who consumes an amount z of the dirty
good is 29




Given the atomistic nature of consumption, the total utility of all other individuals in
the population is simply equal to the social utility as defined in (3.7). Furthermore,
individuals still treat the consumption of all other individuals as given when making their
consumption choice over the dirty good. This means individuals treat the assignment
function ζ(k), and hence the average consumption level z̄, as well as the level of social
utility S(.), as given. Indeed this means that individuals do not just take as given the
damage they themselves suffer from the externality, but also the damage that everyone
else suffers. It follows that, with atomistic consumption, if the individual chooses the
level of consumption of the dirty good that maximises total individual welfare, then,
independent of the level of altruistic concern, consumption will be the same as the level
28This assumption makes it more straightforward to isolate the key drivers of behaviour when we
develop the model of moral behaviour. It is, however, possible to allow the degree of altruism to vary
across different types without altering the key results of this chapter.
29The utility that includes the effect of altruistic concern is referred to as ’welfare’. This is simply
done to separate the direct type of utility from the altruistic type.
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that maximises their utility as characterised by (3.6).
Since we assumed a constant level of α for all types of individuals, we still have identical
personal welfare functions for all individuals. Using (3.11) it is then straightforward to
derive that, for any given tax rate t and assignment function ζ(.), the total welfare of all
individuals, or social welfare, is given by
W (ζ, t, α) = (1 + αM)S(ζ, t). (3.12)
This shows that the level of altruistic concern across the population only scales up the
total level of welfare, but the socially optimal level of consumption is still one in which
everyone consumes the same amount of the dirty good as determined by standard theory.
Consequently the level of ẑ is still defined by (3.9) and the optimal tax inducing everyone
to consume the socially optimal level is still described by (3.10). This result leads us to
the first proposition.
Proposition 1 In a world of atomistic consumption, with every individual choosing their
consumption by maximising their utility, altruistic concern for the utility of others has no
impact on the optimal level of consumption for the individual, the socially optimal level
of consumption or the socially optimal tax level.30
Proof: By maximising individual welfare as shown in (3.11), it is straightforward
to derive that φ′(z) = c + t, which is the same as derived without altruism in (3.6).
Similarly, maximising the social welfare function as shown in (3.12), we derive that
φ′(ẑ) = c + MD′(Mẑ),the same level as under standard theory in (3.9). Combining
these two findings it is also evident that t̂ = MD′(Mẑ) induces everyone to consume
the same socially optimal amount, the same as shown under standard theory without
altruism.
So far this chapter has established the results with and without altruistic concern for the
utility of others based on standard utility-maximising behaviour. The next section will
now turn to the key part of this chapter and develop the theory of moral behaviour.
30Note that this result does depend on the functional form used for the individual’s welfare function
described in (3.11). However, this result can be generalised to other functional forms, for example the
case where individuals’ welfare takes the form w(z; ζ, t, α) = U(z; z̄, t)[S(ζ, t)]α.
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3.3.3 Moral Behaviour
We start by assuming that initially everyone consumes z̃(t), which is the chosen con-
sumption level consistent with standard theory as derived in Section 3.3.1. And since the
aim of the model is to investigate whether moral behaviour can make up for a shortfall
in government policy, we further begin with the assumption that the tax on the dirty
good is below the socially optimal level, i.e. t < t̂, and therefore we also have z̃(t) > ẑ.
The model of moral behaviour developed here assumes that individuals recognise that if
they deviate from the consumption level z̃(t), they will incur a loss in personal welfare.
This means that individuals still know that the rational choice for them and everyone else
would be to choose z̃(t) (given the atomistic nature of consumption). However, they may
also be driven by moral concerns for the environment and recognise that the overall out-
come will be far from optimal for themselves and everyone else as long as the government
continues to set the wrong tax. This may induce some individuals to act differently. Such
an individual may measure a hypothetical moral value of deviating from the standard
consumption level without expecting any personal benefit from this moral action.31
The model measures the hypothetical moral value of the choice through a type of ’Kan-
tian’ calculation as discussed in Section 3.2. This means that an individual with some
propensity to act morally will assess how much better off they and everyone else would be
if they and everyone else were to choose the same level of consumption, z.32 As already
mentioned, the individual recognises that deviating will entail a cost to personal welfare,
but may balance off this cost against the moral value, depending on their propensity to
act morally. Let us assume that different types of individuals may differ in their propen-
sity to act morally. Some individuals may only be concerned with the moral value of
their action and not take any account of the loss of personal welfare they will incur. Yet
other individuals may give no weight to the moral value but fully take account of the
personal welfare cost associated with deviating from z̃(t). In addition to the propensity to
act morally, the model recognises that individuals may still exhibit altruistic concern for
others’ utility as modelled in the previous section. The previous results have shown that
altruistic concern does not have any influence on the consumption choice under utility-
maximising behaviour so the question arises whether this changes when individuals have
31It is crucial to emphasize that moral value does not mean the individual derives any benefit (or
utility) from the moral action.
32This is of course a simplification of Kant’s Formula of Universal Law. For the purposes of this
analysis, and in line with other literature using a Kantian approach as discussed in Section 3.2, we
translate the categorical imperative in the sense that a Kantian calculation asks what would be optimal
if everyone acted the same way (also see Laffont (1975); Brekke et al. (2003)).
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some propensity to act morally.
The first step is to quantify the level of welfare loss associated with deviating from the
initial consumption level. Let ζ(t) be the assignment function that assigns everyone the
initial level of consumption z̃(t). Therefore the average consumption of the dirty good is
also z̃(t). For an individual of type k who gives altruistic weight α ≥ 0 to the utility of
other individuals, this gives an initial welfare level of
w(z̃(t); ζ(t), t, α) =v(z̃(t), t) + αM
[
















However, if the individual chooses a different level of consumption such that ẑ ≤ z ≤ z̃(t),
but everyone else carries on consuming z̃(t) this generates the following level of welfare
for the individual:
w(z; ζ(t), t, α) =U(z; ζ(t), t) + αM
[












Combining (3.13) and (3.14) leads us to the loss in personal welfare of choosing a different
level of consumption of the dirty good, z, as opposed to the initial level, z̃(t):











Let us denote this as the Utility Cost. It is noteworthy that in the calculation of the
Utility Cost everything that depends on what the other individuals do, and therefore
anything associated with the level of altruistic concern, has cancelled out. In addition,
since an individual’s choice has no impact on the total level of emissions, the damage
function has also cancelled out. The Utility Cost is purely driven by the difference in the
private benefit and cost elements of the dirty good. Were the individual to minimise this
cost they would choose φ′(z) = c+ t and then we would be back at the standard level of
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consumption where z = z̃(t). Intuitively, in order to minimise the cost of deviating from
the initial consumption level, one would not deviate at all.33
The next step is to derive a measurement of the hypothetical moral value of choosing
a different level of consumption. As already mentioned, this moral value is assessed by
evaluating the welfare the individual would obtain if they and everyone else were to choose
that same level of consumption. For an individual who places an altruistic weight α ≥ 0
on the welfare of all other individuals this would yield
w(z, ζK(z); t, α) = (1 + αM)
[
y − cz + φ(z)−D(Mz)
]
, (3.16)
where ζK(z) is the ’Kantian’ function that assigns everyone else the same level of con-
sumption of the dirty good as that chosen by the individual. There are two factors the
individual will incorporate when making this calculation. First, the individual sees that
if they and everyone else choose the same level of z, then the lump-sum transfer to the
individual from the government tax revenues will equal the tax paid on the dirty good,
rendering the tax rate irrelevant for the level of welfare obtained. Second, the individ-
ual takes account of the impact the choice of z has on total emissions and therefore the
damage associated with it. Since it is a specific calculation of the level of welfare if every-
one were to choose the same level of the dirty good, the individual effectively makes the
same calculation a social planner would make. This means that the individual does not
just evaluate the moral value for themselves, but also the benefit to everyone else in the
population. Therefore, the hypothetical moral value of choosing a level of consumption,
z, as opposed to the initial level, z̃(t), is
B(z; z̃(t), t, α) =w(z, ζK(z); t, α)− w(z̃(t); ζ(t), t, α)
=(1 + αM)
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Let us denote this as the hypothetical Moral Benefit of deviating from the initial level.
From here it is easy to see that were an individual to simply maximise the hypothetical
Moral Benefit, the individual would choose the socially optimum level of consumption ẑ
33Even if the entire population acted entirely moral and consumed the social optimum regardless of
the tax level, a single utility-maximising individual would minimise the Utility Cost defined in (3.15) and
consume φ′(z) = c+ t regardless of what others do. This is due to atomistic nature of the consumption
decision.
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regardless of their level of altruistic concern for the utility of others.
We can now put together the hypothetical Moral Benefit and the Utility Cost of deviating
from the initial level by assuming an individual will make the consumption choice putting
some weight on the moral value of deviating and balancing this off against the associated
loss in personal welfare. Let this propensity to act morally be measured by µ.34 To begin,
the model will be developed with a linear decision function where individuals choose their
consumption by maximising the weighted difference between the moral value and the
associated personal welfare cost:
µB − (1− µ)C, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1. (3.18)
Substituting (3.15) and (3.17) into (3.18) we see that for an individual with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1,












At this point it is noteworthy that, due to the linear nature of the choice function, the
initial level of consumption z̃(t) is irrelevant to the consumption choice and the initial level
of consumption could indeed be at any level without influencing the resulting consumption
choice under Kantian behaviour. When we explore the generalised choice function later
in this chapter and a couple of non-linear examples, we will see that this will change




, 0 ≤ k ≤ 1, (3.20)
then it is straightforward to derive from (3.19) that the individual’s consumption choice
can be characterised by
φ′(z) = c+
[
kMD′(Mz) + (1− k)t
]
. (3.21)
34This propensity to act morally is assumed to be an exogenously given parameter. Therefore, in this
setting the degree of morality is not influenced by what others do and it is not a parameter that is chosen
with utility considerations. Indeed, it captures the individual’s willingness to sacrifice utility in order to
do ’the right thing’ regardless of what others do. However, as highlighted in the discussion in Section
3.8, it may be interesting to look more closely at what drives the level of µ and how it may change over
time or be influenced by policy choices.
95
The parameter k is a combined parameter capturing both the individual’s propensity to
act morally µ, and the level of altruistic concern for others’ utility α. This parameter can
be thought of as the overall level of ’virtue’ individuals may exhibit, where 0 ≤ k ≤ 1.
Examining (3.21), we see that if k = 1 the individual will choose a level of consumption
equal to the socially optimal level z = ẑ = c + MD′(Mz). On the other hand, if k = 0
the individual will choose a consumption level of the dirty good equal to the conventional
choice, z = z̃(t) = c + t. Of course the level of k can be anywhere between 0 and 1 and
the level of z will vary accordingly between z̃(t) and ẑ. Figure 3.1 illustrates an example






c+ kMD′(Mz) + (1− k)t
z̃(t)ẑ z
Figure 3.1: Consumption Choice for Individuals with Some Propensity to Act Morally
Next let us take a closer look at the determinants of k. Suppose the individual has no
altruistic concern for others’ utility (α = 0). Then it follows that k = µ. This means that
for an individual with no altruistic concern, behaviour only depends on their propensity
to act morally. However, if µ = 1 the individual will still cut down consumption of
the dirty good to ẑ regardless of the level of α. Indeed we find that even if α = 0, an
individual with µ > 0 will choose a lower consumption level of the dirty good relative to
the standard level. It follows that altruistic concern for others’ utility is not a necessary
component of this type of behaviour.
Now suppose that the individual has no propensity to act morally (µ = 0). Then, it is
straightforward to see that k = 0 regardless of the value of α. Effectively, if µ = 0 we
are back to the case where individuals choose consumption of dirty good by maximising
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their welfare function which means that individuals will choose z̃(t) regardless of their
level of altruistic concern. Using these insights we can set out the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Altruistic concern for others’ utility is neither necessary nor sufficient to
induce people to cut back consumption of the dirty good, but a propensity to act morally
is both necessary and sufficient.
Proof: From (3.21) we know that z is a decreasing function of k for any t < t̂. From





> 0 for any value of α. Therefore α is neither necessary nor sufficient, but
µ is both necessary and sufficient to induce a decrease in z.
Let us now look at the case where individuals have some, but not full propensity to
act morally (0 < µ < 1). Then k is an increasing function of α. This means that
the level of altruistic concern can affect the consumption choice even though people
recognise that their consumption of the dirty good has no effect on total emissions and
anybody else’s welfare. This is because in calculating the hypothetical Moral Benefit
of the action, individuals take into account their level of altruistic concern for others’
utility and therefore the impact their choice will have on everybody else’s utility, but the
associated Utility Cost of the consumption choice is independent of the level of altruistic
concern. Yet we should also note that, even if α = 1, as long as µ < 1, an individual will
never cut down consumption of the dirty good all the way to ẑ. This leads us to the next
proposition:
Proposition 3 If individuals have some, but not full propensity to act morally, an indi-
vidual with a higher level of altruistic concern for others will reduce consumption of the
dirty good if the government sets the tax on the dirty good too low, but never all the way
to the socially optimal level.




> 0 for any 0 < µ < 1. Therefore
k is an increasing function of α. Furthermore, we know from (3.21) that z is a decreasing
function of k for any t < t̂. Therefore an increase in α will lead to a reduction in the
consumption of the dirty good for any 0 < µ < 1. However, to achieve z = ẑ, we require
k = 1. As per the definition of k in (3.20), this is only the case when µ = 1 and therefore
z = ẑ can never be achieved for any 0 < µ < 1 regardless of the value of α.
Next, suppose that the individual has some level of altruistic concern and some propensity
to act morally (i.e. α > 0, and µ > 0). Then we can see that k is also an increasing
function of the size of the population, M . It shows that the larger the population of people
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affected, the more people will cut back their consumption of the dirty good. The size of
the population does not just influence the level of k though. Taking a closer look at (3.21)
it is easy to see that for individuals with some propensity to act morally (i.e. k > 0),
there is another channel through which an increase in M will cause individuals to cut
back their consumption of the dirty good. An increase in M increases the social marginal
damage of consumption and therefore reduces the socially optimal level of consumption
ẑ.35 The population size M impacts the social marginal damage because, (a) it increases
the number of people affected, and (b) it increases the total level of emissions which leads
to increasing marginal damage since damage is convex in z (i.e. D′′(.) ≥ 0). We can now
state the following general proposition.
Proposition 4 If the government fails to set the tax that would be optimal given the
usual economic behaviour and the usual conception as to what constitutes welfare, then,
to the extent that individuals have some propensity to act morally, private action will to
some extent compensate for the lack of government action and drive consumption of the
dirty good down towards the optimal level.
Proof: For any 0 < µ ≤ 1 we have 0 < k ≤ 1 as per the definition of k in (3.20).
Using this and comparing (3.21) with (3.6) and (3.9), it is straightforward to see that we
must have φ′(ẑ) ≥ φ′(z) > φ′[z̃(t)] and therefore we also know that ẑ ≤ z < z̃(t).
We further know that although people may behave according to a different set of rules,
individuals’ welfare is still determined by the altruistic welfare function as defined in
(3.11). The government recognises this and therefore still uses the same social welfare
function given in (3.12) to determine the socially optimal allocation of welfare. Similarly,
the social utility function S(.) is also still the same as described in (3.7). It is then
straightforward to see that the socially optimal tax level for the government is still the
standard Pigovian tax rate t̂, the same that would be optimal if the population had
no propensity to act morally (i.e. µ = 0 for all types). Indeed, by examining (3.21)
while plugging in the Pigovian tax as shown in (3.10), we can easily determine that each
individual will choose consumption level ẑ regardless of the level of k. This means with
a tax rate equal to t̂ we can still achieve the first-best solution where everyone consumes
the same amount of the dirty good and the damage is fully internalised. This leads us to
the final proposition.
35This impact of M on the socially optimal level of consumption is of course not an exclusive feature
of moral behaviour as modelled here, but can also be observed in the characterisation of the socially
optimal level of consumption as shown in (3.9).
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Proposition 5 Although individuals may to some extent compensate for the govern-
ment’s failure to set the optimal tax, this does not imply that the government should
not set the optimal tax.36
Proof: From (3.21) we can derive that by increasing t to t̂ = MD′(Mẑ) everyone
will consume ẑ as characterised by (3.9). This raises social welfare because (a) aggregate
consumption of the dirty good is socially optimal and (b) consumption is equalised across
consumers.
3.3.4 Government Sets the Tax Too High
Initially we assumed that the government sets the tax on the dirty good below the optimal
level (i.e. t < t̂). Now suppose that the government actually sets the tax rate too high,






c+ kMD′(Mz) + (1− k)t
z̃(t) ẑz
Figure 3.2: Consumption Choice with a Tax Rate t > t̂
Because the initial level of consumption is now lower than the socially optimal level, an
individual with some propensity to act morally will actually increase their consumption
of the dirty good in order to bring it closer to the socially optimal level. The benchmark
for an individual with some propensity to act morally is always the socially optimal level
of consumption and depending on the weight they give to the hypothetical Moral Benefit,
they will choose a consumption level of the dirty good that moves closer to ẑ. This point
36In the special case that the entire population has full propensity to act morally (µ = 1 for the entire
population), the tax would not be required since everybody would consume the socially optimal level
regardless of the tax. However, even in that case, setting the optimal tax would not create any harm.
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illustrates that the propensity to act morally does not necessarily imply a reduction in
the consumption of an environmentally harmful good. Rather, an individual with some
propensity to act morally will change consumption in order to get closer to the social
optimum in the absence of the correct tax on the dirty good.37
Result 1 If the government sets the tax too high (i.e. t > t̂), individuals with propensity
to act morally will increase their consumption of the dirty good toward the socially optimal
level, ẑ.
3.3.5 Ignoring the Government Budget Constraint
In the model developed so far individuals were able to take account of the government
budget constraint when evaluating the hypothetical Moral Benefit of deviating from the
initial consumption level. This meant that individuals recognise in the calculation of the
hypothetical Moral Benefit that when they and everyone else were to choose z, this would
render the tax rate irrelevant, because - as in the case of the social planner’s optimum
- if everybody consumes the same amount, the tax redistributed is exactly the same as
the tax individuals have to pay. However, now suppose that individuals do not make this
connection when evaluating the hypothetical Moral Benefit, but only assess the effect
the choice will have on total and average emissions and the damage associated with this.
This means they take the price of the dirty good p = c + t, as well as the lump-sum
transfer from the government σ as given. Individuals then choose the consumption level
of the dirty good by maximising
MAX
z





and therefore the consumption choice for the individual is described by
φ′(z) = (c+ t) + kMD′(Mz). (3.23)
An individual who does not take account of the government budget constraint and has
no propensity to act morally (µ = 0 → k = 0) will still not deviate from the initial
consumption level z̃(t). However, an individual with full propensity to act morally (µ =
1 → k = 1) will actually choose a consumption level of the dirty good lower than the
socially optimal level (z < ẑ). Thus an individual with k = 1 actually overcompensates
37Buchholz et al. (2012) also analyse a case of public good provision where the subsidy may be too
high.
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in their consumption choice of the dirty good. This raises the question of what level of
k is required to bring the consumption level to the socially optimal level. We can derive
this level of k by looking at
c+MD′(Mz) = (c+ t) + kMD′(Mz),




The above shows that the required level of k depends on the ratio between the tax rate
and the marginal damage. This is important because if the tax rate were to be equal to
the Pigovian tax (i.e. t = t̂), then only an individual with no propensity to act morally
(k = 0) would consume ẑ. Any individual for whom k > 0 would choose a consumption
level lower than the socially optimal level and therefore the individual’s propensity to act








Figure 3.3: Consumption Choice when Individuals Ignore the Government Budget Con-
straint
The question arises what the optimal tax level would be in this case. From equation (3.24)
we can see that for any given individual the tax rate that would induce an individual to
choose the social optimum ẑ is given by
t̂g = (1− k)MD′(Mz). (3.25)
The optimal tax rate now is a function of the parameter k and we of course know that this
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can be different for different types of individuals. This means that because individuals
fail to make the correct calculation in their assessment of the hypothetical Moral Benefit
we now have to deal with two imperfections and as such the government can no longer
achieve the first-best solution of everyone consuming ẑ through a single tax on the dirty
good.
Result 2 If individuals fail to correctly take account of the government budget constraint
in the calculation of the hypothetical Moral Benefit, individuals with full propensity to act
morally will over-compensate and consume less than the socially optimal level. Further-
more, if the government sets the tax at t = t̂ any individual with µ > 0 will consume less
than the socially optimal level.
The first distortion is because individuals no longer consume the same amount of the
dirty good even when t = t̂ and the second distortion is because average consumption
of the dirty good is not at the socially optimal level when t = t̂. Indeed setting the tax
rate at t̂ could actually reduce social welfare compared to welfare under the initial tax
rate t < t̂. Additionally, the very fact that individuals aim to act morally but fail to do
in the correct way, could lead to lower welfare than if individuals had no propensity to
act morally. Given that in the presence of the behavioural failure the tax is not able to
completely correct for the market failure (the emissions externality), the question arises
whether the initial tax level or no tax at all is actually a preferred solution compared
to setting the Pigovian tax. Shogren and Taylor (2008) discuss whether behavioural
failures lead a behavioural-environmental second-best problem and whether policy inter-
ventions could realistically correct for both market and behavioural failures at the same
time. They argue that it would be practically impossible to design such incentives since
the policy designer would require significant further information (often at the individual
level). Furthermore, there may be a range of behavioural failure some of which may sepa-
rable, but not necessarily all of them. This implies that one would possible have to design
a different incentive structure for each type and degree of behavioural failure, which is
practically impossible. While we only have one behavioural failure in our example, it is
still evident that a policy maker trying to correct for both the market and behavioural
failure would require significant additional information, in this case information about the
distribution of k, the parameter capturing how much ’virtue’ an individual exhibits. This
in turn would require information about the distribution of µ, the individuals’ propensity
to act morally. Note that we have not made any assumptions about the distribution
to this point since it was not necessary to do so. The Pigovian tax was able to induce
optimal behaviour regardless of individuals’ propensity to act morally and there was no
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behavioural failure even though individuals are not acting in a utility-maximising way.
This chapter will not conduct an analysis of the second-best solution as it is outside the
scope of this chapter. The purpose of this example was to illustrate the importance of
individuals’ ability to make the correct calculation with regard to the hypothetical Moral
Benefit and the Utility Cost associated with deviating from the utility-maximising level.
Note that in this example the behavioural failure was with regard to the government
budget constraint and the redistribution of the tax revenues to individuals. Given the
difficulty of correcting both a market failure and a behavioural failure (or even identifying
behavioural failures in the first place), Shogren and Taylor (2008) argue that it may be
best to use instruments to correct market failures that are less likely to induce behavioural
failures, for example a marketable permit system. While not a straightforward approach
to use at an individual level, it may have the advantage of not requiring the individual
to take into account the government’s budget constraint and therefore avoiding the be-
havioural failure in the first place.
3.4 Generalised Choice Function
3.4.1 Analysis of Generalised Choice Function
The model of moral behaviour developed in the previous section uses a simple linear choice
function where individuals maximise the weighted difference between the hypothetical
Moral Benefit and the Utility Cost of deviating from the standard utility-maximising
choice. This section generalises this choice function and analyses how far the previous
results may change. However, it is still assumed that an individual chooses consumption
of the dirty good by maximising some function of the hypothetical Moral Benefit of
deviating from the standard utility-maximising consumption level as described in (3.17),
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{[


















Obviously we require the choice function to be strictly concave in z and this means the
second partial derivative with respect to z has to be negative. Knowing this will help
to interpret some of the comparative statics analysis later in this section. The specific
conditions that need to hold for the choice function to be concave are detailed in Section
3.4.2. Furthermore, it is straightforward to determine from the above that, consistent
with the baseline model, we have
∂B
∂z












≤ 0 ∀ z ≤ z̃(t). (3.30)
Of course we know that the individual will maximise the choice function over z in order



















Determining FB and FC for the baseline linear choice function used in Section 3.3.3, we
can immediately see how the generalisation links to the baseline model (i.e. FB = µ and











Now, analogous to the baseline model, if we let
kg =
FB(1 + αM)
FB(1 + αM)− FC
where 0 ≤ kg ≤ 1, (3.33)
we find that (3.32) becomes
φ′(z) = c+ kgMD
′(Mz) + (1− kg)t. (3.34)
From this it is immediately observable that (3.33) is the equivalent of (3.20) from the
baseline model and (3.34) is the equivalent of (3.21). In general terms the ’virtue’ pa-
rameter kg determines how much weight in the consumption choice is given to the social
marginal damage caused by the externality relative to the weight given to the tax which
has a direct effect on utility derived. It is also straightforward to see that kg = 0 when
FB = 0 and kg = 1 when F
C = 0. This makes intuitive sense. For example, when the
impact of a marginal change in the hypothetical Moral Benefit on the choice function is
zero, then the individual will not take this benefit into account in making the consump-
tion choice and thus the level of ’virtue’ is zero, which in turn leads to a consumption
level of z = z̃(t). On the other hand, if the marginal impact of a change in the Utility
Cost on the choice function is zero, the individual will not take account of the Utility
Cost associated with the consumption choice and only use the hypothetical Moral Benefit.
Thus kg = 1 and the individual will choose z = ẑ. In the baseline model the parameter
µ captured the individual’s propensity to act morally, which was the key determinant of
k and therefore of how much consumption would move towards the social optimum. The
generalised choice function does not have a specific parameter to measure the individual’s
propensity to act morally. However, while the standalone values of FB and FC are of
lesser importance, it is the relative levels of FB and FC that determine the weight given
to the social optimum and therefore are the reflection of an individual’s willingness to
depart from the utility-maximising choice, or in other words, the individuals propensity
to act morally. Note that in the baseline model we had FB = µ and FC = −(1−µ), and
therefore FB and FC were directly related to each other with −FB
FC
= µ
1−µ . In a more
general choice function this does not necessarily have to be the case, but it is still the
relative level that determines how far consumption will be changed towards the social
optimum and therefore the term −FB
FC
captures the individual’s propensity to act morally
for any FB > 0 and FC < 0. At the same time, an individual with FC = 0 and FB > 0
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has full propensity to act morally while and individual with FB = 0 and FC < 0 has no
propensity to act morally.
Looking at (3.33) we can also see that the level of altruistic concern for the welfare of
others is neither necessary nor sufficient for an individual to cut back consumption. Sim-
ilar to the baseline model we have kg = 1 if F
B > 0 and FC = 0 regardless of the
value of α. At the same time, if FB = 0 and FC < 0 we have kg = 0 regardless of the
value of α.38 In the baseline model we also determined that if an individual has some
but not full propensity to act morally, a higher level of altruistic concern would reduce
consumption of the dirty good to some degree. However, with the more general setup we
cannot unambiguously determine that the virtue parameter kg is an increasing function
of α. The reason for this will be addressed in more detail in Section 3.4.6. With regard
to Proposition 3 from the baseline model we can only determine with certainty that even
if kg is an increasing function of α and therefore altruistic concern for the utility of others
reduces consumption of the dirty good, consumption will not be cut to ẑ regardless of
the value of α.
Proposition 6 Proposition 2 holds under any concave general choice function of the
hypothetical Moral Benefit and associated Utility Cost, F (B,C). Altruistic concern is
neither necessary nor sufficient to induce people to reduce consumption of the dirty good,
but a propensity to act morally is both necessary and sufficient. However, Proposition
3 does not necessarily hold in its entirety. Depending on the specification of the choice
function it is possible that altruistic concern can either increase or decrease consumption
of the dirty good. However, even when altruism reduces consumption, it is never sufficient
to reduce consumption all the way to the socially optimal level regardless of the value of
α.
Proof: From (3.34) we know that z is a decreasing function of kg for any t < t̂. From
(3.33) we can further determine that if FB > 0 and FC = 0 → kg = 1; and if FB = 0
and FC < 0 → k = 0. In addition, if we define RBC = −F
B
FC
for FB > 0 and FC < 0
we can rewrite (3.33) as kg =
RBC (1+αM)
RBC (1+αM)+1





for any value of α. Therefore α is neither necessary nor sufficient, but RBC is both







[FB(1+αM)−FC ]2 . For any F
B > 0 and FC < 0 this is only positive
if FB > −FBBB for any ẑ < z < z̃(t). Therefore k is not unambiguously an increasing
function of α and we cannot determine that an increase in α will necessarily lead to a
38As will be evident from the concavity conditions in Section 3.4.2, the definition of kg in (3.33) also
illustrates that at least one of FB and FC has to be non-zero.
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reduction in the consumption of the dirty good when FB > 0 and FC < 0. However, to
achieve z = ẑ we require kg = 1. As per the definition of k in (3.33), this is only the case
when FC = 0 and FB > 0, and therefore z = ẑ can never be achieved for any FB > 0
and FC < 0 regardless of the value of α.
Given the insights we have derived from the generalised model so far, it is easy to see
from (3.34) that Proposition 4 also holds under a generalised choice function and indeed
in the absence of the government setting the right tax, private action may to some degree
compensate for the government’s failure. Now if we let t = t̂ as defined in (3.10), we
can see that (3.34) reduces to φ′(z) = c + MD′(Mz) = φ′(ẑ) independent of the value
of kg. Thus a tax at the socially optimal level of t̂ = MD
′(Mz) induces the first-best
solution where every individual consumes the same, and socially optimal, amount of the
dirty good regardless of their propensity to act morally. This holds regardless of the
functional form used for the concave choice function as long as both the hypothetical
Moral Benefit and the Utility Cost are calculated in the correct way. Furthermore, it is
straightforward to see that if either the Moral Benefit or the Utility Cost is not included in
the choice function, we still obtain the same result whenever t = t̂. This is an important
result because it shows that the result of Proposition 5 is not dependent on the specific
functional form of the choice function.
Proposition 7 Both Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 hold under any concave general
choice function of the hypothetical Moral Benefit and associated Utility Cost, F (B,C). If
the government fails to set the optimal tax, then individuals who put some weight on the
Hypothetical Moral Benefit in their choice function will to some extent compensate for the
wrong tax and reduce their consumption of the dirty good. However, although individuals
may to some extent compensate for the government’s failure to set the optimal tax, this
does not imply that the government should not set the optimal tax, which is the standard
Pigovian tax defined in (3.10).
Proof: For any FB > 0 and FC ≤ 0 we have 0 < kg ≤ 1 as per the definition of k in
(3.33). Using this and comparing (3.34) with (3.6) and (3.9), it is straightforward to see
that we must have φ′(ẑ) ≥ φ′(z) > φ′[z̃(t)] and therefore we also know that ẑ ≤ z < z̃(t).
Furthermore, from (3.34) we can derive that by increasing t to t̂ = MD′(Mẑ) everyone
will consume ẑ as characterised by (3.9).
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3.4.2 Conditions for Concavity of Choice Function
As stated above we require that F (B,C) is a strictly concave function in z in order to
obtain sensible results. In other words, we require that ∂
2F (B,C)
∂z2
< 0. We already know


























Therefore the following conditions are sufficient to ensure strict concavity of the choice
function for any ẑ < z < z̃(t):
1. FB ≥ 0, FC ≤ 0, and FBFC 6= 0.
2. FBB ≤ 0, FCC ≤ 0.
3. FBC ≤ 0, FCB ≤ 0.
4. ∂B
∂z










The first condition determines the that choice function is increasing in the hypothetical
Moral Benefit and decreasing in the Utility Cost, one of which has to be strictly true.
The next condition ensures that the choice function is concave in both the hypothetical
Moral Benefit and the Utility Cost. The third condition ensures that the cross-partial
derivatives of the choice function are also non-positive. This means that the rate at
which the choice function increases in the hypothetical Moral Benefit is decreasing in the
Utility Cost and that the rate at which the choice function decreases in the Utility Cost
is increasing in the hypothetical Moral Benefit. Furthermore, from the earlier definitions
of the hypothetical Moral Benefit and Utility Cost we already know that the last two
conditions hold for any ẑ < z < z̃(t), i.e. the hypothetical Moral Benefit is decreasing in
z and strictly concave and the Utility Cost is decreasing in z and strictly convex.39
39This derives from the strict concavity of the private gross benefit of consumption φ(.) and the
convexity of the damage function D(.) as defined in (3.2).
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3.4.3 Impact of a Change in the Initial Consumption Level
In Section 3.3.3 we saw that due to the linear nature of the choice function the initial
level of consumption - in that case assumed to be the utility-maximising level z̃(t) - had
no impact on the chosen level of consumption. Indeed the initial level could be any value
without any impact. However, this may not be true with a non-liner choice function. It is
important to note here that while z̃(t) will simply be referred to as the initial consumption
level, it is also the level the individual assumes all others in the economy will consume. It
is therefore the determinant of the damage experienced which in turn is a key determinant
of the size of the hypothetical Moral Benefit. To explore the impact a change in the initial


















≥ 0 ∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t), (3.36)
where SOC is the second derivative of the choice function with respect to z as shown in







≥ 0 for any ẑ < z < z̃(t). Furthermore, it is straightforward to see
from (3.27) that ∂B
∂z̃(t)
> 0 for any z̃(t) > ẑ and thus we can determine that the chosen
consumption level is increasing in the initial consumption level. Intuitively this is because
the higher the initial level of consumption, the greater the hypothetical Moral Benefit
given a chosen consumption level z (which is lower than the initial level but greater
than the social optimum). This means that if the initial consumption level increases, the
individual can proportionately achieve the required level of hypothetical Moral Benefit
(given their specific choice function) with a higher consumption level.
However, we also see that the influence of z̃(t) on z is only driven through a change in
the hypothetical Moral Benefit, and not through the associated Utility Cost. This is
because ∂C
∂z̃(t)
= φ′(z̃(t)) − (c + t) = 0, since z̃(t) is defined as the optimal consumption
level under standard theory and thus φ′(z̃(t)) = c+ t. Intuitively this is because we know
that a change in z̃(t) has to be accompanied by a corresponding change in t (assuming
c is held fixed) which will offset any change in the Utility Cost. Note that this is only
the case because the initial level of consumption is assumed to be z̃(t). If the initial level
of consumption were at a different level, say at a level z0 6= z̃(t), then we would have
∂C
∂z0
6= 0 and the impact of a change in the initial consumption level on the chosen level
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≥ 0 ∀ ẑ < z, z0 ≤ z̃(t).
(3.37)
We see from the above that the impact of an increase in z0 is definitively to increase the
chosen consumption level z of the dirty good as long as ẑ < z, z0 ≤ z̃(t) . Indeed, in
this case, the effect of a change in the initial level is even stronger as there are now two
components driving a change in the consumption choice. As before, an increase in the
initial level has an impact on the chosen level through the hypothetical Moral Benefit,
where a higher initial level allows the same level of Moral Benefit to be achieved with a
higher level of consumption. In addition, a higher level of initial consumption - as long as
it is less than the utility-maximising level - requires the individual to increase the chosen
level in order to maintain the same level of Utility Cost (or the other way around, an
increase in the initial level for a given level of the chosen level below the initial level,
increases the Utility Cost associated with that choice). If, however, the initial level were
above the utility-maximising level (z0 > z̃), then
∂C
z0
< 0 and it is no longer clear in which
direction the chosen level will move as the effect through the hypothetical Moral Benefit
works towards increasing the chosen level, but the Utility Cost effect works towards
reducing the chosen level.
Result 3 With a choice function non-linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit, an in-
crease in in the initial consumption level (and consumption level of all others) can increase
the chosen consumption level.
Let us now return to the main assumption that the initial consumption level is at the
utility-maximising level, z̃(t). If we hold the cost of production c constant, we know that
we can’t get a change in z̃(t) without a change in t. Therefore the next step is to evaluate
how a change in the tax would influence the chosen consumption level with a generalised
choice function.
3.4.4 Impact of a Change in the Emissions Tax
In the linear case we have seen that an increase in the tax leads to a decrease in the
chosen consumption level, but this was only driven by the direct effect of the tax on the
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price of the good which in turn impacted the Utility Cost depending on the weight given
to it. If the tax increases, the utility-maximising consumption level z̃(t) decreases and
therefore allows for a reduction in the chosen level without an increase in the associated
Utility Cost. However, in a more general setting we have established that the initial
consumption level - and by definition the consumption level of all other individuals - can
also have an indirect impact on the choice through the hypothetical Moral Benefit and
therefore there is another way the tax influences z. The relationship between the tax t




























≤ 0 ∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t).
(3.38)
This expression is in part very similar to the one in (3.37). There are two components
driving the consumption choice. First is the impact of the tax on the Moral Benefit
through a change in the consumption of everybody else. Since ∂B
∂t







≤ 0. Indeed, this effect is essentially the same as the effect described
in (3.37). Because the tax only enters the calculation of the hypothetical Moral Benefit






and therefore the effect through the Moral Benefit channel is simply determined by how
much a change in the tax changes the initial tax level.
Second, we have the impact of the tax on the Utility Cost of the chosen consumption level.
When looking at a change in the initial consumption level only, we found that ∂C
∂z̃(t)
= 0
because φ′(z̃(t)) = c + t. This is still the case here but the tax also enters the Utility
Cost directly on both the calculation of utility under the initial level as well as the chosen
level. Therefore we have ∂C
∂t
= z − z̃(t) < 0. And since we know from the conditions of






+ FC ≤ 0.
Thus we can confirm that, as we would intuitively expect, we have ∂z
∂t
≤ 0.
Result 4 With any concave choice function of the hypothetical Moral Benefit and as-
sociated Utility Cost, an increase in the tax reduces consumption of the dirty good if
ẑ < z < z̃(t).
3.4.5 Impact of a Change in the Damage Experienced
Next let us evaluate how z is influenced by the total damage from consumption of the
dirty good that individuals experience, D(Mz̃(t)). Since the individual assumes that
111
everybody else will continue to consume z̃(t), and the individual’s consumption change
is negligible due to the atomistic nature of the consumption decision, this is the damage

















≥ 0 ∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t).
(3.39)
This is very similar to Equation (3.36) since the experienced damage only has an impact
on the hypothetical Moral Benefit. It is easy to determine that ∂B
∂D(Mz̃(t))
> 0 for any ẑ <
z < z̃(t) and therefore, as we would expect from the above intuition, z is increasing in the
damage experienced D(Mz̃(t)). As the damage experienced increases, an individual with
some propensity to act morally can consume a higher level of the dirty good to achieve
the same level of hypothetical Moral Benefit. Note that a change in the total damage
caused by the dirty good does not affect the Utility Cost associated with the consumption
choice and therefore the consumption choice is only increasing in total damage when the
choice function is non-linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit.
Result 5 With a choice function non-linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit, an in-
crease in the level of damage the individual experiences increases the chosen consumption
level if ẑ < z < z̃(t).
3.4.6 Impact of a Change in Altruism
So far we have established how the tax, the initial consumption level as well as the damage
experienced may impact the chosen consumption level z. For completeness let us now
look at the level of altruistic concern for others’ utility, α. The impact of a change in α


















From here we can establish that ∂z
∂α
< 0 only when FB > −FBBB for any ẑ < z < z̃(t).
This may seem counter-intuitive since we would expect any altruism to have an effect to
reduce consumption if it has an effect at all. However, there are two factors working in




≤ 0 works towards reducing consumption of the dirty good since the marginal





works towards increasing the consumption since the higher the level of α the higher the
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level of the Hypothetical Moral Benefit for a given difference between z and z̃(t). This
effect does not exist in the linear setting as the initial level does not impact the choice of
consumption in that case.
Result 6 With a choice function non-linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit, an in-
crease in the degree of altruistic concern for others only reduces consumption of the dirty
good when FB > −FBBB.40
This section has so far provided some insights about how the chosen consumption level
may be more sensitive to the initial conditions within a non-linear choice function. To
illustrate these insights further, we will now go through two examples of a non-linear
choice function, one that is linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit but non-linear in the
Utility Cost, and one that is linear in the Utility Cost but non-linear in the hypothetical
Moral Benefit.41 The purpose of these examples is to help highlight some of the effects
described in the more general analysis of this section.
3.4.7 Example 1: µB − (1− µ)C2
In this first example we will analyse a simple version of the choice function that is still
linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit B, but quadratic in the associated Utility Cost C.
This specific example will help to isolate some of the individual components influencing
the consumption choice that have been established in Sections 3.4.3 - 3.4.6. The choice
function in this example is specified such that an individual with propensity to act morally
0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 will choose consumption of the dirty good to maximise
µB − (1− µ)C2. (3.41)
It is straightforward to verify that this choice function is strictly concave in z as required.
40This condition can be rearranged to B
FB
FBB > −1 and could be interpreted as saying that the
elasticity of the marginal choice function value with respect to the hypothetical Moral Benefit has to be
less than one in absolute terms.
41The two example funcitonal forms used in Section 3.4.7 and Section 3.4.8 are not suggestions that
these are the ’correct’ ones or one is more applicable that the other. They were chosen as example
functions that are simple to analyse while fulfilling the concavity condition and at the same time provide
one example where the choice function is linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit and non-linear in the
Utility Cost, and one example where the choice function is non-linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit
and linear in the Utility Cost.
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Using the results from Section 3.4.1 we find that consumption of the dirty good is defined
by
φ′(z) = c+ kC2MD




µ(1 + αM) + 2(1− µ)C
. (3.43)
As in the linear case, when µ = 1 we have kC2 = 1 and when µ = 0 we have kC2 = 0.
Furthermore, as already determined in more generality, the result that the standard
Pigovian tax induces everyone to consume the social optimum still holds in this case as




since the choice function is linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit and the level of dam-
age experienced does not affect the Utility Cost. This means that, as in the baseline
model, the level of damage experienced D(Mz̃(t)) has no impact on the chosen consump-
tion level. Next we can determine that the impact of a change in the initial consumption


























As already discussed in Section 3.4.3, this result is driven by the fact that φ′(z̃(t)) = (c+t),
which is a result of the individual assuming that all other individuals will make their con-
sumption choice optimally in line with standard theory. Given that the initial consump-
tion level is at the utility-maximising z̃(t), we know that the only channel through which
an exogenous change in z̃(t) might impact the chosen level is through the hypothetical
Moral Benefit, and since the choice function is still linear in B(.), the marginal impact is
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[z − z̃(t)]− 2(1− µ)C
}
< 0
∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t).
(3.46)
As we can see from the above, the effect of the tax is still just the direct effect on the
Utility Cost. The only difference is that this effect is stronger compared to the standard
linear case because of the quadratic increase in the Utility Cost from a change in t. As we
already know from the result in (3.45), there is no further effect through the impact of a
change in t on the consumption of all other individuals. Finally let us look at the impact
of a change in α, the altruistic concern for others’ utility, on the chosen consumption












< 0 ∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t). (3.47)
In the general setting we were not able to determine that ∂z
∂α
≤ 0 would generally hold for
any ẑ < z < z̃(t). However, in this example of the choice function it is straightforward
to establish that it does hold and so the chosen consumption level is indeed a decreasing
function of the level of altruism; as it is in the baseline model and as we would intuitively
expect. There is no upward effect of altruism in this case because the choice function is
still linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit. Indeed the numerator of (3.47) is the same
as with the linear choice function. The only difference is in 1
SOC
. The rate at which the
choice function changes as z increases is stronger with this choice function compared to
the linear function due to the quadratic influence on the choice function and so the effect
of an increase in α on the chosen consumption level is actually stronger than it is in the
baseline model.42
3.4.8 Example 2: µBγ − (1− µ)C, 0 < γ < 1
As a second example let us now look at a choice function linear in the Utility Cost, but
non-linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit. To maintain simplicity let us assume that
an individual with propensity to act morally 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 chooses consumption of the dirty
42This can be determined by comparing the second derivative with respect to z of the linear choice
function and the non-linear example used here.
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good to maximise
µBγ − (1− µ)C, where 0 < γ < 1. (3.48)
Again, it is straightforward to verify that the choice function is indeed strictly concave
in z as required, which is ensured by 0 < γ < 1. And again we can simply derive the
equation that defines the consumption choice of the dirty good as
φ′(z) = c+ kγMD




µγBγ−1(1 + αM) + (1− µ)
. (3.50)
As already established for the general case, we again see that when µ = 1 we have kγ = 1
and when µ = 0, we have kγ = 0. Furthermore, of course the standard Pigovian tax as
defined in (3.10) still induces every individual to consume the socially optimal amount of
the dirty good.
With regards to comparative statics, as a first step we can determine that the non-linearity
in the hypothetical Moral Benefit implies that the consumption choice of the dirty good
does now depend on the consumption choice of all other individuals and therefore also on
the damage experienced as a result of the emissions caused by consumption of the dirty









µγ(γ − 1)Bγ−2(1 + αM)2[
φ′(z)− c−MD′(Mz)
]}
> 0 ∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t),
(3.51)
where








+ (1− µ)φ′′(z) < 0.
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It is straightforward to verify that z is indeed an increasing function of D(Mz̃(t)) for
any ẑ < z < z̃(t). An increase in the damage experienced actually enables the individual
to consume a higher amount of the dirty good and still achieve the same level of hypo-
thetical Moral Benefit. Similarly, we can confirm that z is an increasing function of the















> 0 ∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t).
(3.52)
An increase in the consumption of all other individuals increases the benchmark level
of the Moral Benefit which in turn means that the individual can consume a higher
amount of the dirty good to achieve the same level of Moral Benefit. Unlike the first
example, we can also see now that an increase in the tax on the dirty good does not just
impact the consumption choice through the direct effect, but also through the shift in


















< 0 ∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t).
(3.53)
The above confirms that z is a decreasing function of the tax rate t. The first part in the
braces captures the indirect effect from a shift in the consumption of all other individuals
while the second part - (1 − µ) - captures the direct linear effect on the Utility Cost.












≤ 0 ∀ ẑ < z < z̃(t). (3.54)
Therefore z is also a decreasing function of the level of altruistic concern for others’ utility
with this example of a choice function. In this case there is both a factor driving to de-
crease consumption as well as the factor driving to increase consumption as described in
Section 3.4.6, but the downward effect outweighs the upward factor with this particular
setup.
This section has provided some insights into how the factors driving the consumption
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decision under the alternative theory of moral behaviour may be affected by using a non-
linear choice function and confirmed that Propositions 2, 4 and 5 also hold with a more
general choice function while Proposition 3 only holds under specific conditions. The
next section will now extend the analysis further to analyse the case when the individual
has to choose consumption of a range of different dirty goods rather than just one.
3.5 Multiple Goods
The baseline model assumed that there is one dirty good causing emissions and damage,
as well as the clean numeraire good covering expenditure on all other goods. This section
aims to extend this framework to the case of multiple dirty goods, each of which may
have a different emissions rate and be subject to a different tax. Note though that each
of the dirty goods causes the same type of emissions and it is the total of all emissions
from all the dirty goods that cause the damage experienced. This approach is in line
with capturing the global climate change problem, with countless different goods causing
the GHG emissions which lead to climate change. The primary purpose of this section
is to describe the conditions for determining the chosen consumption levels with moral
behaviour when there are multiple dirty goods and analyse the effect of a change in the
relative price (through the tax) of one dirty good on the chosen consumption level of
another dirty good.
3.5.1 Analysis of Choice over Multiple Goods
The setup of this model is mostly identical to the baseline model, but we now have a
vector z of n ≥ 1 different dirty goods, where z = [z1, . . . , zn]. Each good has a cost
of production ci, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which is captured by the vector c = [c1, . . . , cn], as well
as a corresponding emissions rate ei captured by the vector e = [e1, . . . , en]. The cost
of production and emissions rate may be different for each good, but doesn’t necessarily
have to be. Of course if two or more goods have exactly the same cost of production and
emissions rate they can be regarded as one and the same good for the purposes of this
analysis. But two goods may, for example, have the same cost of production but differ in
their emissions rate and vice versa. Finally, each of the n dirty goods may be subject to a
different tax imposed by the government.43 The tax for good zi is given by ti and all the
43In practice one would expect there to be a tax on each unit of emissions rather than a different tax
on each dirty good. The model could be changed to that effect without any significant changes to the
results described in this section. However, the comparative statics analysis in Section 3.5.2 aims to show
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tax rates are captured by the vector t = [t1, . . . , tn]. Given this setup the hypothetical
Moral Benefit of deviating from the standard consumption level is





































− (c + t) · z
]
. (3.56)
For any consumption decision driven by the maximisation of a choice function F (B,C),
there are effectively two steps an individual takes in making their consumption choice.
The first is a matter of efficiency which means that the individual needs to choose con-
sumption such that the hypothetical Moral Benefit is maximised subject to any given
level of Utility Cost. This will provide the efficient frontier of consumption. The second
is the choice of consumption along that efficient frontier, which is determined by the
weight given to the Moral Benefit and the Utility Cost in the choice function.
As a first step we aim to determine the efficient frontier of consumption, that is to find
the maximum level of the hypothetical Moral Benefit given a level of Utility Cost, C̄.
Assuming linearity in both the hypothetical Moral Benefit and the Utility Cost, this













− l s.t. C ≤ C̄, (3.57)
where










captures the component of the hypothetical Moral Benefit level that represents everything
how a change in the relative price of one dirty good affects the chosen consumption levels of another
dirty good. For this it is useful to have a policy instrument (the tax) that changes the relative prices
of the two goods without having to assume a change in the cost of production or emissions rate. Note
further that it is not the primary purpose of this section to determine the optimal tax on each good or
a unit of emissions but rather to describe the conditions for determining the chosen consumption levels
with moral behaviour when there are multiple dirty goods.
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to do with the initial level of consumption.44 The optimisation problem shown in (3.57)
is a straightforward multivariate maximisation with an inequality constraint. We can
transform this problem into the following Lagrangian:















The Kuhn-Tucker conditions then define the chosen level of consumption for each of the
dirty goods zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Denoting Bi = ∂B∂zi and Ci =
∂C
∂zi
, the conditions are
Bi
Ci
≤ λ, zi ≥ 0, zi
Bi
Ci
= λ, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n; and (3.59)
C̄ − C ≥ 0, λ ≥ 0, λ(C̄ − C) = 0, (3.60)
where both (3.59) and (3.60) are of course complementary slackness conditions. Also
note that ∂L
∂C
= −λ. The value of λ represents the marginal effect of the Utility Cost
constraint on the optimal Moral Benefit, which can also be thought of as the shadow price
of the Utility Cost. Of course, if λ = 0 then no weight would be given to the Utility Cost
and the individual would simply maximise the hypothetical Moral Benefit (i.e. Bi = 0
∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n). For analysis purposes let us therefore assume that λ > 0 which implies
C̄ = C. From the conditions in (3.59) and (3.60) we can then see that for any positive




















− (ci + ti)







. If we assume that there is positive consumption levels of all the
dirty goods for any particular individual then we know that consumption of the dirty










The condition in (3.62) is analogous to the optimality condition in any standard utility
44The initial consumption level is irrelevant in the maximisaiton problem because - as in the baseline
model - we again have assumed a linear setup for simplicity.
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maximisation problem where the marginal rates of substitution of the various goods have
to be equal. Indeed we can think of Bi
Ci
as a marginal rate of ’moral’ substitution, the
marginal Moral Benefit relative to its marginal Utility Cost. As such it is intuitive that
we require that the marginal rate of moral substitution is equal for each of the dirty
goods, which in turn have to be equal to λ. Given we don’t yet know the value of λ we




Figure 3.4: Efficient Frontier of Consumption
This curve represents the maximum level of the hypothetical Moral Benefit given any level
of the associated Utility Cost. At the same time, each point along this curve represents
the optimal consumption level for each different level of λ. The level of λ, and therefore
the actual choice of consumption, then of course depends on the specification of the
choice function. For any choice function F (B,C) as specified in Section 3.4, we know






Ci = 0 ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ n. (3.63)
For the linear setup used in this section it is then straightforward to determine that for









good which has a positive consumption level. If we assume that n = 1 then of course this
reduces the baseline model where µB1 = (1− µ)C1.
So far we have looked at the first-order conditions that define the chosen levels of con-
sumption for each of the dirty goods. In addition, let us assume that all the necessary
second-order conditions hold to ensure the stationary points are maxima. If we have only
two dirty goods, both of which have a positive consumption level, then it is straightfor-
ward to derive that the second-order condition for maximum is given by
C1C2L12 + C1C2L21 − C22L11 − C21L22 > 0. (3.65)
It is straightforward to determine that this condition is fulfilled if the following two
inequalities hold:
C1L22 − C2L12 > 0, (3.66)
and
C2L11 − C1L21 > 0. (3.67)
We will assume that the conditions above hold. These will help us in evaluating the
results of the comparative statics analysis that follows.
3.5.2 Comparative Statics
Given that we have established the required conditions for determining the consumption
choice when there are multiple dirty goods, let us now investigate how consumption of
each good is affected by the tax imposed on any of the dirty goods. To simplify the
analysis, let us look at the case of two goods. Then it is straightforward to derive from
the workings in Section 3.5.1 that the choice problem is characterised by the following
three equations:
C̄ − C = 0, (3.68)
L1 = B1 − λC1 = 0, (3.69)
L2 = B2 − λC2 = 0. (3.70)
For illustration we look at the effect of a change in the tax imposed on good 1. From the
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 (z1 − z̃1)λ
0
 . (3.71)
Furthermore, let us define
J =
 0 −C1 −C2−C1 L11 L12
−C2 L21 L22
 .
From the second-order conditions established in (3.65) we know that |J| > 0. To first
investigate how a change in the tax on good 1 affects the consumption of good 1, using














∣∣∣∣∣ −C1 L12−C2 L22
∣∣∣∣∣+ λ|J|
∣∣∣∣∣ 0 −C2−C2 L22
∣∣∣∣∣ < 0.
(3.72)
As we would intuitively expect, and in line with the results of the single good case in
Section 3.4.4, consumption of good 1 will decrease with an increase in the tax on good
1. The above also shows us that, analogous to any standard consumption optimisation,
we were able to split the effect of an increase in the tax rate (which is an increase in the
effective price of good 1) into the equivalent of an income and substitution effect. To
clarify this, note that (3.72) is the same as
∂z1
∂t1






∣∣∣∣∣ 0 −C2−C2 L22
∣∣∣∣∣ < 0. (3.73)
We can think of the first component not as an income effect but as a ’Utility Cost effect’
and the second component as the substitution effect. The Utility Cost effect captures
the change in consumption as a result of an increase in the Utility Cost level (where we
know that ∂z1
∂C̄
< 0) and is weighted by the difference between the chosen consumption
level and the optimal choice under standard utility-maximising behaviour. Note also that
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−(z1 − z̃1) = − ∂C∂t1 , which is the marginal Utility Cost of an increase in the tax on good
1. Since we know that when an individual maximises the hypothetical Moral Benefit
subject to the Utility Cost constraint, we must have zi ≤ z̃i and therefore we know that
−(z1 − z̃1) ≥ 0. This in turn means that the Utility Cost effect of an increase in the tax
on good 1 is negative as we would intuitively expect. On the other hand, the substitution
effect captures the change in consumption purely due to the change in relative prices
between the two goods, holding the level of Utility Cost constant, and of course this
substitution effect is negative in line with standard theory.
However, the more interesting question is to ask what happens to consumption of good














∣∣∣∣∣ −C1 L11−C2 L21
∣∣∣∣∣+ −λ|J|
∣∣∣∣∣ 0 −C1−C2 L11
∣∣∣∣∣





∣∣∣∣∣ 0 −C1−C2 L11
∣∣∣∣∣ .
(3.74)
Again we are able to split the derivative into a substitution effect and a Utility Cost
effect. The second part of the above (i.e. the substitution effect) is positive as we would
expect. However, just as for good 1, the Utility cost effect is negative. Since the total
Utility Cost caused by deviating from the standard consumption level is driven by the
consumption of both goods, a change in the tax rate for one good affects the Utility
Cost for both goods. This means that it is not clear whether consumption of good 2 will
increase or decrease as a result of an increase in the tax on good 1. For the consumption
of good 2 to increase, i.e. ∂z2
∂t1
> 0, the substitution effect needs to outweigh the Utility
Cost effect. For this to be the case we require that
C1C2
C2L11 − C1L21
λ > −(z1 − z̃1). (3.75)
Intuitively we know that the closer z1 and z̃1 are to begin with the lower the marginal
Utility Cost (i.e. C1) is at z1. At the same time, the left hand side of (3.75) is decreasing
in C1 and increasing in C2. Of course a higher marginal Utility Cost for good 1 also goes
hand in hand with a larger value for −(z1−z̃1). But we can say that the substitution effect
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can outweigh the Utility Cost effect if the marginal Utility Cost of good 2 is sufficiently
small (less negative) and at the same time the weight given to the Utility Cost (i.e. the
value of λ) is sufficiently large. A larger weight given to the Utility cost is equivalent
to a lower propensity to act morally. Therefore, the lower the propensity to act morally
the higher the value of λ and thus the more likely it is that an increase in the tax on
good 1 increases consumption of good 2. This makes intuitive sense since the lower the
propensity to act morally, the more weight is given to utility considerations, and therefore
the more flexible the individual is to substitute consumption. In addition, we know that
the higher the consumption level of good 2 (i.e. the closer it is to the utility-maximising
level), the smaller (less negative) the marginal Utility Cost of good 2. Therefore, the
higher the consumption level of good 2 is to begin with the more likely it is that the
substitution effect outweighs the Utility Cost effect. This is consistent with the effect of
λ since the lower the propensity to act morally, the closer the consumption level of each
good will be to the utility-maximising level.
Result 7 An increase in the tax of a dirty good will decrease consumption of that dirty
good but can increase the consumption of another dirty good if the marginal Utility Cost
of the second good is sufficiently small and λ is sufficiently large.
This section has demonstrated how the consumption choice is made when there are mul-
tiple dirty goods the individual has to choose over. In addition, this section has demon-
strated the interdependencies between the goods, specifically how the tax imposed on one
good can either increase or decrease the chosen consumption level of another dirty good.
3.6 Heterogeneous Preferences
A central simplification element of the baseline model was the assumption that private
preferences for the dirty good are identical for all individuals in the population. This
also meant that in the social optimum all individuals would consume the same amount
of the dirty good and the only factor distinguishing individuals in the theory of moral
behaviour was their propensity to act morally captured by the parameter µ. This section
will attempt to relax this assumption and evaluate what would happen if individuals
have heterogeneous preferences. Specifically the aim is to analyse if the result under
Proposition 5, which states that the optimal tax is still the standard Pigovian tax as
defined in (3.10) under moral behaviour, still holds with heterogeneous preferences. This
section assumes that the government is only able to set one tax for all individuals and
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therefore is not able to set a different tax for individuals of different preference types.
For this analysis we will return to the case of just one dirty good and one clean good and
furthermore to the linear choice function as used in the baseline model. Furthermore,
for simplicity reasons, this section will also assume that there are only two different
preference types and there is no altruistic concern for others’ utility (i.e. α = 0 for
the entire population). As before, we will first analyse the model under standard utility-
maximising behaviour and then compare this to the alternative theory of moral behaviour.
3.6.1 Standard Theory
There are two types of consumers in the population; those with a ’high’ preference for the
dirty good and those with a ’low’ preference. The private gross benefit from consumption
of the dirty good for the high and low type is given by φH(z) and φL(z) respectively,




L(z) for any given z. Then the utility for a consumer
of type i, where i = H,L, is
ui(z; z̄, t) = φi(z)− (c+ t)z + (y + tz̄)−D(MT z̄), i = H,L. (3.76)
Note that z̄ denotes the average consumption of the dirty good across the entire popula-
tion and, as in the baseline model, due to the atomistic nature of the consumption decision
the individual takes this as given with regard to the tax transfer from the government
as well as the damage experienced from the externality. The parameter MT captures the
total mass of the entire population and therefore total emissions in the atmosphere are
captured by E = MT z̄. Given this setup it is straightforward to determine that, similar
to (3.5), we know that the utility-maximising level of consumption of the dirty good for
an individual of type i is given by z̃i(t) and can be derived from
z̃i(t) = ArgMax
z
ui(z; z̄, t) ∀ i = H,L. (3.77)
From here it is easy to show that utility-maximising consumption of the dirty good for
an individual of type i is characterised by
φ′i[z̃i(t)] = c+ t ∀ i = H,L. (3.78)
As we can see, this is very similar to the case of identical preferences in the baseline
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model. The individual consumes the amount where the marginal private gross benefit is
equal to the marginal private cost of consumption. In doing so, as in the baseline model,
the individual ignores both the lump-sum transfer from the government to the individual
as well as the damage experienced from the emissions externality. Of course from this
we also see that the high type will consume more of the dirty good compared to the low
type, i.e. z̃H(t) > z̃L(t).
When looking at the social optimum under heterogeneous preferences we first have to
recognise that we no longer have a case where everybody consumes the same level of
the dirty good. As private preferences differ, the socially optimal level of consumption
will also differ for the different types of individuals. The social planner maximises total
welfare across all individuals. Denoting the consumption level of the dirty good for the
high and low types by zH and zL respectively, the social utility function is given by
S(.) =σHMT
[









z̄ = (σHMT zH + (1− σH)MT zL)/MT .
The parameter σH captures the share of the population that is of the high type, while
(1 − σH) = σL represents the share of the population that is of the low type. Therefore
σHMT captures the mass of the high type population and (1−σH)MT captures the mass
of the low type population.
The first point that becomes obvious from (3.79) is that because socially optimal con-
sumption is no longer the same across the population, we have z̄ 6= zH 6= zL, and therefore
the social planner recognises that the individual will receive a different amount in lump-
sum transfer from the government than the individual pays in tax. The social planner also
recognises that the total level of emissions is a function of the consumption of both types
of individuals and therefore simultaneously maximises the social utility function for the
entire population with regard to both the optimal consumption level of each preference





















− σHMT t+ σ2HMT t− σ2HM2TD′(MT z̄)
+ σHMT t− σ2HMT t+ σ2HM2TD′(MT z̄) = 0.
(3.81)
From this it is then easy to see that the socially optimal level of consumption for the high
type is characterised by
φ′H(ẑH) = c+MTD
′(MT ẑT ), (3.82)
where
ẑT = (σHMT ẑH + (1− σH)MT ẑL)/MT . (3.83)
Similarly, the socially optimal level of consumption for the low type is characterised by
φ′L(ẑL) = c+MTD
′(MT ẑT ). (3.84)
As one would intuitively expect, the socially optimal levels for each type are defined
by the point where the private marginal gross benefit of consumption is equal to the
social marginal cost of consumption. Individuals of different types are not consuming the
same amount in the social optimum and we have ẑH > ẑL. However, the difference in
consumption levels is purely driven by the difference in preferences. It is also noteworthy
that the socially optimal level of consumption for a particular type is a function of the
socially optimal consumption level of the other type and therefore it is a function of the
preference level of the other type. The optimal level of the other type influences the
total emissions level and therefore marginal damage. To illustrate this let us determine
specifically how optimal consumption of the high type is affected by a change in the




(1− σH)M2TD′′(MT ẑT )
φ′′H(ẑH)− σHM2TD′′(MT ẑT )
< 0. (3.85)
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From (3.85) we see that if the optimum for the low type increases - for example as the re-
sult of an upward shift in preferences - the social optimum for the high type is reduced.45
This is because the increase in demand from the low type increases their optimal con-
sumption level which in turn increases total emissions and therefore the marginal damage
for both types. The increase in marginal damage of course dampens the optimal increase
in consumption for the low type compared to the case if there were no externality asso-
ciated with the good. However, it increases the marginal damage for the high type as
well, and this will reduce their optimal consumption level. Note that the degree to which
consumption changes depends on the share of the population that is of the low type, as
this determines how much marginal damage increases as a result of an increase in the
optimum for the low type (i.e. the numerator of the expression in (3.85)). The change
in optimal consumption for the high type is therefore determined by the increase in the
marginal damage relative to the difference between the marginal change in private gross
benefit derived from the dirty good and the change in marginal damage as a result of a
change in consumption of the high type. It is also important to note that while individ-
ual utility-maximising behaviour for each type is completely independent of any other
preference type, the social optimum for each type is linked to the preferences of all other
types. While the atomistic nature of the consumption decision means that individuals
do not take into account the emissions externality in their utility-maximising choice, the
social planner does of course takes this into account and it is consumption of all types
that determines total emissions and therefore the damage experienced from consumption
of the dirty good.
We have determined that the socially optimal level of consumption of the dirty good for
each type will be different. However, it also becomes evident from (3.82) and (3.84) as
well as (3.78), that for each type the optimal tax that induces the socially optimal level
of consumption is still given by
t̂H = t̂L = t̂ = MTD
′(MT ẑT ). (3.86)
Therefore we still have a single tax rate at the standard Pigovian level of social marginal
damage as defined in (3.10). This tax induces the socially optimal level of consump-
tion for both types despite the differences in consumption preferences. Intuitively this
45Note that this is only the case with a strictly convex damage function. if the damage function were
linear in emissions, i.e. D′′(.) = 0, then the socially optimal consumption level would be unaffected by
a preference change of the other type.
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makes sense as the purpose of the Pigovian tax is to bring the individual to internalise
the damage caused by consumption of the dirty good and the marginal damage across
the population is the same as both types are equally affected by the total emissions. Of
course this doesn’t mean that, unlike the baseline model, individuals consume the same
amount of the dirty good, but each individual will consume their socially optimal level
depending on their preferences.
3.6.2 Moral Behaviour
The Utility Cost an individual incurs from deviating from the utility-maximising choice is,
as before, given by the difference in utility between the chosen level given that everybody
else continues to behave in a utility-maximising way and the level obtained under utility-
maximising behaviour. Therefore the Utility Cost for an individual of preference type i
is









∀ i = H,L.
(3.87)
Of course this is essentially the same as the Utility Cost of the baseline model as defined in
(3.15). The only difference between different types is in the private gross benefit derived
from consumption of the dirty good, φi(zi), and the corresponding utility-maximising
level of consumption z̃i(t). As we know from the development of the baseline model,
the atomistic nature of the consumption decision determines that individuals ignore the
effect of their consumption on others and take the consumption of all others as given.
This in turn means that the calculation of the loss in utility as a result of deviating
from the utility-maximising choice is also independent of the choices of all others, and
therefore independent of other preference types. As in the case of identical preferences, it
is also straightforward to determine from (3.87) that an individual of type i who chooses
consumption to minimise the loss in utility will simply choose the utility-maximising level
defined in (3.78).
In the baseline model with homogeneous preferences the Kantian question the individual
asked was what would be optimal if the individual and everybody else were to consume the
same amount of the dirty good. This rule worked in the case of homogeneous preferences
since the social optimum required all individuals to consume the same amount of the
dirty good. However, now that we have introduced heterogeneous preferences we need
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to refine the Kantian question to reflect the variation in preferences. The following
description given by Brekke et al. (2003) gives a good way of doing so: ”In a model with
heterogeneous consumers, the adequate question would be: ’Which general rule of action
would maximise social welfare, as I perceive it, given that everyone acted according to the
same general rule as I?’ The morally ideal action would then be a function of one’s own
individual characteristics, for example income and/or preferences.” (p. 1972, footnote 8).
Using this we can say that a fully Kantian individual would need to determine the social
optimum in some way. The hypothetical Moral Benefit used in the baseline model asked
what the utility gain would be for the individual if everybody were to act the same way
compared to standard utility-maximising behaviour. Since everyone was homogeneous,
maximising the utility this individual would get if everybody else acted the same way,
was the same as maximising the social welfare function. However, now the social welfare
function is not just the individual’s utility multiplied by the population size, it is the
aggregate of all the different preference types across the population. And as we have
established in the analysis under standard theory, the social optimum is different for each
type and is also a function of the social optimum of other types. This is important in the
way we define the hypothetical Moral Benefit. If we were to determine the hypothetical
Moral Benefit by looking at the gain in overall social welfare if everybody were to act in
the socially optimal way compared to the utility-maximising way, then the maximisation
of this would indeed lead individuals to choose the morally ideal (or socially optimal) level
of consumption. However, in this alternative theory of moral behaviour the individual
trades off the hypothetical Moral Benefit against the loss of utility incurred by deviating
from the utility-maximising choice. If we defined the hypothetical Moral Benefit based
on aggregate social welfare, then the choice function would make an inconsistent trade-off
(i.e. gain in aggregate social welfare versus loss in individual utility). Furthermore, if we
then tried to correct for this by making the utility-cost calculation also on the basis of the
aggregate across the population, then we would have removed the consumption choice
entirely from the individual’s perspective. The alternative theory of moral behaviour that
has been developed in Section 3.3.3 is concerned with the trade-off between an individual’s
propensity to act morally and their individual loss in utility from acting morally. This
is a central element and should be maintained under heterogeneous preferences as well.
Therefore we need to find a way in which the individual’s hypothetical Moral Benefit is
still determined by assessing the utility gain if that individual and everybody else acted
in the same way (but not necessarily consumed the same amount of the dirty good).
We know that the individual’s moral choice is a choice of consumption at or somewhere
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between the utility-maximising level and the social optimum. We can therefore represent
the chosen level for an individual of type i as
zi = θẑi + (1− θ)z̃i(t) ∀ i = H,L, (3.88)
where the parameter θ captures the weight given towards the social optimum and deter-
mines how far the individual moves from the utility-maximising level towards the social
optimum. Given this we can stipulate that the hypothetical Moral Benefit is determined
by looking at the gain in utility the individual would have if they and everybody else in
the population would move towards the social optimum by the same degree. In other
words this means that the hypothetical Moral Benefit is determined by asking what would
my utility gain be if I and everybody else were to choose the same θ. Therefore the hypo-
thetical Moral Benefit of deviating from the utility-maximising choice for an individual
of type i is therefore given by
Bi(θ; t, z̃i(t), ẑi) = ui(θ, ζ(θ); t, z̃i(t), ẑi)− ui(z̃i(t), ζ(t); t), ∀ i = H,L, (3.89)
where ζ(θ) is an assignment function that assigns everybody else in the population the
level of consumption consistent with a level between their utility-maximising and socially
optimal level (which differs depending on preference type) based on the weight θ as
defined in (3.88). Furthermore, ζ(t) is the assignment function that assigns everybody
else in the population their utility maximising level of consumption. As an example, the
hypothetical Moral Benefit for an individual of the high type is
BH(.) =
[
φH(zH)− [c+ t]zH + t[σHzH + (1− σH)zL]




φH(z̃H(t))− [c+ t]z̃H(t) + t[σH z̃H(t) + (1− σH)z̃L(t)]





zH = θẑH + (1− θ)z̃H(t), and zL = θẑL + (1− θ)z̃L(t).
If the individual’s consumption were only driven by the hypothetical Moral Benefit, the


















From (3.91) it is straightforward to determine that this will only lead to a consumption
choice at the social optimum (i.e. φ′H(zH) = c + MTD
′(.)), if we have ẑH − z̃H(t) =
ẑL − z̃L(t) when t 6= t̂. However, due to the differences in the preferences between the
high and low type the difference between their social optimum and utility-maximising
level may well be different.46 Therefore, contrary to the baseline model with identical
individuals, maximisation of the hypothetical Moral Benefit no longer necessarily leads
to consumption of the social optimum. This is because the individual is not actually able
to determine the ’true’ moral optimum (i.e. the utility derived if they and everybody else
were to consume the social optimum) but rather makes an estimate of this by assuming
that everybody else would move towards their social optimum by the same degree. The
effect we observe is driven by the fact that if the individual of type H chooses θ, this
moves the assumed consumption choice for individuals of type L different to that of type
H. But at the same time the consumption level of type L influences type H through
both the lump-sum transfer from the government and the total emissions leading to the
experienced damage. We can see from (3.91) that the degree to which the damage is
internalised depends on the weighted difference between the utility-maximising and so-
cially optimal levels across the population relative to the difference for this particular
preference type. This makes intuitive sense since it reflects the assumption that every-
body else moves towards the social optimum by the same factor and so the individual
will internalise the movement of the entire population relative to his preference type.
Another critical difference to the baseline model is that maximising the hypothetical
Moral Benefit leads the individual to take account of the tax imposed on consumption
of the dirty good. In the baseline model the individual’s benchmark was that everybody
consumes the same amount and therefore the tax paid on the dirty good would equal the
lump-sum transfer from the government, rendering the tax irrelevant. However, given
that the government only sets one tax across the entire population and we have heteroge-
nous preferences, the tax paid by a particular preference type will no longer match the
transfer from the government since the average consumption level across the population
is not the same as the consumption level of that preference type. From (3.91) we also see
46And if there were more than two types it would almost be certain that the differences would not be
the same.
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that whether an individual maximising the hypothetical Moral Benefit alone, consumes
more or less than the social optimum depends on the tax relative to the Pigovian level
and whether the difference between the social optimum and the utility-maximising level
is larger for the high or low type.47 For example, assuming a t < t̂ an individual of the
high type will consume less than the social optimum if the difference between the social
optimum and the utility-maximising level is grater for the high type compared to the low
type. On the other hand, if the difference of the low type is sufficiently large relative to
the high type, then the individual may consume more than the social optimum.
The key here is that even if the individual only maximises the hypothetical Moral Benefit,
the tax plays a critical role in determining consumption. However, we can also determine
from (3.91) that if the government imposes the Pigovian tax (i.e. t̂ = MTD
′(.)), this
reduces (3.91) to φ′H(zH) = c + MTD
′(.) and therefore means that maximisation of the
hypothetical Moral Benefit with the Pigovian tax in place leads to consumption of the
socially optimal level. Looking at (3.91) we can see that if t = t̂ the distortion through
the damage effect exactly cancels out the distortion through the tax channel. Note that
while this is shown here for the high preference type, the equivalent also holds for the
low preference type. Intuitively this makes sense because the Pigovian tax eliminates any
difference between the utility-maximising level and the social optimum for all preference
types as shown in the analysis of standard behaviour in Section 3.6.1.
Given we have set up both the Utility Cost of alternative behaviour as well as the cal-
culation of the hypothetical Moral Benefit, we can now combine them in the individual’s
choice function determining their consumption choice. Just as in the baseline model we
will assume that the individual makes the consumption decision by maximising the basic
linear choice function as defined in (3.18). Therefore the individual of type i will choose
consumption by maximising
µBi − (1− µ)Ci, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, i = L,N. (3.92)
As in the baseline model, the parameter µ captures the individual’s propensity to act
morally. This propensity to act morally is also distributed across the population but
entirely independent of the distribution of preferences. Using preference type H for the
further analysis, and substituting (3.87) and (3.90) into (3.92) it is straightforward to
47The case where the individual only maximises the hypothetical Moral Benefit is equal to the case
of µ = 1 when we use the linear choice function.
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determine from the first-order condition that the consumption choice for an individual of
type H with propensity to act morally µ is characterised by
φ′H(zH) = c+ µMTD
















Similarly, the consumption choice for an individual of type L with propensity to act
morally µ is characterised by
φ′L(zL) = c+ µMTD
















We know that an individual with full propensity to act morally (i.e. µ = 1) puts no
weight to the Utility Cost associated with deviating and therefore only maximises the
hypothetical Moral Benefit. From the earlier analysis of this case we already know that
maximisation of the hypothetical Moral Benefit does not on its own lead to consumption of
the social optimum and, unlike the baseline model, is still a function of the tax rate. This
of course translates directly into the results determined by (3.93) and (3.94). Assuming
that t 6= t̂, we know that an individual with µ = 1 will consume their best estimation
of the morally ideal effort, but not the actual social optimum. On the other hand, an
individual with no propensity to act morally (i.e. µ = 0) will minimise the Utility
Cost without regard for the hypothetical Moral Benefit and therefore, as in the baseline
model, simply consume the utility-maximising level as defined in (3.78). However, we
can also determine from (3.93) and (3.94) that if the government imposes the Pigovian
tax, the individual will consume the social optimum regardless of their propensity to
act morally. Therefore the baseline model result that the standard Pigovian tax is still
the optimal tax under the alternative theory of behaviour also holds under heterogenous
preferences. The reason for this that (a) the Pigovian tax exactly offsets the distortion
caused through the damage factor and the tax factor from the imperfect assessment of
the morally ideal consumption level as described earlier and (b) the Pigovian tax makes
everybody consume the social optimum regardless of their propensity to act morally as
demonstrated in the baseline model results. Therefore, even when individuals make the
calculation of the morally ideal benchmark level in an imperfect way in the presence
of heterogenous preferences, the optimal tax induces everyone to consume the socially
optimal level of the dirty good regardless of differences in preferences and differences in
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individuals’ propensity to act morally.48
Proposition 8 If there are two types of individuals with different preferences over con-
sumption of the dirty good, where at the same time individuals may exhibit some propen-
sity to act morally, the Pigovian tax still induces everyone in the population to consume
the socially optimal level of the dirty good.
Proof: Plugging the Pigovian tax defined in (3.10) into the characterisation of con-
sumption of both the high and low types as defined in (3.93) and (3.94) respectively,
these reduce to their socially optimal levels as defined in (3.82) and (3.84).
So far we developed a number extensions around the baseline model and shown that these
do not change the optimal tax the government should set on consumption of the dirty
good. The next section will develop one further extension, combining the theory of moral
behaviour with a model of desire for conformity.
3.7 Moral Behaviour and a Desire for Conformity
This section aims to combine the theory of moral behaviour with the model of desire for
conformity developed in Ulph and Ulph (2014) and also introduced as part of Dasgupta
et al. (2015). The model developed by Ulph and Ulph (2014) captures the idea that indi-
viduals might change their consumption choice away from the standard level in order to
get closer to a norm that is established by the consumption choices of other individuals.
This approach is different from the modelling of Veblen effects in that individuals are
not trying to match their consumption to that of an aspirational group, but rather value
the conformity with similar individuals as such, which in turn establishes a consumption
norm. This also means that, in contrast to competitive consumption, it may induce the
individual to consume less of good in order to conform to the norm. At the same time
an individual chooses whether to adhere to norm or not, and will only do so if this yields
a net utility benefit. For more details on this see Ulph and Ulph (2014).49
When combining this model of desire for conformity with the alternative theory of moral
behaviour it is important to determine at what stage morality enters into the individual’s
consideration. One option is that the moral consideration enters at the consumption de-
cision stage, another is that it enters at the stage where individuals choose to adhere to a
48While one can intuitively expect this result to also hold when there are more then two preference
types, further analysis is required to formally show this.
49For a brief overview of the literature on social norms see Section 3.2.2.
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norm or not. Furthermore, when including morality it is important to consider whether
the norm itself should have some normative value or whether norms simply emerge as a
result of the consumption decisions as done in Ulph and Ulph (2014). In order to be as
consistent as possible with the two models this section is based on, the analysis will focus
on the case where the norm simply emerges and morality only enters at the consumption
decision level. This is consistent with the approach in the baseline model. Note that
this means that the Kantian optimum is therefore independent of the norm that emerges
since the Kantian optimum already assumes that everybody consumes the same level and
therefore everybody consumes at that level which would also be the emerging norm if
everybody were to act in a fully Kantian fashion. This also means that an individual’s
choice whether to adhere to a norm or not is a purely utility-maximising process and
individuals will take into account their propensity to act morally and the effect it has
on their utility when they choose whether to adhere to a norm or not. Note that the
analysis done in this section will not analyse the emergence of norms in detail but will
only do so to evaluate whether Proposition 5 - which says that the government should
set the standard Pigovian tax - still holds when individuals have a desire for conformity.
3.7.1 Model Setup
The basic model setup is the same as in the baseline model developed in Section 3.3.
However, for notational simplicity we will now denote average consumption of the dirty
good by zA instead of z̄. In order to extend the model to capture adherence to a norm with
a desire for conformity in line with Ulph and Ulph (2014) we simply add two elements to
the utility function defined in (3.4). First is the ”strength of the desire for conformity”
(Ulph and Ulph 2014, p. 4) which is captured by ω. Second, we require the ”individual’s
strength of adherence to the norm” (Ulph and Ulph 2014, p. 4), which is captured by γ.
Therefore utility for an individual who is adhering to a norm is
u(z; zA, zN , γ, ω) = φ(z)− (c+ t)z + (y + tzA)−D(MzA)− γ|z − zN |+ ω, (3.95)
where zN is the norm level of consumption that this individual has chosen to adhere to.
While ω is simply a benefit the individual derives from adhering to a norm, the parame-
ter γ determines the reduction in utility if an individual has chosen to adhere to a norm
but doesn’t consume exactly the norm level.50 As will become clearer in the analysis,
50While it is not straightforward to make predictions about the levels of the strength of desire for
conformity ω and the strength of adherence to the norm γ, one may expect that an individual with
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the individual has a choice whether to adhere to a norm in the first place or not. If the
individual chooses not to adhere to a norm then the utility function reduces to the stan-
dard setup and the model reduces to the baseline case analysed in Section 3.3. As usual,
we will briefly develop the key results under standard utility-maximising behaviour to
serve as counterfactual before moving on to the main analysis of moral behaviour when
individuals also value conformity.
3.7.2 Utility-Maximising Behaviour
This section will only repeat the analysis of Ulph and Ulph (2014) at a very simple
level in order to build a counterfactual for the analysis of moral behaviour. For detailed
results of consumption choices when people value conformity and act in a standard utility-
maximising way, see Ulph and Ulph (2014) and Dasgupta et al. (2015). As is explained
in those papers, there are three stages to analysing the consumption problem. First is
the individual’s choice whether to adhere to a norm or not. If the individual chooses not
to adhere to a norm, then they will simply maximise their ’standard’ utility as shown
in (3.4) and the individual’s consumption choice will be characterised by φ′(z) = c + t
as usual. The second stage is the determination of the norm and the third stage is the
individual’s consumption decision. Note that for now we will ignore a further stage where
the government decides on the level of the tax on the dirty good, but of course this stage
would precede the others. Of course it is most effective to conduct the model analysis
backwards through the various stages - as done in Ulph and Ulph (2014) - and therefore
we start with the consumption choice given the individual has chosen to adhere to a norm
zN . Note also that for analysis of Stage 2 & 3 we can ignore the fixed benefit ω that
individuals get if they choose to adhere to a norm, since it is not a function of the chosen
level or the norm level of consumption and only has significance when the individual
decides whether to adhere to a norm or not.
Stage 3 - Consumption Choice
The maximisation of the utility function has to be done in two stages to deal with the
absolute value of the difference between consumption and the norm level. Therefore we
a high desire for conformity also has a higher strength of adherence to the norm. However, it is also
plausible that an individual may care a great deal about being a conformist without being too strict
about how close the consumption choice then actually is to the norm level. At the same time, there may
be individuals whose desire for conformity is not very strong, but once they have decided to conform to
a norm they are very strict about consuming close to the norm level.
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have two constrained maximisation problems. In the first one the consumer chooses z to
MAX
z
y + φ(z)− (c+ t)z + tzA −D(MzA)− γ(z − zN) s.t. c ≥ cN , (3.96)
and in the second one the consumer chooses z to
MAX
z
y + φ(z)− (c+ t)z + tzA −D(MzA)− γ(zN − z) s.t. c ≤ cN . (3.97)
The solutions to the above problems are
z = zN ⇔ zN ≥ z; z = z ⇔ zN < z, (3.98)
and
z = zN ⇔ zN ≤ z; z = z ⇔ zN > z, (3.99)
respectively. As such the solutions in (3.98) and (3.99) define the norm-consistent interval
of consumption [
φ′(z) = c+ t+ γ , φ′(z) = c+ t− γ
]
. (3.100)
If the norm lies within that interval the individual will choose the norm level, and if it
lies outside the norm-consistent interval, the individual will choose the boundary level
closest to the norm (i.e. either the upper or lower bound of the interval).
Stage 2 - Equilibrium Norms
The analysis in this section will use the same definition of an equilibrium norm as defined
in Ulph and Ulph (2014), which states that:
A norm, zN is an equilibrium norm if
51
1. it is the average of the consumption decisions of al the individuals who adhere to
that norm, as determined in Stage 3.
51Ulph and Ulph (2014), p. 7
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2. there is more than one norm in existence then the norm to which any individual
adheres is that which generates the highest level of indirect utility for that individ-
ual.
So far we only have identical individuals in the analysis. In that case there will be a single
equilibrium norm that can take any value in the norm-consistent interval of consump-
tion. If there were heterogeneity in the individuals’ strength of adherence to the norm,
γ, but everybody would be identical otherwise, there will be a single norm within the
norm-consistent interval of the individual with the lowest strength of adherence to the
norm. Heterogeneity in other factors may lead to norms outside anyone’s norm-consistent
interval and may also lead to multiple norms. We will explore this further when it be-
comes relevant in the analysis of moral behaviour. For more detail on the norms that
may emerge under standard utility-maximising behaviour see Ulph and Ulph (2014).
Stage 1 - Decision over adherence to Norm
An individual will choose to adhere to a norm if the utility derived from adhering to it,
as defined in (3.95), is greater than the utility derived if the individual chooses not to
adhere to a norm, as defined defined in (3.4). This means an individual will choose to
adhere to a norm if
ω > γ|z − zN |. (3.101)
Social Planner
When maximising social welfare we know that since individuals have identical utility
functions, all individuals would consume the same amount of the dirty good and therefore
the social optimum is characterised by
φ′(ẑ) = c+MD′(Mẑ). (3.102)
This level is of course the same as in the baseline model. Furthermore, since all individu-
als would consume the same level, this social optimum would also be the norm level and
everybody would choose to adhere to that norm.
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3.7.3 Moral Behaviour
Let us now implement the moral behaviour element and, as in the baseline model, the
analysis will assume that individuals may have some propensity to act morally 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1,
and choose consumption by maximising the choice function
µB − (1− µ)C,
where, for an individual who has chosen to adhere to a norm, B(.) is the hypothetical
Moral Benefit given by
B(.) =
[








and C(.) is the associated Utility Cost given by
C(.) =
[




φ(z)− (c+ t)z − γ|z − zN |
]
. (3.104)
The term z0 captures the chosen consumption level under utility-maximising behaviour
as analysed in Section 3.7.2.
Stage 3 - Consumption Choice
Applying the two-stage analysis analogous to the one in Section 3.7.2, we find that the
norm-consistent interval for an individual with 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1 is[
φ′(zµ) = c+ µMD
′(Mzµ) + (1− µ)t+ (1− µ)γ,
φ′(zµ) = c+ µMD




For individuals with full propensity to act morally, i.e. µ = 1, we find that φ′(zµ) =
φ′(zµ) = c+MD
′(Mẑ), which is the socially optimal level. This means that people with
full propensity to act morally will always choose the social optimum regardless of their
strength of adherence to the norm. As such they will ignore the social norm in favour
of the moral norm. However, if the individual with full propensity to act morally has
nevertheless chosen in Stage 1 to seek conformity, their choice will impact the norm that
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emerges and therefore pull the consumption of individuals with a lower propensity to act
morally towards the social optimum. The extent to which this happens will of course
depend on where the norm lies, and how strong others’ adherence to that norm is.
On the other hand, for µ = 0 we have φ′(z) = c + t + γ and φ′(z) = c + t − γ, which
is identical to (3.100) and represents the norm-consistent interval of consumption under
utility-maximising behaviour. This is of course a function of the desire for conformity,
but not a function of the social optimum. As before, the individual will consume the
norm level if the norm lies within the interval and will consume the boundary level if the
norm lies outside the interval.









c+ µMD′(Mz) + (1− µ)γ
c+ µMD′(Mz)− (1− µ)γ
z0z0 z0ẑ zµzµ zµ
Figure 3.5: Norm-Consistent Intervals of Consumption under Moral Behaviour
Figure 3.5 shows the norm-consistent intervals for an individual with µ = 0 (blue) and for
an individual with 0 < µ < 1 (red). Note also that for an individual with µ = 1 (green),
there is no norm-consistent interval and, as already mentioned, this individual will always
consume the socially optimal level. Critically, we can see from (3.105) and Figure 3.5
that the norm-consistent interval of consumption becomes narrower as µ increases. This
is because the higher the individual’s propensity to act morally, the less weight is given
to the individual’s utility relative to the Kantian optimum and therefore effectively less
weight is given to adherence to the norm.
Result 8 The higher an individual’s propensity to act morally, the narrower the norm-
consistent interval of consumption given a certain strength of adherence to the norm.
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An individual with full propensity to act morally has no norm-consistent interval and
will consume the social optimum regardless of where the norm lies and the individual’s
strength of adherence to the norm.
Stage 2 - Equilibrium Norms
Since we don’t have identical individuals anymore it is less straightforward to determine
what the emerging norm looks like. Let us proceed by first assuming that individuals are
identical in all regards except their propensity to act morally. Looking back at Figure
3.5 assume that there are only two types of individuals, one with no propensity to act
morally (µ = 0, marked in blue), and individuals with some, but not full propensity to
act morally (0 < µ < 1, marked in red). Further assume that, as drawn in Figure 3.5, the
norm-consistent intervals of consumption for the two types do not overlap and that there
is only one norm.52 Then we know from Ulph and Ulph (2014) that the norm will lie
between the red interval and the blue interval. This in turn means that the red individuals
consume the upper bound of their interval and the blue individuals consume the lower
bound of their interval. Therefore adhering to the norm actually increases consumption
for the individual with some propensity to act morally, and decreases it for the individual
with no propensity to act morally relative to the level that would have been chosen if the
individuals were not adhering to a norm. However, because the norm-consistent interval
for the individuals with some propensity to act morally is narrower than the one for
individuals without propensity to act morally, their increase in consumption from the
level that would have been chosen if they weren’t adhering to a norm, is smaller than the
decrease in consumption for the individuals with no propensity to act morally relative
to their consumption that would have been chosen if they weren’t adhering to a norm.
Because an individual with some propensity to act morally is incurring a Utility Cost,
the increase in consumption from adhering to the norm actually increases utility derived
from consumption (excluding the direct effect from having chosen to conform in Stage
1). This is contrary to the results under utility-maximising behaviour, where deviation
from the standard level yields a decrease in direct utility derived from consumption.
Result 9 If an individual with some, but not full propensity to act morally adheres to
a norm that lies at a higher consumption level, adherence will increase consumption and
utility as it reduces the Utility Cost associated with the individual’s propensity to act
morally.
52Of course in this example we could also have two norms emerging, and one would lie in the norm-
consistent interval of the blue individuals and the other in the norm-consistent interval of the red indi-
viduals.
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Example of Specific Functional Form
In order to understand how the effect just described affects average consumption of the
dirty good across the population let us analyse a simplified example of the model using
a specific functional form for the private gross benefit of consumption of the dirty good
and the damage function. These are









Then the utility function described in (3.95) becomes
u(z; zN , γ, ω) = az −
b
2




2 − γ|z − zN |+ ω. (3.106)
Next let us assume that there are two types of individuals in the population and both
have some propensity to act morally. The first type has a high propensity to act morally
(µH > 0) and the other type a low propensity to act morally (µH > µL > 0). Then we
find that the norm-consistent interval for each type is defined as













, i = L,H, (3.107)




, i = L,H. (3.108)
From the above it becomes evident that the propensity to act morally does not just define
the baseline level of consumption, but also influences the width of the norm-consistent
interval. If the two norm-consistent intervals do not overlap and we only have a single
norm, then we know that this norm will lie in between the two intervals at the average
level of consumption, with the high type consuming zµH and the low type consuming zµL .
For the norm-consistent intervals not to overlap, we require that zµH < zµL . If we denote
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the share of the population that is ’high’ type by 0 < π < 1, the norm that emerges is























Note that the first two terms in (3.109) describe the average consumption across the
population if there were no desire for conformity. Let us denote that level by zA. Then
we can derive that zN < zA if the sum of the last two terms above is negative. Therefore












If we assume now that half of the population is high type and half is low type (i.e.
π = 0.5), then it is easy to show that the above condition will always hold as long as
µH > µL, which we have of course assumed at the start. This is turn means that we








Since the terms on both sides are positive and greater than one, we can also derive that the
condition in (3.110) will always hold if π
1−π ≤ 1. This is of course the case for any π ≤ 0.5.
This means that the smaller the share of the population with a high propensity to act
morally, the more average consumption will decrease as a result of individuals’ desire for
conformity. On the other hand, this also means that if the share of the population with
high propensity to act morally is large, the desire for conformity may actually increase
average consumption compared to the case without desire for conformity. Note that
this result is specific to the case where the norm-consistent intervals do not overlap. If
they were to overlap the resulting norm could take any value in the overlap area and
therefore we are not able to make more specific predictions about the size of the change
consumption relative to the case where individuals do not adhere to a norm.
Result 10 Adherence to a norm can decrease overall average consumption of the dirty
good if the population has a relatively high share of individuals with low propensity to act
morally. However, if the population has a high share of individuals with high propensity
to act morally, adherence to a norm can increase overall average consumption.
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Stage 1 - Decision over adherence
As noted in the introduction to this section, morality only enters at the consumption
decision stage and the decision whether to adhere to a norm or not is done purely on a
utility-maximisation basis. This means the individual will also take into account the effect
of the propensity to act morally and the consequences this has for the utility achieved.
An individual with propensity to act morally, 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1, will choose to adhere to a norm
if
φ(znorm)− (c+ t)znorm − γ|znorm − zN |+ ω > φ(zµ)− (c+ t)zµ, (3.111)
where znorm is the consumption level under adherence to a norm (given the individual’s
propensity to act morally) and zµ is the consumption level without adherence to a norm.
To explore this further, let us go back to the three cases depicted in Figure 3.5. First,
an individual with µ = 1 will consume ẑ regardless of what the norm is and regardless
of whether he adheres to a norm or not. As such, if there is a norm that is equal to ẑ,
then the individual will always consume at that norm level and thus all individuals with
µ = 1 will choose to adhere to the norm. Then the individual gains ω in utility but has
no cost to utility other than the one the individual occurs anyway due to their morality.
Result 11 If there is a norm at the social optimum ẑ, all individuals with full propensity
to act morally (µ = 1) will choose to adhere to a norm.
However, if there is no norm equal to the social optimum, the individual with full propen-
sity to act morally will only choose to adhere to the norm if
ω > γ|ẑ − zN |. (3.112)
As such, if the norm level is sufficiently far away from the social optimum, the individual
may choose not to adhere to the norm. Next let us look at the case from Figure 3.5
where there are two types, one with no propensity to act morally (blue) and the other
with some propensity to act morally (red). The norm-consistent intervals do not overlap
and there is a single norm. Then the individual with no propensity to act morally (µ = 0)
will choose to adhere to the norm if
ω − γ(z0 − zN) > φ(z0)− φ(z0)− (c+ t)(z0 − z0), (3.113)
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and the individual with some propensity to act morally will choose to adhere to the norm
if
ω − γ(zN − zµ) > φ(zµ)− φ(zµ)− (c+ t)(zµ − zµ). (3.114)
While these two conditions look similar, they have a significant difference. The right
hand side of (3.113) is positive, but the right hand side of (3.114) is negative. This is
because adhering to the norm increases consumption for the red type and this leads to an
increase in the direct utility from consumption. This is important because it makes that
type significantly more likely to choose to adhere to the norm. Of course our example
assumed that both types are adhering to the norm, which created that norm in the
first place. However, the key point to take away from this is that for individuals with
propensity to act morally, adhering to a norm may increase their consumption of the
dirty good and this will to some degree offset the Utility Cost they are incurring due to
their morality. As such an individual who is fully aware of the fact that they will sacrifice
utility in consumption may mitigate his morality through the utility-maximising choice
of whether to adhere to a norm or not.
Result 12 An individual with some, but not full propensity to act morally may consume
more of the dirty good when adhering to a norm than if they weren’t adhering to norm.
Therefore an individual may choose to adhere to a norm in order to mitigate the effect of
the individual’s morality to some degree as it decreases the Utility Cost incurred compared
to the case where the individual does not adhere to a norm.
3.7.4 Optimal Tax
The final step is to evaluate what the existence of moral behaviour and adherence to a
norm means for determining the optimal tax. Of course we know that for individuals
who do not adhere to a norm, the tax inducing socially optimal consumption is the same
standard Pigovian tax as defined in (3.10) for everybody regardless of their propensity
to act morally. The question is whether this still holds when individuals adhere to a
norm. To start, let us look at what happens to the norm-consistent interval of a moral
individual when we impose the standard tax. The norm-consistent interval described in
(3.105) then becomes[
φ′(zµ) = c+MD




This shows that with the tax the norm-consistent interval of consumption centres around
the socially optimal level of consumption for all individuals regardless of their propensity
to act morally. However, the width of the norm-consistent interval depends on the value
of the individual’s propensity to act morally as well as the strength of adherence to the
norm. This is because the tax has not internalised the norm component from the Utility
Cost calculation and therefore the propensity to act morally still matters in determining
how much weight is given to the norm compared to the Kantian optimum (which ignores
adherence to norm). Therefore we still have the case that the higher an individual’s
propensity to act morally, the narrower the norm-consistent interval of consumption.
Also we can see from (3.115) that only individuals with full propensity will definitely
consume the social optimum under this tax.
However, this also means that effectively all individuals are identical under this tax except
for the size of their norm-consistent interval. We know from Ulph and Ulph (2014) that
if individuals only differ in their strength of adherence to the norm, there will almost
certainly be a single norm and that will be within the norm-consistent interval of the type
with the lowest strength of adherence to the norm. In our case this means that there will
be a single norm and it lies within the narrowest norm-consistent interval. If we assume
that we have at least some individuals with µ = 1, we know that the narrowest interval
is no interval at all around the social optimum and therefore we know that the emerging
norm will almost certainly be at the social optimum. This in turn means that everybody
will consume at that norm level and therefore the first-best solution is achieved through
the standard Pigovian tax as in the case without adherence to the norm. Therefore the
same tax induces the first best solution for all individuals who adhere to the norm and
those who do not adhere to a norm. Finally, since imposing the tax induces everybody
who adheres to a norm to consume the single norm at the social optimum, we can also
derive that all individuals will choose to adhere to the norm, as they will gain the private
benefit derived from conformity, ω, but incur no cost compared to the case where they
do not adhere to a norm.
Proposition 9 If there is at least one individual with µ = 1 and individuals only differ
in the propensity to act morally and the strength of adherence to the norm, the stan-
dard Pigovian tax of t̂ = MD′(Mẑ) induces everyone to choose to adhere to a norm and
consume at the single norm level that emerges at the socially optimal level of consump-
tion. As such the tax induces the first-best solution for all individuals regardless of their
propensity to act morally and the degree to which they value conformity.
Proof: Plugging the Pigovian tax as defined in (3.10) into (3.105) the norm-consistent
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interval of consumption for an individual with propensity to act morally 0 ≤ µ ≤ 1
emerges as defined in (3.115). Therefore, for each individual the norm-consistent inter-
val of consumption is centred around the socially optimal consumption level φ′(ẑ) =
c + MD′(Mẑ). The individual’s propensity then only affects the size of the norm-
consistent interval. For an individual with µ = 1, we can see from (3.115) that the
interval is reduced to only the socially optimal level. We also know that since the norm
level is determined by average consumption of all individuals adhering to that norm that,
if individuals only differ in their strength of adherence to the norm, there will be a single
norm within the narrowest norm-consistent interval. Since the narrowest interval is the
social optimum, the norm has to be at the social optimum and all individuals adhering to
the norm will consume the norm level. Furthermore, since the consumption level under
adherence to the norm is the same as the utility-maximising level given the tax imposed,
all individuals will choose to adhere to the norm and increase their utility by their private
benefit derived from conformity, ω.
3.8 Concluding Remarks
The aim of this chapter was to develop an alternative theory of moral behaviour and al-
truism in an environmental context and evaluate what implications such behaviour may
have for environmental policy. It has shown that when people have some propensity to
act morally they will cut back consumption of an environmentally harmful good. At the
same time, altruistic concern for the utility of others can contribute to the amount that
individuals cut consumption, but only if they also have some propensity to act morally.
The optimal tax on the dirty good remains the same as under standard theory and the
first-best solution can be achieved. A key reason for this is that, even though some in-
dividuals may cut consumption towards to socially optimal level for moral reasons, we
are still only dealing with market failure, which the Pigovian tax can correct for all in-
dividuals. However, as demonstrated in Section 3.3.5 this result hinges on individuals
correctly making the (sophisticated) calculation of the hypothetical moral value when
acting in this genuinely altruistic way. If this is not the case there will be both a market
and behavioural failure. Consequently the Pigovian tax will no longer induce the welfare-
maximising social optimum and may indeed reduce welfare compared to the initial tax or
even no tax on the dirty good at all. While this chapter has only briefly addressed such
behavioural failures, further work may be useful to investigate what second-best solution
could be achieved through an emissions tax alone. Furthermore, it may be interesting to
analyse other policy instruments that may correct for, or avoid, behavioural failures such
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as the one in Section 3.3.5.
Section 3.4 has demonstrated that the main results of the baseline model also hold with
any concave choice function of the hypothetical Moral Benefit and the Utility Cost.53 In
particular it has shown that the optimal tax is always the standard Pigovian tax. The
intuition behind this is that the tax makes the social optimum the same as the utility-
maximising choice and therefore eliminates the Utility Cost for an individual. At the
same time it also makes the utility-maximising choice equal to the Kantian optimum and
so everybody will choose the social optimum regardless of their propensity to act morally.
When individuals choose consumption of a range of different dirty goods as analysed in
Section 3.5, the consumption choice is not dissimilar from a standard consumption prob-
lem, but since the individual is not determining the choice through maximisation of the
utility function, the consumption choices are determined by a marginal rate of moral
substitution of the relative level of the marginal Moral Benefit and marginal Utility Cost
of each good. However, there are still the usual price effects and an increase in the tax on
one good will decrease consumption of that good. At the same time, whether an increase
in the tax on one good will increase consumption of another good depends on whether
the substitution effect outweighs the Utility Cost effect of increasing consumption of
that good. Following this, Section 3.6 extended the model to the case of heterogenous
preferences. This required an adjustment of the Kantian question an individual uses to
determine the hypothetical Moral Benefit. With identical preferences the individual could
simply ask what would be optimal if everybody consumed the same amount of the dirty
good. However, with heterogenous preferences the equivalent calculation of a Kantian
optimum would become social welfare maximisation problem rather than a hypothetical
gain in the individual’s utility. In order not to remove the consumption decision from
the individual’s perspective entirely, it is assumed that the individual simply asks what
would be optimal if they and everybody else moved proportionately by the same amount
from the utility-maximising level to the social optimum. While this imperfect calculation
can be regarded as a type of behavioural failure, and affects the degree to which individ-
uals with propensity to cut back their consumption in the absence of the optimal tax, it
does not change the optimal tax that the government should set. As a final extension
to the baseline model, Section 3.7 combined the model of moral behaviour with a model
of desire for conformity as developed in Ulph and Ulph (2014). The analysis shows that
if people exhibit this desire for conformity, individuals with propensity to act morally
may adhere to a norm that makes them consume more of the dirty good than if they
53The only key result that is different is that that altruism does not necessarily have to lead to a
reduction of consumption with a choice function non-linear in the hypothetical Moral Benefit.
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were not adhering to a norm. And this may also influence some individuals’ decision
whether to adhere to a norm or not since the increase in consumption may mitigate some
of the loss in utility from their propensity to act morally. However, if there is at least one
individual with propensity to act morally and individuals only differ in their propensity
to act morally and the strength of their desire for conformity, the standard Pigovian tax
will still induce everyone to consume the social optimum.
A key assumption of the model developed in this chapter is that the propensity to act
morally for each type of individual is a given and static parameter. There are two ques-
tions that arise from this observation. First, where does the propensity to act morally
come from? This question is researched in a number of disciplines including psychology,
sociology, neuroscience and evolutionary biology (see for example Heinrichs et al. 2013
for a variety of contributions on moral motivation from different fields of research). Ex-
tensions to this chapter could make more detailed links between the insights from those
disciplines and the model developed in this chapter. And second, can the propensity
to act morally be influenced by extrinsic incentives on the dirty good? This addresses
whether the propensity to act morally can be crowded-in or crowded-out by extrinsic in-
centives. Crowding of intrinsic motivation has received a lot of attention in the literature
on pro-social behaviour due to its potential policy relevance.54 Both of these questions
raise the issue of how the propensity to act morally could change over time and it may
be interesting to develop a dynamic model of moral behaviour to address this. In this
context it could be interesting to evaluate whether a temporary tax can crowd-in individ-
uals’ moral behaviour such that the tax becomes redundant at some point or whether the
opposite will occur and the tax crowds out the propensity to act morally, thus making
it even more important that the government continues to set the right tax. Furthermore
this raises the issue of whether, if the government can undertake some action to increase
the propensity to act morally in consumers, there is a case that this may be preferable
compared to setting a higher tax. Of course to develop such a model with reasonable as-
sumptions would require a thorough understanding of the psychological factors that can
influence an individual’s propensity to act morally. In addition, there may be scope to
further develop the model of moral behaviour in combination with conformity and social
norms. For example, it is conceivable that the propensity to act morally is a function of
the share of the population exhibiting some propensity to act morally. This also relates
to the issue of crowding of intrinsic motivation. For example, if the government sets the
right tax this may over time erode the social norm that determines individuals’ propensity
to act morally and may make others also less inclined to act out of moral consideration.
54See Section 3.2.3 for an overview of the literature on crowding of intrinsic motivation.
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At the same time, a temporary tax could create a norm of moral behaviour that may be
able to sustain itself even when that tax is removed.55
55This is ine line with the theory proposed by Nyborg et al. (2006) as described in Section 3.2.1.
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